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ABSTRACT: Emerging from a critique of the concept of “populism” in contemporary 
democratic theory, this dissertation develops a theory of radical democracy based on the politics 
of cooperative movements. I argue that cooperative politics help to clarify a central concern for 
democratic theory that is often obscured by theories of populism: how the popular sovereign can 
develop a form of social interdependence that facilitates their free and equal participation in self-
government. Working through a political history of cooperative movements in the United States 
from the Civil War to the Cold War, my study traces a series of reformulations of the ideal of 
“the cooperative commonwealth,” beginning with the Populist movement and extending through 
the Socialist Party and the work of John Dewey and W.E.B. Du Bois. In the end, I argue that 
cooperative politics requires combining the local work of voluntary cooperation in multiple sites 
of self-organization with efforts to forge alliances among the popular classes centered on a non-
exploitative vision of cooperative interdependence. Such a vision must clarify that cooperation is 
not simply shared instrumental activity, but a form of free association in which participants’ 
personal autonomy is secured by sharing in the inherently collective work of social reproduction. 
Cooperative movements’ reveal how the difficulty of achieving such cooperation is not a natural 
feature of human sociality, but an organizational defect of capitalist societies. Today, the project 
of cooperative democracy does not require an abstract blueprint for the cooperative 
commonwealth, but an archive of lessons based on the history of cooperative struggles.  
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Introduction: Cooperative Democracy Beyond Populism 
 
In both contemporary democratic theory and the public sphere, the idea of populism 
constellates a series of anxieties about the political health of contemporary liberal democracies – 
ranging from the stability of their party-systems to the political culture of their electorates – 
making “populism” one of the most salient terms in contemporary political discourse.1 
According to dominant analytical frames, populism emerges during moments of social crisis, 
when political leaders claim to represent “the people” against a corrupt “elite,” a polarizing form 
of antagonism that transverses the boundaries of right and left and that shapes political conflict in 
the United States, Latin America, Europe, and Asia.2 In the United States, contemporary 
discussions of populism often reference our own People’s Party of the 1890’s – one of the 
original “populist” movements in modern democratic history – but these discussions have often 
obscured, rather than clarified, the democratic significance of the Populist movement and its 
afterlives. The People’s Party is not significant today because it represents one episode in a 
history of adversarial visions of popular unity in American history, but because of its attempt to 
construct an alternative economy based on cooperative democracy.3  
                                                      
1 The academic literature on populism is large and expanding, and discussions of populism in democratic theory are 
but one subset of a general literature that extends throughout political science and related fields. For a recent 
representative survey of the state of the discussion in political science and political theory, see The Oxford 
Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). For radical democratic justifications of populism 
coming from the left see Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), and Chantal Mouffe, For a 
Left Populism (London: Verso, 2018). For contemporary liberal critiques of populism see Jan-Werner Müller, What 
is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) and Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured: 
Opinion, Truth, and the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014). For a journalistic account of the ‘rise 
of populism’ as a defining trend in contemporary politics, see John Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great 
Recession Transformed American and European Politics (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2016). 
2 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
3 A general relationship between populist movements and cooperation is occasionally noted, though rarely explored 
in depth. Peter Wiles, for instance, noted that cooperatives tend to feature in movements labeled “populist,” but 
concluded that the idealization of cooperatives simply pointed to the movements’ characteristic economic 
immaturity. The North American and Russian cases – often thought to be the historical firsts among populist 
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The fact that contemporary conversation tends to ignore the Populists’ efforts to construct 
a cooperative commonwealth is a revealing marker of our distance from their own aspirations. 
For the Populists4 and their successors, the cooperative commonwealth named a democratic 
society where the people are all equal co-participants in the making of their shared future, a form 
of social organization made possible when the gains of social labor redound the common benefit 
of all citizens.5 Among these figures, the concrete, practical meaning of the cooperative 
commonwealth was the subject of contestation, ranging over the kinds of property relations, 
social infrastructure, and forms of political self-organization it would require. Nonetheless, 
cooperators were united by the belief that only a cooperative republic could realize the basic 
promise of popular sovereignty: that the people govern themselves collectively as equals. 
Alongside organizations of artisan laborers, as well as subsequent socialists and radical 
progressives, the Populists were committed to what Beatrice Potter, in her classic study of the 
British cooperative movement, called “the Co-Operative Idea.” She wrote that while “the Creed 
of Universal Competition” held “that the politics and enterprise of the nation should be directed 
solely to the acquisition of territory abroad and to the accumulation of wealth at home,” 
cooperators believed that the goal of a democratic society should be the shared progress of its 
                                                      
movements – both had a cooperative dimension: the Farmer’s Alliance cooperatives in the American case, and the 
idealization of the cooperative nature of the peasant commune in Russian populism. Cooperatives also feature in 
Canadian, Scandinavian, African, and Asian movements labeled “populist.” See Peter Wiles, “A Syndrome, Not A 
Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism,” in Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics ed. Ernest 
Gellner and Ghita Ionescu (USA: Macmillan, 1969), 166-180.  
4 Throughout this study, I use “Populism” to refer to the People’s Party, its affiliated organizations, and its integrated 
reform program (what I call “cooperative market reconstruction”), and “populism” to refer contemporary theories of 
phenomena labeled “populist.” 
5 While this idea of the cooperative commonwealth might immediately identify its aims with those of socialism or 
communism, debates about the nature of cooperation and the political struggles required to achieve it were more 
expansive than these terms suggest today. There can be socialist or communist iterations of the idea of the 
cooperative commonwealth, but as both a practical and conceptual matter, these do not exhaust the possible ways to 
imagine a cooperative democratic society.  
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members: “The wealth of the nation was no longer the goal of political and economic action; it 
was simply a means to an end – the formation of a noble character in the citizen.”6  
Populism’s connection to the cooperative idea disappears from contemporary theories of 
populism not because of empirical ignorance about the Farmers’ Alliance cooperatives at the 
core of the movement, but because of how theories of “populism” mold the phenomena that they 
aim to describe. For both critics and admirers of populist politics, the category of “populism” 
filters the difficulties inherent in the ideal of popular sovereignty through a specific problematic: 
the problems of political identification as a collective “people.”7 Within this identification frame, 
popular sovereignty’s conditions of possibility are premised on the people’s symbolic unity, a 
prerequisite to their ability to forge a common, self-determining will. With identification as the 
guiding concern, democracy’s difficulties revolve primarily around the dynamics of identity-
based forms of inclusion and exclusion (who belongs within a specific vision of “the people”) 
and the nature of political representation in a pluralistic society. In other words, theorists wonder 
if democratic aspirations for ‘rule by the people’ will manifest in tolerant, open-ended efforts to 
build electoral majorities through persuasion, or if they will culminate in the formation of a 
unified popular identity, polarized against the people’s adversaries.8  
                                                      
6 Beatrice Potter, The Co-Operative Movement in Great Britain (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1987 
[1891]), 18-20.  
7 Jason Frank, “Populism and Praxis,” The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
629-644. 
8 While anxieties about popular illiberalism shape the worldview of populism’s liberal critics more than its radical 
democratic admirers like Laclau and Mouffe, their left-populist perspective is also defined by the difficulties of 
melding popular unity and difference within the discourses of popular movements. For them, populist polarization 
actually facilitates a balance between pluralism and unity among social movements, because they believe that unity 
around an enemy is part of what allows a plurality of grievances to coexist. Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘pluralistic’ 
justifications for left-populism are rarely considered by liberal critics who argue that populism is incompatible with 
pluralism tout court. See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London, Verso: 1985). For a compelling argument that Laclau and Mouffe’s focus on the 
discursive dimension of coalition-building is particularly suited to the dynamics of electoral politics rather than the 
formation of concrete social alliances see Ellen Meiksins-Wood, The Retreat from Class: A New ‘True’ Socialism 
(London: Verso, 1986). 
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In this dissertation, I argue that the contemporary preoccupation with populism is based 
on a mistaken assessment of the difficulties inherent in the ideal of popular sovereignty, and that 
when we move beyond populist preoccupations, we can grasp a theory and practice of radical 
democracy centered on the ideal of a cooperative society. At the root of this argument is my 
contention that popular sovereignty’s underlying difficulties do not revolve primarily around the 
people’s symbolic unity, but around the difficulty of creating a shared form of self-government 
that synthesizes personal and collective autonomy through the material organization of social 
reproduction. From this materialist vantage, aspirations immanent to the ideal of popular 
sovereignty – specifically, the aspiration to free and equal participation in the activity of self-
government – need not culminate either in illiberal populism or liberal pluralism. Instead, 
popular sovereignty can manifest in how citizens’ shared control over their common fate is built 
into the infrastructure of a democratic economy and society. Moreover, I argue that the problems 
of inclusion and exclusion in American history are better understood through this materialist lens 
– as struggles not simply over membership in a liberal polity but over the nature of the division 
of labor in a settler colonial society founded on the massive expropriation of land, labor, and 
human possibility.9 
I develop this theoretical argument about the social basis of popular sovereignty 
beginning with a study of the cooperative dimension of Populism and extending into how the 
ideal of the cooperative commonwealth was re-iterated in socialist unions, African-American 
community development initiatives, and Progressive Era efforts to imagine democratic self-
determination in a fully industrialized capitalist society. These initiatives struggled on two 
related fronts: first, they struggled to construct inclusive and practicable experiments in 
                                                      
9 On the vexed relationship between ideals of democratic freedom and settler colonialism in US history see, Aziz 
Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 2010).  
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cooperation, and second, they struggled to generate the constituent power necessary to re-shape 
the basic associational patterns that structured their everyday experience – transforming 
artificially enforced relations of competition and atomization into free and empowered social 
cooperation. The possibility of this transformation does not simply depend on reversing the 
social Darwinian logic of ‘the survival of the fittest’ – making cooperation, not competition, the 
natural basis of social organization. Instead, cooperation was the product of intentionality and 
artifice, and it needed to be created as a shared capacity and institutionalized in democratic 
organizations capable of channeling the people’s political agency in protracted struggles for a 
better society.  
During these struggles, the beginnings of cooperative agency emerged in non-political 
efforts at self-help, where agents sought to resolve discrete problems through collective action. 
Whether they resulted in halting success or outright failure, efforts at cooperative self-help 
proved to many cooperators that the people’s own associational possibilities are limited by 
mutable forms of social and political power. In these moments when social relations seemed 
capable of change, far-sighted cooperators prepared for political challenges to the powerful 
forces that hindered their projects. In each case I examine, the theory and practice of the 
cooperative commonwealth was defined by this relationship between self-help and politics: by 
the dual imperatives to 1) cultivate immediate experiences of cooperative democratic localism 
and 2) to form political agencies adequate for struggle against ruling groups. The move to 
politics not only presumed engaging in conflicts, but it also enlarged the meaning of cooperation: 
cooperation was no longer simply a form of collective action based on shared interests and goals, 
but the guiding ideal for a social order beyond exploitation. The body of my dissertation traces 
these dynamic struggles, exploring not only how they elaborated the practical meaning of 
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“cooperation” itself, but also how the conflicts they generated reveal a specific catalogue of 
obstacles to democratic progress in the United States’ political and social history.  
Ultimately, I argue that this dynamic tension between cooperative self-help and the 
politics of cooperation remains relevant for a new era of capitalist development in the early 21st 
century, where financialization, information technology, and new possibilities for automation 
constitute a new epoch in the history of capitalism and a new terrain of social struggle. In this 
contemporary context, our political alternatives are often presented as a choice between liberal 
democracy and some form of populism (whether on the right or the left). There are powerful 
reasons for this presentation of alternatives: it reflects dominant interpretations of the form that 
intra-party conflict has taken throughout the liberal democratic world. Nevertheless, examining 
the history of cooperative politics and cooperative theory in the United States not only shows 
why a radically democratic alternative to binary choice is possible, but it can also illuminate how 
the cooperative commonwealth can again become a horizon of expectation for democratic 
struggles. The cooperative commonwealth is not a mere historical artifact – a dream that belongs 
to the past and cannot be re-animated. Even in a radically transformed social landscape, the 
capacity for cooperation remains a latent attribute of our sociality, a capacity that requires active 
cultivation and transformations in social infrastructure to become the basis of a more democratic 
society. Then as now, these transformations require political struggle; far from a naïve vision of 
social harmony, social cooperation is a terrain of conflict.  
In the next section of this introduction, I explain why an ideal of cooperation emerged as 
a solution to an internal dilemma in the ideal of sovereign citizenship descended from the 
American revolution, revolving around how it envisioned the relationship between personal and 
collective autonomy in a specific ideology of of ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ labor. I claim 
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that the imperative to discover a form of egalitarian cooperation derives from the need to 
synthesize personal and collective autonomy within a theory and practice of democratic sociality. 
Rather than reconstruct a “radical democratic tradition” cohered by a common intellectual 
conversation,10 I argue that the ideal of the cooperative commonwealth emerged from a 
distinctive problem space that transcended conversations within communities of political 
actors.11 While these tensions around the ideal of sovereign citizenship at times emerged from 
attempts to inscribe citizens in a national democratic project, they are not uniquely “American” – 
as we will see, cooperators consistently defined themselves within an international milieu. At the 
same time, struggles for the cooperative commonwealth are also not “un-American” products of 
foreign collectivist ideologies unsuited to a supposedly inveterate American spirit of competitive 
individualism. Instead, the imperatives to develop cooperative politics emerged from conflicts in 
the simultaneously material and symbolic evolution of the United States during its 
transformation from a burgeoning industrial society into the center of global empire.  
The next section explains what I mean by “cooperation” and “the politics of 
cooperation.” It is crucial at the outset to explain why “cooperation” is a critical concept, since 
the term is often used in generic ways that fail to grasp its polemical meaning. Only when we 
transcend a common-sense notion of cooperation as instrumental collective action can we see 
why it should be understood as a form of free association that gives meaning to the ideal of 
popular self-determination and sets a specific horizon for the project of radical democracy. 
Finally, I explain my project’s scope and its underlying methodology, which bridges the history 
of movements and parties with intellectual history and political theory.  
                                                      
10 For one effort to catalogue a radical democratic tradition in the United States see Marc Stears, Demanding 
Democracy: American Radicals in Search of a New Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
11 My conception of “problem space” is adapted from David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of 
Colonial Enlightenment (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).  
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I. From Identification to Cooperation: The Dilemmas of Sovereign Citizenship 
The underlying premise of democracy is that we are citizens of a self-determining 
society. While this premise already contains the embryo of democracy’s radical ideals – freedom 
through self-determination, self-determination through equal participation, and the imperative of 
solidaristic action – the ideal of collective autonomy does not automatically produce a radical 
interpretation of democracy. Rather, the ideal of a self-determining society is an elementary 
component of normative justifications of democracy throughout its modern history. For figures 
ranging from Alexander Hamilton to John Rawls, democracy implies the ideal of a self-made 
society. Hamilton, for instance, introduced The Federalist Papers hoping that the American 
republic would affirmatively prove “whether societies of men are really capable or not of 
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to 
depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”12 For Rawls, citizens of a 
democracy, “do not regard their social order as a fixed natural order, or as an institutional 
structure justified by religious doctrines or hierarchical principles expressing aristocratic values,” 
but instead understand their society as the product of their own shared activity and amenable to 
change through self-reflection.13 In other words, democracy is not a political order premised on 
subordinate subjects following the commands of an external sovereign under the threat of force, 
but a polity where the people themselves are sovereign, forming a body of associated citizens 
who jointly shape the parameters of their common life.  
Insofar as this basic premise of collective autonomy is understood to define the 
democratic project, democratic theory needs to explain what it means for citizens to participate 
                                                      
12 The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 1961), 1.  
13 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 6.  
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in their shared self-government as the collective sovereign.14 Such an explanation not only 
requires elaborating the status of the individual “citizen” as sovereign (the rights, freedoms, 
duties, and attitudes that define their status), but a sense of the form that citizens’ necessary 
interdependence with one another takes.15 Centering social interdependence reveals how 
democratic aspiration influences society as a whole, affecting the nature of citizens’ self-
perception and their relations with one another beyond the formal avenues of political 
participation.16 To take one representative example from American political culture, Walt 
Whitman represented democratic sovereignty’s broader social and cultural meaning in his poem, 
“The Prairie-Grass Dividing,” which depicts a democratic people through the image of the 
prairie grasses of the American Midwest. Like the sun-lit grasses standing tall against the 
horizon, democratic individuals express personal autonomy as they, “go their own gait, erect, 
stepping with freedom and command – leading not following.” In the same instance, each 
individual, “never constrain’d’ never obedient,” is an equal member of a democratic people, a 
form of association that requires “the most copious and close companionship.”17 In Whitman’s 
vision, personal autonomy manifests in practices of independent self-assertion that do not 
contravene interdependence, but facilitate a specific form of companionship. Since popular 
sovereignty is inherently collective, accounting for the interdependent character of autonomy 
                                                      
14 There is a large debate about sovereignty in contemporary political theory, and many theorists reject the idea of 
sovereignty as inescapably wedded to a variety of social ills, ranging from the lawlessness of emergency rule to a 
modernist ideal of agency as ‘mastery.’ Within this debate, my use of the term popular sovereignty resonates most 
with the perspective of Andreas Kalyvas, who opposes visions of sovereignty premised on command (which fall to a 
number of contemporary criticisms) to popular sovereignty, which is based on the ideals of shared creativity and 
order-institution. See Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power,” 
Constellations 12:2 (2005), 223-244. 
15 For this reason, democratic theory does not simply require a theory of freedom (pace contemporary theories of 
neo-republicanism), but a theory of society and social interdependence.  
16 For one example, see Pierre Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010).  
17 Walt Whitman, “The Prairie-Grass Dividing.” The Walt Whitman Archive 
https://whitmanarchive.org/published/LG/1867/poems/42 (Accessed July 20, 2019). 
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must be an essential part of our theories, and it requires grappling not only with the formation of 
cultural attitudes but with the concrete shape of the social division of labor. Since interdependent 
individuals’ own capacities for agency are shaped by the social relations in which they live, they 
cannot achieve autonomy isolated from society. At the same time, collective autonomy will not 
express self-determination if it does not manifest in the experience of concrete persons. In other 
words, for sovereignty to be popular, it must not only correspond to forms of empowered agency 
experienced by individual citizens, but it must also express relationships of power-sharing 
among them that facilitate their free and equal participation in self-government.  
Defining the forms that democratic interdependence takes is not only a task for social 
theory, but is also a consistent preoccupation in the history of popular movements. As an aspect 
of their shared sovereignty, the people must actively negotiate the terms of their interdependent 
self-government, ensuring that their everyday activity enhances, rather than undermines, their 
joint capacity to subject their society’s development to reflective control. Contrary to these 
expectations, the modern history of democracy does not reveal societies in which popular control 
over decision-making, resource allocation, and the formation of a richer, freer culture steadily 
develops. Instead, capitalist democracies are premised on forms of power that actively inhibit 
efforts to unite social development with the people’s shared autonomy. In US history, the idea of 
“cooperation” emerged as a resolution to this problem of squaring expectations of autonomy 
with interdependence in an emerging capitalist society: how can the social world that the people 
already constitute jointly be brought under their shared, self-reflective control?  
By formulating the difficulties of achieving popular sovereignty through a discussion of 
the social dimensions of autonomy and interdependence, we are already moving away from 
today’s critics of populism. For these theorists, aspirations to collective self-government are 
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acknowledged as a component of the democratic ideal, but they are also viewed with skepticism. 
According to Jan-Werner Müller, sovereign expectations are a reservoir of populist 
identification, and a central task for democratic theory is to protect against their possible 
pathologies. For Müller, populism emerges when political actors generate discursive antagonism 
between “the people,” who are posited as a unitary collective and the seat of sovereignty, and 
“the elite,” who are charged with abrogating the people’s will. The aspiration to sovereignty can 
culminate in populist antagonism since any attempt to formulate a coherent vision of “the 
people” and their will in a pluralistic society creates exclusions and representational distortions, 
making the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty potentially un-democratic in its 
consequences: what appears to activate democracy’s promise of popular rule actually 
undermines the procedures of representation that allow for self-government in a complex, 
diverse, modern society. More concretely, Müller worries that rather than utilize public debate 
and electoral contests to register popular claims, form competing policy agendas, and work out 
compromises in the parliamentary arena, populism threatens to delegitimate these procedures in 
favor of the direct representation of a unity and exclusionary popular will.  
Since Müller derives populism from the very ideal of democratic legitimacy, he does not 
believe that it is a product of foreign barbarians storming the liberal democratic castle. Instead, 
he claims that populism emerges from an intuitively appealing but ultimately impossible “folk 
theory of democracy” that inheres in citizens’ political expectations. According to this folk 
theory, the people are self-governing when, “the people as a whole not only have a common and 
coherent will but also can rule in the sense that the right representatives can implement what the 
people have demanded in the form of an imperative mandate.”18 Since this wish can never be 
                                                      
18 Müller, What is Populism?, 76. Müller does not explain why this is the inevitable formulation sovereign 
expectations in popular culture. It would be better to assess the dynamic ways these expectations manifest in popular 
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fulfilled – the people are always plural and their collective voices are inevitably polyphonic, if 
not cacophonic – the aspiration to popular unity can only manifest in forms of identification that 
construct symbolic surrogates for collective autonomy, either by stressing cultural homogeneity 
among the people (often through a form of ethnic nationalism), or by imagining direct 
identification between the people and a leader who embodies their will outside the established 
procedures of preference aggregation and party competition. The first mode of identification 
undermines the tolerant spirit of a liberal society, while the second undermines the legitimacy of 
competitive pluralism in the political arena. Opposed to these populist forms of democratic 
collectivity, Müller poses an alternative: an inclusive, liberal nationalism that is not premised on 
a homogenizing vision of “the people,” but on shared civic values and commitment to pluralistic 
procedures of democratic decision-making, what he elsewhere calls “constitutional patriotism.”19
 When looking back at the history of populism from this frame, analysts are primed to 
assess how political actors constructed an inclusive and pluralist or exclusive and adversarial 
vision of “the people,” concerns that essentially revolve around the nature of political rhetoric 
and discursive identity-construction.20 For Müller, the anxiety that the aspiration to collective 
autonomy ends up presuming the creation of a homogenous identity makes these concerns 
central. Since we cannot formulate a common will that could form the basis of an imperative 
command to political representatives unless we share a common vision that only identity-based 
homogeneity can provide, the history of democracy can be understood as a battle between 
pluralist representation and populist temptation. This frame of reference constructs a particular 
                                                      
culture, rather than formally derive them from how Müller himself envisions the discursive preconditions for 
popular sovereignty. 
19 Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
20 See ibid., 87-91. For a historical account of American populism that centers political rhetoric over social struggle 
see Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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problem space in which democratic actors operate. Their dilemma is how to devise mechanisms 
of representation that can register a plurality of democratic claims, while avoiding the temptation 
to form a homogeneous sovereign will in response to crises. Democrats have to be active 
emissaries of tolerance and persuasion, hoping to utilize existing institutional procedures to enact 
policy changes that all social sectors have the potential to influence.  
When we look back at the history of Populism, this problem space not only fails to 
illuminate the Populists’ own efforts to develop an alternative economy, but it also misconstrues 
the underlying dilemmas of sovereign citizenship that their projects of cooperation sought to 
resolve.21 As a consequence, the preoccupation with populism is not only a problem for political 
history, but also for political theory, since it misconstrues the identifiable problems endemic to 
constructing an inclusive and transformative democratic politics in the present. At the root of 
these errors is the strong assumption that popular sovereignty requires a common will that can 
function as an imperative command to political representatives. Instead, the Populists showed 
how popular sovereignty can manifest in the people’s shared control of their own social activity. 
In other words, collective autonomy need not rest on the people’s symbolic coherence as a 
collective, but on their capacity to act in relationships of egalitarian cooperation. Rather than 
search for relationships of sameness to cohere their vision of “the people,” the Populists 
attempted to create a form of cooperative association that advanced their shared self-government. 
In these efforts, their obstacle was not pluralistic difference, but their own exploitation and the 
relations of power that a society based on exploitation confers to dominant social groups. 
Asserting that they were sovereign citizens like any other, Populists’ struggles for the 
                                                      
21 To be clear, my claim is that Müller’s conception of populism cannot describe the problem that the People’s Party 
and their legatees set out to address. I will not fully justify the claim that his conception of populism also fails to 
explain what is called “populism” today, but I am also doubtful that his theory has real explanatory power in our 
current context. 
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cooperative commonwealth sought to work out a form of association that simultaneously 
advanced their personal and collective autonomy: in Whitman’s image, it would simultaneously 
facilitate their upright gait and their copious and close companionship. While national 
chauvinism, racism, and sexism can be justified through the image of a restricted demos, we need 
not see these pathologies as immanent to the very idea of democratic self-determination. Instead, 
they derive from a more complex and material history of social development, and they can be 
productively critiqued as violations of democratic sovereignty’s underlying aspiration to 
inclusive power-sharing and creative self-making.   
While the ideal of an egalitarian, solidaristic sovereign citizenry should be normatively 
defended and identified with the cause of democracy, demonstrating why it is not a reservoir of 
“populism” does not imply that is without its own tensions and dilemmas. In my project, there 
are two central tensions that engender difficulties for the project of cooperative democracy and 
define the problem space in which its agents operated, and they both revolve around how 
theories of economy and society conceive of the relationship between personal and collective 
autonomy in material terms. The first revolves around the relationship between the independence 
of sovereign citizens and their underlying interdependence with one another, and the second 
revolves around how, when problems were identified in these relations of independence, a 
political force could be created to transform them. These relations may appear to be under the 
control of the people who participate in them, yet the effort to develop cooperation depends on 
more than the voluntary reorientation of attitudes and habits, but the politics of divesting ruling 
groups of unjust forms of power and creating the infrastructural support for cooperative 
association. We can consider the first the problem of elaborating the social meaning of 
“cooperation” in inclusive, concrete, and critical terms, and the second as the problem of “the 
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politics of cooperation”: how cooperation can not only become an experience of local possibility 
but the horizon of a mass democratic project.   
To grasp the first issue, we can recall that in early American history, the ideal of 
sovereign citizenship centered on the relationship between citizens’ economic independence and 
their political standing, a civic ideal that defined the status of white settlers.22 The ideal of free 
labor as independent labor had a direct antithesis in the widespread forms of dependent labor 
practiced by women and slaves, and it was also contrasted with the colonial perception of 
indigenous societies as ‘non-productive.’ Clearly, independence for some was purchased at the 
expense of the dependence or violent expropriation of others, relations of subordination that were 
naturalized by an ideology of orders that justified excluding some from the democratic sociality 
of free and equal associates. The primary problem here was not that the ‘white settler’ was a 
homogenous identity created so that “the people” could formulate and express their common 
will, but that the reproduction of settler society was structured around various forms of 
expropriation. Moreover, the stratifying ideologies on which settler ideology was based did not 
clarify the nature of social reproduction, but engendered an elementary mystification of social 
relations, based in the very idea of citizens’ “independence” itself. If we consider the early 
republican ideal of independence from a certain perspective, we can see that independence was 
never independent; it was always dependent on the relationships of subordination that sustained 
it. Foisting “independence” as a legitimating ideal was a way to conceal the experience of 
subordinates, since their agency created the conditions for independence even as republican 
ideology presented citizens’ agency as self-standing and self-determining. From this vantage, the 
problem for the ideal of sovereign citizenship is not the latent danger that popular collectivism 
                                                      
22 See Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom 
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will become illiberal and exclusive, but that popular sovereignty would replace the sovereignty 
of the British Crown with the ‘democratic’ sovereignty of petty despots, lording their 
independence over others. In other words, the question is whether the aspiration of the Populist-
descended Huey Long to make “every man a King,” would lay the groundwork for a stratified 
society where the freedom of some is won through the subjection of others, or whether the ideal 
of democratic sovereignty contains principles that can structure a transparent and egalitarian 
division of labor.23  
Often, these tensions between autonomy and interdependence are described in theoretical 
terms as a tension between liberty and equality. While this frame is superior to the 
preoccupations of populism theory, defining the tension in this way is not capacious enough to 
grasp the depth of the problem that the cooperative commonwealth aimed to resolve. To grasp 
this problem, we must clarify why liberty is achieved not only through equality and solidarity, 
but also through collective autonomy. Otherwise, we will not clarify the practical task of 
rendering social interdependence more transparent, subjecting it to the self-reflective control of 
all of the participants whose own activity constitutes society. To take an recent and illuminating 
example, Alex Gourevitch calls the question of whether the freedom of some always depends on 
the servitude of others “the paradox of slavery and freedom,” and he posits universalizing 
republican independence as a conceptual and practical solution to the paradox.24 Following the 
lead of 19th century workers, Gourevitch’s solution offers a specific vision of how autonomy and 
interdependence can be squared: a form of cooperative association must be worked out that 
allows everyone to experience personal independence. In his telling, this meant adapting the 
                                                      
23 On the relationship between Huey Long and Populism see, Alan Brinkley Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father 
Coughlin & The Great Depression (New York: Vintage Books, 1983).  
24 Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the 19th 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 16.  
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early republican view that independence requires control over productive property to social 
conditions where control over productive property can only be collective. Initially, the idea of 
republican independence manifested in the yeoman ideal that control over landed property could 
secure independence, or alternatively, in the artisan vision that control over the tools and terms 
of labor could guarantee independence.25 When forms of property developed that could only be 
operated collectively, workers sought to discover a form of cooperation that would preserve their 
independence as sovereign citizens by devising forms of joint control over productive resources.  
Gourevitch’s argument lucidly shows how the expectations of sovereign citizens 
manifested in the late 19th century in cooperative, non-populist ways, and though his argument is 
centered on the Knights of Labor, it could easily apply to similar ideological innovations by their 
coalition-partners in the agrarian Populist movement, as I show in the first chapter. At the same 
time, resolving the paradox of slavery and freedom does not merely require recovering a “lost 
language of freedom,”26 but critical reflection on the nature of democratic sociality. It is clear, 
for instance, that Gourevitch’s labor republicans envisioned “cooperation” as a form of industrial 
self-government at the level of the enterprise, but it is not clear from his account whether they 
envisioned a fully social form of cooperation that gave shape to a democratic society.27 The 
vision of the cooperative commonwealth that emerges is a society of autonomous cooperative 
                                                      
25 The example of land-ownership already belies that landed property was premised on “independence” for three 
clear reasons. First, the land was converted to private property through colonialism. Second, the operation of a 
family farm is a collective, not an individual pursuit. Third, yeomen were frequently not subsistence producers, so 
emphasizing their “independence” belied their dependence on the market. The narrative of “landed independence” 
rests on rendering invisible colonialism, the dependent labor of women and children, and forms of market-
dependence that actually structured society.  
26 Ibid., 10.  
27 Gourevitch is well aware of Knights’ struggles to gain a foothold in local markets, but rather than illuminate their 
attempts to resolve these problems through practical innovation and social theory, he commits them to a form of 
voluntarism that sees the struggle for the cooperative commonwealth as fundamentally a project of creating 
voluntary organizations and re-organizing attitudes and habits. See ibid., 168. The Knights horizons were not limited 
to this sort of voluntarism, though it did exist their organization. 
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organizations that relate to one another in an unspecified way, replicating the problem of the 
“independence” of the yeoman or artisan at the level of the jointly owned enterprise. Concretely, 
what is swept aside here is whether a competitive market for basic necessities is compatible with 
democratic, social cooperation.28 In this way, the project of universalizing independence 
reproduces a version of the same problem that plagued early republicanism: positing as 
“independent” experiences that are structured by primary forms of dependence on others, in this 
case through commodity markets and the social infrastructure that creates them.  
More importantly, since all forms of neo-republicanism envision freedom negatively (as 
“non-domination”), they obscure the positive democratic problem of rendering society more 
amenable to the shared, self-reflective control of those who compose it. In fact, cooperation was 
not only formulated as a solution to the problem of domination, but to the problems of 
heteronomy (being governed by a system of law that you did not co-author) and alienation (being 
estranged from the powers that you exercise). Within democratic movements, these problems run 
together and they should be comprehended together. Bringing these issues into our account does 
not require abstractly imagining a fully dis-alienated society; instead, we can see achieving a 
greater degree of collective autonomy as a cultural achievement that must be progressively won 
and that can be undone. Whether or not a form of social organization can be devised that ensures 
that autonomy is not won through subjection is not something that can be proved in the abstract; 
it can only be demonstrated experimentally and extended in a process of political struggle. For 
this reason, the problems posed by the ideal of interdependent sovereign citizens do not merely 
require a theory of freedom, but a theory of how forms of social relation can be transformed 
                                                      
28 Outside his critique of the arbitrary power of employers over workers, Gourevitch is concerned with 
proletarianized labor’s dependence on the market. But rather than reflect on the generalized market dependence 
produced by capitalism, Gourevitch is preoccupied with only one facet of this dependence: the imperative to enter 
the labor market. See ibid., 161.  
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through politics. For such a theory, we need to begin to define cooperation and the politics of 
cooperation more concretely. 
 
II. Defining Cooperation: From Non-Instrumental Solidarity to Political Struggle 
One of the reasons why Populism’s legacy as a cooperative movement remains obscured 
in both political history and political theory is that problems endemic to theories of populism 
have not been alleviated by theories of democratic cooperation. While the idea of “cooperation” 
is an elementary term in the social sciences, we lack political theories of cooperation that are tied 
to the specific experiences of cooperative movements.29 As a result, our ideas about cooperation 
are often overly generic and detached, since they lack elaboration by the historical experiences of 
agents struggling to develop cooperative social relations. While an exhaustive survey of theories 
of cooperation in the social sciences is outside the scope of this introduction, it is useful to draw 
a basic contrast between ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ visions of cooperation. While 
cooperative movements rest on both, they carry the potential to generate non-instrumental 
solidarities in ways that many theories fail to grasp. Moreover, non-instrumental elements of the 
idea of cooperation are essential to give meaning to the cooperative commonwealth as a horizon 
of democratic expectation.  
According its literal, etymological meaning – co or “with” and operare or “to act” or “to 
work” – “cooperation” can denote a wide variety of social activities. According to prevalent 
game-theoretic assumptions, cooperation indicates collaborative activity for a common goal, as 
                                                      
29 Jean-Françios Draperi, for instance, notes how the development in the idea of “cooperation” in classical sociology 
generally proceeded without reference to the unique experiences of cooperatives or cooperative movements. See 
Draperi, “From Cooperative Theory to Cooperative Practice,” Revue Internationale de L’Economie Sociale. 
http://recma.org/sites/default/files/FROM_COOPERATIVE_THEORY_TO_COOPERATIVE_PRACTI
CE.pdf (Accessed July 23, 2019).  
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opposed to competition over a scarce good. If we take theories of instrumental rationality as our 
starting point, our ideas about cooperation often reduce it to collective action toward a shared 
end: we cooperate when we want something we can only achieve through the assistance of 
others. In the instrumentalist frame, cooperation is only possible when we have shared, non-rival 
ends, since an arena of scarcity necessitates competition among self-seeking individuals over a 
finite set of goods. In this framework, “cooperation” simply refers to how groups generate joint 
effort for shared goals, and says nothing else about the nature of their collective action (whether 
it is egalitarian or hierarchical or whether the ends of action are understood in flatly instrumental 
terms or have fuller meaning). By contrast, non-instrumental cooperation names relationships 
with a more open-ended telos: cooperators’ own self-governing association. Conceived in this 
way, non-instrumental cooperation does not require a heroic form of altruism, nor does it require 
a utopian vision of a society without conflict.30 Instead, democratic cooperation centers an 
ethical commitment that is simultaneously more simple and more powerful: that the inherently 
collective nature of all social progress demands that everyone who generates that progress should 
benefit on equal terms.  
In general, democratic collective action involves cooperation of the instrumental kind. 
Citizens often come together because of shared interests and common goals, and these 
experiences themselves often create habits of collective action that enhance democratic sociality. 
Indeed, I argue that the seedbeds for the cooperative commonwealth are precisely these kinds of 
experiences of community self-help. The Alliance movement, labor organizations, W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s study of the “group economy” among black Americans, and John Dewey’s theory of 
                                                      
30 These ideals often derive from reductive interpretations of communitarian movements, like Owenism or 
Fourierism. Laclau would perhaps call such ideals as an instance of “The various myths of the totally reconciled 
society” which he charges with eliminating the possibility of politics. See Laclau, On Populist Reason, 63.   
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democratic problem-solving all illuminate how these elementary efforts to band together to 
resolve popular problems is an initial locus of democratic possibility. In these moments, 
cooperation is not created out of a pre-existing atomic individualism. Instead, what makes 
cooperative self-help distinctive is not that many are formed into one, but that existing forms of 
social interdependence are re-worked, creating a distinction between the experience of 
empowered cooperation and the regular pattern of association, which has failed to synthesize 
personal autonomy with collective self-determination. For some cooperators, these moments 
created a distinctive form of democratic politicization, making the horizon of an alternative 
society perceptible. As one iron molder put it in a letter to his union journal: “I do not think I 
ever thought so much about any one subject before in my life. You know that workingmen do 
not have much time to think about anything else than how to best keep hunger, nakedness, and 
cold from becoming members of his family; but, somehow, this thing called cooperation got such 
a hold on me that I have been, in a manner, lost to everything else. I have dreamed about it, 
thought about it in the shop, on the street, at church, in fact, everywhere.”31 
Axel Honneth has clarified the meaning of such cooperation in a recent book about the 
original meaning of socialism. While not all cooperators were socialists, the socialist critique 
illuminates something essential about how a non-instrumental vision of cooperation can emerge 
from elementary experiences of solidaristic action. In Honneth’s view, early socialists, 
“employed categories such as “association”, “cooperation”, and “community” in order to make 
clear that their very different economic models were based on the principle that the self-
fulfillment of each must depend on the self-fulfillment of the other.”32 For socialists, another 
                                                      
31 Quoted in Steve Leikin, The Practical Utopians: American Workers and the Cooperative Movement in the Gilded 
Age (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), 28.  
32 Axel Honneth, The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal trans. Joseph Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 13. 
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individual is not seen as the potential obstacle to my freedom, nor as an instrumental means for 
fulfilling it. Instead, free cooperation implies the recognition among society’s members that their 
own self-fulfillment is inextricably bound to the self-fulfillment of all. As Honneth helpfully 
notes, many socialists did not understand this vision of cooperative social solidarity as merely an 
ethical exhortation seeking to change attitudes, enjoining people to subjectively perceive others’ 
freedom as a condition of their own. Instead, they saw cooperation as an objective, but 
incompletely realized principle of the social division of labor, distorted by the capitalist market 
economy. The social division of labor necessarily creates interdependence, but this 
interdependence is “systematically concealed by capitalist relations of production: Although 
subjects produce in order to satisfy economic demand, and thus the needs underlying this 
demand, they are not motivated by concern for the needs of others, but solely by their own 
egocentric interest in increasing their own utility.”33 As Honneth clarifies, these positions emerge 
from immanent critique: market exchange only functions insofar as it satisfies common needs, 
yet it is not pursued for the sake of these needs, but only for the sake of private profit. The 
intermediation of interdependence by market exchange means that “in this society … each 
member is only a “merchant” for the other,” so that, “in capitalism, freedom means viewing 
others as a mere means.”34 In socialist cooperation, the mutual interdependence inherent to the 
division of labor is openly recognized (rather than repressed through the atomizing logic of 
commodity production and sale35) which “means that individual intentions must be so clearly 
interlinked that we can only achieve our aims cooperatively, conscious of our dependence on 
                                                      
33 Ibid., 17. 
34 Ibid., 16, 18. 
35 Honneth is operating with one of Marx’s early critiques of John Stuart Mill, before Marx had developed his theory 
of commodity fetishism. His discussion would have been enriched by integrating the component of reification into 
this relationship: the experience of interdependence (social relations) becomes transposed onto the relationship 
between things (money and commodities). See Marx, Capital, 163-177.  
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each other.”36 When we grasp how our shared dependence on one another is a concrete condition 
for our individual self-fulfillment – each one of us requires the social contributions of others as a 
basic pre-condition for free self-development – it opens the possibility to conceive of the shared 
development of all as the ideal guiding our interaction. This would imply a real ‘working 
together,’ not in the sense that our private aims simply happen to coincide, but in the sense that 
we formulate our aims collectively in democratic deliberation: we “do not merely act “together,” 
but “for each other”” in non-instrumental relations of solidarity.37 In other words, satisfying the 
needs of others (and having our needs satisfied in return) is an elementary condition of sociality, 
which, when elevated to a principle of association, can become a guiding rationale for the re-
formulation of social relations. As a consequence, the ideal of cooperation has an immediate 
critical component: the social labor of all cannot merely serve the private luxury of the few, but 
its surplus must be invested in the common elevation of the entire community, considered as 
equal.  
As Honneth begins to clarify, cooperation is not a form of altruism, nor does it describe a 
perfectly harmonious society; instead, it names an ongoing project of self-reflective, democratic 
interdependence whose goal is the free self-government of its members.38 For Honneth, social 
cooperation has no discrete goal. Glimpsed when Potter called the telos of cooperation “the 
formation of a noble character in the citizen,” or when Whitman referred to the “copious and 
close companionship” of democratic peoplehood, the ends of cooperation must be themselves 
‘open-ended.’ Today, the purpose of economic activity is almost uniformly presented as 
                                                      
36 Honneth, The Idea of Socialism, 18.  
37 Ibid., 23. 
38 It might be helpful to state that Honneth’s and my position rest on rejecting any attempt to separate political self-
determination from social activity, and therefore rejects the separation of the economic and political endemic to 
capitalism (created by the artificial legal construction of a “private” economy). See Ellen Meiksins-Wood, “The 
Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism,” New Left Review 1:127 (May/June 1981), 66-95. 
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economic growth, indexed to the ongoing profitability of a capitalist economy. Capitalist growth 
offers a number of tangible benefits to workers and consumers, but it not only systematically 
enriches the few at the expense of the many, but it prostrates our activity to the imperatives of a 
social system that we set it into motion on a daily basis but cannot democratically control. The 
cooperative commonwealth has no such discrete end. Instead, its goal is the shared progress of 
its members, however that progress is worked out in their free association. Giving concrete 
meaning to this abstract formulation is what the Populists, Socialists, and radical progressives 
did in both theory and practice. 
Beyond the difficulties of formulating the meaning of cooperation within organizations of 
self-help, cooperation also became a political struggle. The politics of cooperation forces us to 
recognize that society is not a neutral terrain for our experiments, but a terrain of conflict. While 
defending an experimentalist attitude toward social change, we need to grasp how political 
experimentation fundamentally occurs within asymmetries of power and insist that the only 
alternative to these constraints is transformation, not escape. In Honneth’s conception of 
experimentalism, the dimension of conflict is left unclear. For his democratic socialism, “The 
addresses of socialist experimental insights will no longer be the members of a certain social 
group, but all citizens – provided the latter are convinced that their individual freedom can only 
be realized through cooperation in solidarity in significant spheres of life. The guarantee for the 
realizability of socialism will no longer be the existence of a social movement with 
corresponding aims, but the capacity to bring about institutional reforms within the given social 
reality – reforms that point toward future change.”39 Too little is said here since even reforms 
require their own agencies – parties, parliaments, and movements – whose development is 
                                                      
39 Ibid., 74. 
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always a political struggle in an unequal society. When Rosa Luxemburg criticized Eduard 
Bernstein’s idea that socialism could be gradually created “by means of the progressive 
extension of social control and the gradual application of the principle of cooperation,” she was 
partly targeting how the socialist demand for workers’ cooperative control of their labor cut to 
the root of capitalist society’s organization, precipitating an elementary conflict that required an 
integrated theory and practice of popular struggle as a condition of its victory.40 Any account of 
the politics of cooperation cannot repeat Bernstein’s problem, but must clarify the depths of the 
difficulties that cooperative movements face.  
Rather than insist abstractly on the imperative of revolutionary politics, an account of the 
politics of cooperation should proceed dynamically, exploring a multiplicity of avenues for 
social transformation that integrate voluntary localism, social reform, and large-scale collective 
action. A dynamic account of the politics of cooperation refuses to identify the project of 
cooperative democracy with a single strategy. To take the case of another contemporary advocate 
of cooperative democracy, James Tully defends a tradition of a cooperative democracy based 
fundamentally on withdrawal: cooperation, he claims, is fundamentally about divesting from 
exploitative institutions and setting up parallel cooperative societies at the margins of 
exploitative economies. For Tully, this cooperative tradition’s aim, “is to refuse to cooperate 
with this undemocratic and unjust mode of production and consumption; to withdraw one’s 
producing and consuming capabilities from commodification; and to exercise productive and 
consumptive capabilities ‘in common’ in democratically run cooperatives that are re-embedded 
in the surrounding social relationships.”41 Strategies of withdrawal have clear limitations in the 
                                                      
40 Rosa Luxemburg, The Essential Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution and the Mass Strike ed. Helen Scott 
(Chicago: Haymarket, 2008), 44. 
41 James Tully, “To Ways of Realizing Justice and Democracy: Linking Amartya Sen and Elinor Ostrom,” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16:2 (2013), 228.  
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case of the majority of society’s wage-earners – who cannot simply withdraw from the labor 
market – setting a strong limit to how ‘democratic’ and inclusive Tully’s vision of cooperative 
democracy could be. Yet rather than fully reject parallel organization, a contemporary account of 
the politics of cooperation can emphasize learning from what can be done where, and how the 
integration of a diverse set of cooperative institutions could constellate into a real movement 
with a shared determination of purpose and a shared horizon of expectation.  
 
III. From Cooperation to the Cooperative Commonwealth, in History and Theory  
The democratic project I call “the politics of cooperation” is not derived from 
philosophical reflection on the nature of egoism or altruism, but is shaped by an investigation 
into the struggles and experiments of cooperative movements within a specific society – the 
United States from the Civil War to the Cold War. Rather than project an abstract vision of a 
totally reconciled community, I argue that these movements and their allied intellectuals 
formulated a theory and practice of democratic cooperation based on their struggles to re-shape 
associational life so that political and social power could be shared. Their effort to synthesize 
personal and collective autonomy did not require the formation of a homogenous cultural 
identity opposed to pluralism, and it did not simply cohere around the figure of a political enemy. 
Instead, it emerged out of practical experiments to reformulate associational life. The ideal that 
these movements generated – the cooperative commonwealth – rested fundamentally on a the 
reformulation of democratic critiques of political economy that crystalized the laboring 
majority’s hope that their common labor could redound to their mutual benefit. These critiques 
were based on confrontation with concrete difficulties, and alongside their innovations, we can 
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elaborate the meaning of “cooperation” beyond its generic connotations and grasp its importance 
for democratic theory and democratic politics.  
In selecting my cases, I prioritized two issues. First, I chose movements and figures who 
primarily saw in Populism the hope of creating an alternative cooperative economy. In other 
words, they saw Populism beyond the narrow preoccupations that have come to dominate 
contemporary populism theory. These figures either shared direct allegiance with the movement 
– as in the case of the Knights of Labor and Eugene Debs – or they looked back on the 
movement as a site of cooperative possibility. Second, I chose figures who specifically 
formulated a radical vision of cooperation linked to the promise of popular autonomy. What 
unites these figures is a common problem: how can a society of sovereign citizens create a form 
of interdependence that synthesizes their personal and their shared autonomy in practices of 
cooperation? After formulating this problem, these figures entered into a practical terrain of 
struggle against forces impeding the development of cooperative association, ranging from the 
inaccessibility of finance and capital for cooperative enterprise, the control over society’s means 
of self-reproduction vested in the hands of a capitalist class, the difficulties of forming durable 
self-managing organizations that could achieve the necessary scale for protracted efforts at social 
change, the imperative to balance direct control and accountable representation, and a working 
class divided by race, gender, and skill. These are well-worn problems for democracy that many 
have struggled to resolve in both theory and practice. What makes this project distinctive is that 
it explores them with a specific horizon of expectation and with emphasis on a specific 
democratic problematic: how the organization of economy and society can be reworked to 
synthesize our personal and collective autonomy, giving meaning to the ideal of popular 
sovereignty in practices of social cooperation. Based on these common traits, these figures can 
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be meaningfully put in conversation, despite the numerous missed encounters between them in 
political and intellectual history.  
In the first chapter, I outline the politics of cooperation in the Populist movement. While 
theories of “populism” prime interpreters to see the Populist division between “the people” and 
“the money power” as the effect of political antagonism, I argue that it was fundamentally rooted 
in the Populists’ producerist theory of political economy. Derived from critiques that saw 
concentrated financial power as the driving force behind the maldistribution of wealth, the 
Populist critique of the money power animated what I call a politics of “cooperative market 
reconstruction” centered on the aspiration for democratic banking, social control of the means of 
distribution and communication, and public ownership of natural monopolies. Derived from mid-
19th century visions of egalitarian commercial sociality and the concrete experiences of agrarian 
and proto-industrial producers, the Populists envisioned ‘cooperation’ as a social arrangement 
where all producers receive the full value for their labor in a politically constructed market. In 
such a commonwealth, the rewards to capital and the rewards of labor could be balanced and the 
equal rights of both respected, ensuring that labor retains the bulk of the value it produced. More 
than ‘regulation’ of a pre-existing, naturalized market, the Populists’ envisioned distribution and 
exchange as amenable to democratic political reconstruction, like any sphere of social life. 
Moreover, rather than constitute a merely ‘agrarian’ class program, the Populist vision of 
cooperative market reconstruction was broadly shared by labor organizations from the National 
Labor Union to the Knights of Labor, and it represented a practical locus of farmer-labor unity 
and social alliance. Far from capitulation to the direction of American social and political 
development, the Populist vision constituted an existential challenge to the privileges of the few, 
a dynamic reflected in their tense struggles over the formation and development of agrarian 
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wholesale cooperatives, workers cooperatives, and the People’s Party itself. Since the social 
conditions for the development of cooperation were thwarted by the existing social order, the 
Populists realized that a new political party was necessary as a vehicle for their project, and their 
independent program took its constructive rationale from their specific vision of the cooperative 
commonwealth.  
In the second chapter, I examine how the idea of the cooperative commonwealth was 
reformulated within the American socialist movement, and I center my analysis on the figure of 
Eugene Debs. Debs was allied to the Populist movement in his early career as a trade unionist, 
and he shared the Populists’ basic conviction that if labor were accorded its equal rights 
alongside capital, its social standing would dramatically improve. Rather than adjust these 
relations through banking reform and market reconstruction, Debs initially imagined cooperation 
emerging from the protection of workers’ collective autonomy on the job through strong 
unionism. If workers’ could set the terms of their own labor and retain the value of their social 
contributions in the form of high wages, cooperation could occur between capital and labor on a 
footing of equality. After repeated failures to develop this kind of unionism, Debs became a 
socialist, which meant that he no longer believed that any free power-sharing between capital 
and labor was possible. Instead, Debs believed that capitalist power – rooted in the command of 
labor made possible by private ownership of means of production that could only be socially 
operated – needed to be abolished as a precondition for social cooperation. Unlike the Populist 
view, Debs’s vision of the cooperative commonwealth was not predicated on producers receiving 
the full value of their labor in the market, but on producers receiving their socially due share of 
collectively produced wealth, measured both in egalitarian opportunities for private consumption 
and in a democratic reinvestment of the social surplus around the ideal of public luxury. Not only 
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would socialist cooperation imply more freedom to set the terms of work in collective 
deliberation, but it would also imply greater freedom from work in a social environment 
organized around opportunities for shared self-development instead of the narrower goal of 
maximized private consumption. Instead of a ‘commercial’ form of sociality, Debs envisioned 
production and distribution organized within democratically controlled industrial structures, 
enhanced by the achievements of science and technology, and operated by workers educated to 
understand the full scope of their role in the division of labor. And instead of forming 
autonomous cooperative organizations parallel to the capitalist economy, Debs sought to 
transform an existing social movement – the labor movement – into a site of the formation of 
cooperative agency through a theory and practice of socialist unionism. Capitalist domination 
meant that large-scale means of cooperation were inaccessible to workers as an autonomous 
collective, so a movement must be built to wrest these productive powers from capital and 
deliver them to freely associated labor. Doing so not only required ideologically converting 
workers to the cause of socialism in electoral politics, but connecting the praxis of the labor 
movement to socialist aspirations, a link that could begin to prove in practice how the embryo of 
workers’ comprehensive self-government existed in embryo in the present order.  
Next, I discuss the reformulation of the cooperative commonwealth ideal in the political 
theory of John Dewey. While the Socialists had already begun to update the theory and practice 
of cooperative democracy for a mature industrial society, Dewey continues this trajectory by 
linking the aspiration to social cooperation with his specific theory of social intelligence. Like 
Populists and Socialists, Dewey aspired to unite the people’s everyday activity with their 
collective autonomy, a process that he originally formulated along neo-Hegelian lines in his early 
ethical writings. Rather than base cooperation in a theory of political economy, Dewey’s vision 
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of the cooperative commonwealth foregrounded ethical concerns, which contributed to both the 
power and limitations in his theory. Defending democracy from its elitist critics, Dewey’s early 
writings posited a radical vision of dis-alienated popular self-government, effected by the ethical 
unity of citizens who contribute to the common work of reproducing society while finding 
personal self-realization in social activity. In Dewey’s subsequent philosophical trajectory, the 
attempt to unify the general (the collective good) and the particular (individual self-realization) 
within the formation of ethical culture was transposed onto the terrain of a pragmatic theory of 
action. Dewey now looked to practices of collective problem-solving as a site where relations of 
social cooperation are developed. Despite his occasional description of pragmatism as 
‘instrumentalism,’ Dewey ultimately did not restrict cooperation to the instrumental pursuit of 
the solutions to discrete problems, but envisioned it as a general practice of free association 
oriented toward the shared growth of a community of inquirers. When democratic communities 
work jointly to solve problems, they constitute and re-constitute a social infrastructure of 
practices, institutions, and material resources that compose their society and condition the 
possibility of its free development. Rather than reflect the logic of industrializing capitalism, 
Dewey understood his vision of cooperative intelligence as incompletely realized by capitalism, 
and he lamented not only how workers’ intelligent contributions to society did not ensure their 
fair share of the surplus, but also how the domination of class interests within society prevented 
the free development of social intelligence and restricted democratic cultural advance. As an 
alternative, Dewey oriented his vision of social democracy around what I call “the infrastructure 
of intelligence” – the social conditions that would allow for all citizens to participate in the 
resolution of their common problems, a form of free association akin to that of scientific 
communities. To secure the infrastructure of intelligence, Dewey also ultimately favored the idea 
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of forming a broad-based, independent popular party as a vehicle, and I argue that Dewey’s 
normative account the centrality of social intelligence for democratic progress can justify 
coercive action towards powerful interests. 
Finally, I examine how W.E.B. Du Bois integrated a more thorough appreciation of the 
formative role of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction into a history of capitalist 
development, interventions that conditioned his own unique vision of the cooperative 
commonwealth. From his earliest sociological studies, Du Bois examined the history of what he 
called “the group economy” within African-American political culture, an arrangement of 
practices he understood as a form of social cooperation. In his early years, he praised the group 
economy as a strategy for building black wealth. In his later years, he began to believe that the 
African-American predicament was not rooted in poverty, but in exploitation, and gravitated 
toward a socialist conception of cooperation as a resolution. Radical Reconstruction had been 
based on the aspiration to democratize capital and create a society based on equal opportunity. 
By the 1930’s, Du Bois believed that these aspirations were no longer practically feasible. With 
black Americans shut out of most facets of economic life, including the labor movement, Du 
Bois chose to reformulate his conception of the group economy around the formative power of 
consumer cooperatives. Du Bois believed that the democratic community planning made 
possible by consumer cooperation would create an empowered constituency for socialism among 
black Americans, which he hoped to connect with the progressive wings of the labor movement 
and international allies to build a common front against capitalism and imperialism. While Du 
Bois began to favor more aggressive measures to combat the unconstrained power of wealthy 
elites – reflecting on the model of Reconstruction’s suppression of attempts to restore slavery 
and white supremacy after the Civil War – he remained hopeful that a peaceful transition to 
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socialism was possible if the majority of the world’s population could strive for a society that did 
not reproduce war, theft, and plunder as it engaged in the inherently beneficent work of 
providing for its common needs. 
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“Equal Rights to All and Special Privileges to None”: Populism and the Politics of Cooperative 
Market Reconstruction 
“It is strange that a feature so important as co-operation should engage so little of the public 
attention. It is one of the grandest themes for the contemplation of mankind.” – W. Henry Morgan, 
History of the Wheel and Alliance and the Impending Revolution (1891)42  
 
Cooperative experiments were a general feature of late-19th century popular politics, and 
the People’s Party was their most powerful political creation. According to the historian 
Lawrence Goodwyn, the Populist ethos was forged in the Farmers’ Alliances, an agrarian self-
help movement that cultivated “a massive cooperative vision of a new way to live” as an 
alternative to the tenancy regime that defined the post-Reconstruction organization of 
agriculture.43 From its earliest emergence in the 1870’s through its rise and decline over the next 
two decades, Alliances experimented with a variety of strategies for local self-help, ranging from 
direct action against evictions and land enclosures, to boycotts, selective buying agreements with 
local merchants, and cooperative enterprise.44 More than any of their experiments, cooperatives 
provided an immediate alternative to tenancy by creating a parallel economy through farmers’ 
own self-organization. Through cooperative warehouses that collectively purchased farm 
equipment, sold crops, and sought credit, the Alliances became “the most nearly successful effort 
at counter-institutional change ever attempted in this country.”45 When Alliance members 
realized that economic cooperation alone could not address the roots of the legal, financial, and 
                                                      
42 W. Henry Morgan, History of the Wheel and Alliance and the Impending Revolution (St. Louis: C.B. Woodward 
Company, 1891), 209.  
43 Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), xi. The analysis of crop-lien system and sharecropping arrangements as forms of “tenancy” comes 
from Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure: The Southern Farmers’ Alliance and Cotton 
Tenancy, 1880-1890 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 20-33.  
44 For a concise and thorough overview of Alliance activities see Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, 
Workers and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 117-133.  
45 Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, 15.  
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political power arrayed against them, they created a new party – the People’s Party – to secure 
lasting change.  
While the Populists’ philosophy of cooperation was central to their movement, it has 
proven difficult to theoretically reconstruct. Without a clear sense of the social, economic, and 
political dimensions of their theory and practice of cooperation, the Populists’ unique vision of 
cooperative democracy remains obscure. Accounts of the movement that subsume it within a 
general history of “populism” tend not to interrogate the political or economic dynamics of 
cooperation. Instead, when confronted with the Populists’ “producerist” rhetoric, these accounts 
often center how antagonism between “the people” and “the elite” mobilized protest, focusing on 
the movement’s sense of collective identity and its ability to navigate the dynamics of inclusion 
and exclusion within an identitarian framework.46 In this way, populism theory tends to displace 
a thorough explication of the critique of political economy that inspired Populist producerism 
and structured their vision of social democracy. While the People’s Party used “populist” 
rhetoric, their organizations targeted a deeper problem for democracy that exceed the populist 
analytical frame: how self-organized democratic collectives can generate the power to 
reconstruct their own social relations. Beyond representing “the people,” the Alliances’ 
cooperative struggles developed popular power by re-shaping the possibilities of democratic 
association. Through politicizing their cooperative organizations, Populists did not simply target 
                                                      
46 For the consequences of centering a “populist” frame to assess the People’s Party and its legacies see Michael 
Kazin, The Populist Persuasion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Kazin, for instance, titles his chapter on the 
Populists “The Righteous Commonwealth of the Late Nineteenth Century” not the cooperative commonwealth. 
Kazin’s arguments are frequently invoked in Müller, What is Populism? and Laclau, On Populist Reason. For an 
alternative, deeper framework that locates Populist difficulties with exclusion and inclusion within a social, legal, 
and ideological history of settler empire, see Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 176-263. For a parallel critique of the limitations of an identification framework to 
understand the People’s Party, see Jason Frank, “Populism and Praxis.” 
 41 
an unrepresentative “elite,” but organized a challenge to an entire social infrastructure that 
exploited the people’s labor (what they often called “the money power”47).  
When the Populist critique of political economy is explored by historians, its cooperative 
dimension is rarely theoretically reconstructed on its own terms.48 In part, confusion results from 
how the movement’s multiple ideological resonances have tempted interpreters to cast the 
Populist experience according to a pre-given ideological mold, each of which has its own 
political-economic assumptions that shape what “cooperation” might mean. For different 
commentators, the Populists have appeared as representatives a permanent liberal consensus at 
the heart of American political culture,49 as an embryonic force for socialism,50 or as a clue to the 
moods and anxieties of the mid-20th century right.51 Grasping the Populists’ vision of 
cooperative democracy requires suspending these assumptions and directly examining the 
development of their organizations and ideology. Rather than interpret the Populists through 
subsequent ideological formations, understanding their theory and practice of cooperation 
requires reconstructing how Populists and their allies transformed inherited democratic ideals 
about citizens’ autonomy according to shifting experiences of exploitation and new possibilities 
for collective empowerment. Only then can we understand why they turned to cooperation, first 
as a strategy of self-help, and later as the guiding ideal for a democratic society.     
                                                      
47 For Richard Hoftstadter, the Populists’ invocation of “the money power” was an aspect of their “paranoid” 
conception of history as the product of conspiracies. Hoftstadter’s claim overlooks how the idea of the money power 
had an actual genealogy in farmer and labor movements, which I trace below. See Richard Hoftstadter, The Age of 
Reform: From Byran to FDR (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 70-81.  
48 For the most thorough attempt to assess the Populist theory of political economy and its relation to their general 
vision of politics and society, see Bruce Palmer, “Man Over Money”: The Southern Populist Critique of American 
Capitalism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980).  
49 Louis Hartz collapses Populism into Bryanism and Bryanism into a generic “American democracy” hardly 
different from Jacksonianism. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American 
Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, 1955), 174. 
50 Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 12.  
51 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 19-21.  
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 As many scholars have noted, the locus of the Populists’ social critique was what 
Goodwyn called “the greenback critique of American finance capitalism.” 52 At the same time, 
Goodwyn and others have often left the connection between the push for greenback currency and 
the ideal of cooperation unclarified. By reconstructing the origins of the greenback critique, its 
connections with inherited conceptions of equality and popular sovereignty, and how both labor 
and agrarian reformers reformulated it after the Civil War, we can better understand the 
idiosyncratic nature of the Populists’ reform program. At their most radical, greenbackers did not 
simply seek to stimulate economic activity through inflation by replacing the gold standard with 
the government-issued currency, as a number of its prominent advocates did argue.53 Instead, 
popular appropriations of greenbackism gravitated toward its specific critique of exploitation, 
which rested on the cardinal cooperative demand that all producers receive the full equivalent for 
their labor in exchange. When integrated into the ideology of the National Labor Union, Knights 
of Labor, and Farmers’ Alliances, greenback theory helped inspire a political project to 
cooperatively transform the market – a task at the core of the Populist aspiration for a 
cooperative commonwealth. In the minds of radical greenbackers, government-issued currency 
would open the possibility for popular control of the social infrastructure subtending exchange: 
first through creating democratic financial institutions in lieu of private banks, and then through 
achieving public control of supply lines and natural monopolies. The Populist focus on 
distributive infrastructure extended the greenback preoccupation with finance to transportation 
and communication, positing that only collective, democratic control of market institutions could 
                                                      
52 Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 14.   
53 On the history of greenback agitation and its occasionally divergent camps see Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and 
Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America, 1865-1896 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). Ritter notes the tension between popular greenbackism and elite greenbackism, 
but also does not reconstruct the connection between popular greenbackism and cooperation.  
 43 
ensure social cooperation. If the people could mobilize their political sovereignty to create this 
new infrastructure, Populists believed that producers would receive the full reward for their 
labor, equivalents could be exchanged in economic transactions, and the poverty of labor would 
be abolished. No longer exploited by the special privileges of bankers, creditors, merchants, and 
monopolists, Populists believed that the equal rights of all would be secure and the inherently 
cooperative nature of commerce could be realized.54  
Neither capitalist nor socialist (as their contemporaries in the Socialist Labor Party did 
not tire of repeating), the Populist cooperative commonwealth envisioned social cooperation as 
egalitarian reciprocity among producers and consumers within workplaces, communities, and a 
politically constructed market. While the nature of their cooperative commonwealth was 
debated, critiqued, and re-articulated by different actors within the popular camp, the basic 
aspiration to reconstruct market infrastructure while reforming the state formed the practical 
basis of the Populists’ incipient agrarian-labor coalition. At the local level, workers were able to 
create incipient forms of cooperation that catalyzed experiences of self-determination, often by 
using voluntary organizations to exercise social control over aspects of their immediate 
surroundings: local labor markets, commodity markets, and investment. When these efforts 
confronted obstacles that were not under their control – and were instead under the control of 
powerful adversaries – they came to understand their project as an existential threat to the current 
order of power and privilege, realizing that it could not develop without a combined social and 
political struggle. Since local cooperative praxis could not deliver the cooperative 
                                                      
54 In this sense, attempts to see proto-socialism in the Populist vision can be both right and wrong, depending on 
how one understands the history of socialism. The Populists were not proto-Marxist; instead, they were closer to 
strains of socialism that Marx himself criticized as “petty-bourgeois socialism,” like Proudhonism, whose ideal of 
social reform was not transcending market exchange through social planning, but perfecting market exchange by 
disclosing how its official justifications (the exchange of equivalents protected by property rights) were undermined 
in practice. See G.D.H. Cole, Socialist Thought: The Forerunners, 1789-1850 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), 
201-218. 
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commonwealth alone, the relationship between local possibility and a broader political struggle 
deeply structured not only what “cooperation” meant institutionally and conceptually, but the 
kinds of collective action the Populists undertook. In their move from self-help to politics, the 
Populists confronted a basic problem for theories of democratic agency: how can the people not 
only mobilize local collective action, but become a constituent force capable of structural 
reforms that allow for social and political power to be cooperatively shared? The move from 
self-help to organizational consolidation and political struggle did not entail the suppression of 
local “rebellious aspirations to power” as Laura Grattan claims.55 Instead, by developing and 
politicizing their organizations, the Populists came to a deeper appreciation of their collective 
power, and began to see themselves as “the people”: a creative, self-determining force capable of 
building new social infrastructure that would better facilitate their ongoing self-government.56 
Alongside the whole class of “producers” – a social category that was the source of both 
Populism’s power and some of its important ambiguities – agrarian Populists also began to form 
an incipient hegemonic coalition with laborers in other sectors.57 Even if these alliances did not 
fully materialize, the Populists’ effort to orient their coalition around a common theory and 
                                                      
55 See Laura Grattan, Populism’s Power: Radical Grassroots Democracy in America (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 83. While Kazin calls the Populist cooperative commonwealth a “righteous” commonwealth, Grattan 
calls it a “rebellious” commonwealth.  
56 As Goodwyn put it in the frontispiece to his book: “The people need to “see themselves” experimenting in 
democratic forms.” See Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, i.  
57 As Richard Bensel has argued, American industrialization after 1877 was firmly under the control of a ruling elite, 
predominantly institutionalized within the Republican Party and the Supreme Court. Industrialization according to 
ruling class prerogative was compatible with democratic institutions of mass suffrage and political representation 
since elites were able to preserve their control of national economic development through legislative brokering 
between regional demands (through control over tariffs), the Court’s willingness to construct a national market by 
enforcing federal power over inter-state commerce, and Executive protection of the gold standard (which ensured 
foreign capital investment by keeping currency value and exchange-rates stable). Fusing with the Democrats brought 
the Populists closest to challenging this reigning power, though fusion had major costs that undermined the 
cooperative dimension of the movement and the People’s Party as a vehicle for social democracy. I explore the 
dynamics of fusion in this chapter’s conclusion. See Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American 
Industrialization, 1877-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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practice of cooperation is one of their most important legacies, and a legacy that would outlast 
the People’s Party.  
 
I. Populism and Cooperation: Negotiating Interpretations 
While labor organizations like the Knights of Labor are often readily associated with the 
idea of the cooperative commonwealth,58 whether agrarians held a similar cooperative ideology 
(or a cooperative ideology at all) has been the subject of long-standing scholarly debate. If 
American agrarians during the 19th century are understood as inherently entrepreneurial and pro-
capitalist – either by proponents of the liberal consensus or by leftists who see small farmers’ 
commitment to private land-ownership as inherently tending toward a defense of capitalism59 – 
the cooperative nature of the Populist movement is hard to appreciate. From this point of view, 
the Populist movement may have rested on the formation of agrarian cooperatives, but it is 
unclear whether the Populists truly aspired to a cooperative society. Since the Populists did not 
reject “market society” in toto like some 19th century socialists and communitarians, does that 
mean that their cooperative experiments were simply locally oriented, and that they accepted 
competition as the regulating principle of society?60 Grasping the Populists’ vision of 
                                                      
58 For the most recent theoretical treatment of the Knights’ ideology of cooperation see Alex Gourevitch, From 
Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), esp. chapter 4.  
59 Two recent accounts of the relationship between republicanism, labor, and socialism in the 19th century – by Alex 
Gourevitch and William Clare Roberts – both divorce agrarianism from cooperation given their sense that the 
relative isolation of agrarian labor and its dependence on small property do not incline toward cooperation. 
Gourevitch regards cooperative self-organization as distinct to “labor republicanism,” which transcended an earlier 
“agrarian republicanism” based on movements for land-ownership and redistribution, See Gourevitch, From Slavery 
to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 69-72. Roberts argues that capitalism creates the preconditions for social 
cooperation only among industrial wage-laborers, since agrarians and journeymen who own their own tools and 
work in small groups do not experience the unique force of large-scale cooperative labor, and therefore “have no 
interest on earth in cooperation.” William Clare Roberts, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory of Capital 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 349 (epub version). I discuss Roberts’ views further in the next 
chapter.  
60 While more attentive to the potential for connections between agrarian and labor cooperation, Jason Frank claims 
that “More than a coherent ideology or ideal, cooperation was a multifaceted practice that shaped the Populist vision 
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cooperation not only requires abandoning a zero-sum contradiction between “cooperation” and 
“competition,” but also appreciating how and why Populists believed that market institutions 
could be democratized and cooperatively transformed. By creating the analytical space to 
evaluate the Populist cooperative commonwealth on its own terms, my goal is to clarify its 
contours, demonstrating how both rural and urban labor probed the deep inadequacies in 
emerging rationalizations of capitalist power in the late-19th century United States. Moreover, 
agrarian cooperative experiments – no less than worker cooperatives – cultivated latent 
capacities for democratic self-determination in ways that directly countered how capitalist 
development had subjected the entire working class to exploitation, social atomization, and 
disempowerment. Neither agrarian cooperatives nor workers’ cooperatives posed an immediate 
challenge to capitalism; instead, they were democratic attempts to re-shape the course of social 
development through the direct agency of producers. In both cases, these experiments 
demonstrated how capitalist development compromised workers’ possibilities for egalitarian 
democratic agency – the very political agency of the demos acting on the principles of mutual 
support and power-sharing – proving the imperative of an alternative path of social development 
guided directly by the interests and organizations of the producing classes. 
To assess how we might interpret agrarian resistance to capitalism – and to further 
illuminate why theories of “populism” based on ideational accounts of popular/elite antagonism 
obscure the politics of cooperation – it is worth recalling Richard Hofstadter’s influential 
argument about the Populist movement. Not only was Hofstadter’s argument instrumental for 
                                                      
of the reformed democratic state for which they struggled.” Frank, “Populism and Praxis,” 22. Demonstrating the 
connection between cooperative practice and the cooperative commonwealth aspiration is necessary to grasp how 
cooperative ideology was not simply a reflection of experiences of mutual support in the Alliances, but a way of 
connecting these experiences to a general social project, instituted by the people’s constituent power.  
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developing general theories of populism in mid-20th century political science,61 but its limitations 
also illustrate the importance of understanding how popular resistance to capitalist development 
manifested at both theoretical and practical levels within the Populist movement. While 
Hofstadter’s efforts to connect the Populists to a “paranoid style” in American politics might 
appear purely psychological,62 his arguments were importantly based on an economic history of 
American agriculture that not only shaped his diagnosis of Populist paranoia, but also limited his 
ability to grasp both Populism’s cooperative dimension and its labor alliances. At the root of 
Hofstadter’s diagnosis is his estimation that, while the ideal of yeoman democracy and its 
“agrarian myth” was central to early American democratic culture – weaving the ideal of the 
sturdy, independent farmer into the nation’s “patriotic sentiments and republican idealism”63 – 
agricultural development during the 19th century undermined this vision of yeoman 
independence, creating the basis of an ‘identity crisis’ for large swaths of the population. While 
farmers held onto their self-image as paragons of republican virtue, he claimed, the development 
of new agricultural machinery and commercial opportunities transformed them from republican 
yeoman into a nearly opposite figure: “a harassed little country businessman who worked very 
hard, moved all too often, gambled with his land, and made his way alone.”64  
While this passage reveals Hofstadter’s often-critiqued penchants for exaggeration and 
condescension, it also reveals an important dimension of the Populist movement: the general 
market-dependence of late-19th century American farmers as both buyers and sellers of 
commodities. As Hofstadter notes, by 1860, “The independent yeoman, outside of exceptional or 
                                                      
61 See Anton Jäger, “The Semantic Drift; Images of Populism in Post-War American Historiography and their 
Relvance for (European) Political Science,” Constellations 24:4 (September 2017), 310-323.   
62 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1952). 
63 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 28.  
64 Ibid., 46.  
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isolated areas, almost disappeared before the relentless advance of commercial agriculture. … 
The cash crop converted the yeoman into a small entrepreneur, and the development of horse-
drawn machinery made obsolete the simple old agrarian symbol of the plow. Farmers ceased to 
be free of what early agrarian writers had called the “corruptions” of trade.”65 Taking things 
much further, Hofstadter then placed this transformation of the democratic citizenry from 
yeomen into entrepreneurs not as a locus of political conflict and contestation, but as the site of 
repressed psychological conflict in the culture of American farmers that, when resolved in favor 
of private profit over republican virtue, ultimately produced the nation’s culture of self-seeking 
capitalist individualism: “its rage for business, for profits, for opportunity, for advancement.”66 
The Populist movement – long understood as one of the nation’s most significant mass 
mobilizations against the process of capitalist industrialization – was not only presented as a 
primarily psychological drama (displacing the conflict from society and politics), but also as the 
basis for a powerful ballast of capitalist ideological hegemony.  
In Hofstadter’s estimation, the material integration of American farmers into the capitalist 
market implied a kind of vexed ideological integration. Hofstadter believed that capitalist 
agriculture was good for farmers at the level of their self-interest – it allowed them to increase 
their yield, retain more of a surplus, and even increase their earnings by speculating on land – so 
he claims that they largely accepted their new status as entrepreneurs and businessmen, at least in 
practice. At the same time, market integration made them increasingly dependent on forces 
beyond their control. Since farmers lacked a complex understanding of the capitalist economy, 
they understood their relation to these forces in “highly personal terms,” since, “An 
overwhelming sense of grievance does not find satisfactory expression in impersonal 
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explanations, except among those with a well-developed tradition of intellectualism.”67 Given 
these intellectual deficits, Hofstadter argued that the mythical yeoman became a useful device for 
symbolically representing agrarian grievances. Even though Populist farmers acted like 
commodity-producing entrepreneurs seeking to maximize their personal surplus, they presented 
themselves to both themselves and society as virtuous yeomen battling corruption. As he 
claimed, “In Populist thought the farmer is not a speculating businessman, victimized by the risk 
economy of which he is a part, but rather a wounded yeoman, preyed upon by those who are 
alien to the life of folkish virtue.”68 In this way, the agrarian myth not only facilitated farmers’ 
own repression of their sins against the virtue they professed, but it also crystallized the symbolic 
unity of the community of producers (“the pure people”) whose way of life was threatened by 
non-agrarian, constitutively alien forces (“the corrupt elite”).  
In Hofstadter’s estimation, this self-identification as “wounded yeomen” in the capitalist 
world is at the root of Populist paranoia, creating mythical rather than social-theoretic diagnoses 
of popular problems. In other words, for Hofstadter, the Populists did not formulate an 
independent critique of political economy; they only reflected their insecure imbrication in the 
emerging modern, capitalist culture. Like the consensus school of American historiography in 
general, Hofstadter failed to grasp how the Populists’ cooperative vision emerged out of an 
immanent critique of inherited ideologies, as new experiences of exploitation and openings for 
popular empowerment informed how political actors re-shaped their self-understandings. When 
claiming that, “American traditions of political revolt had been based upon movements against 
monopolies and special privileges in both the economic and the political spheres, against societal 
distinctions and the restriction of credit,” Hofstadter saw in these tendencies only a reflection of 
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an embryonic liberal capitalism.69 The goal of such movements, he claimed, “tended neither to 
be social democracy nor social equality, but greater opportunities,” since opposition to privilege 
primarily targeted “limits upon the avenues of personal advancement,” not obstacles to social 
cooperation.70 At a more insidious level, Hofstadter’s suppression of the Populist critique of 
political economy also contributed to his often-critiqued naturalization of anti-Semitism as an 
element of American agrarian culture. Since he had not reconstructed their theoretical critique, 
Hofstadter associated the Populist critique of “the money power” not only with a logic of 
conspiracy, but also with “a kind of rhetorical anti-Semitism” derived from farmers’ basic need 
to symbolize their grievances through a scapegoat.71 Without any reconstruction of greenback 
ideology in the history of farmer-labor activism, Hofstadter was unable to see how anti-Semitism 
within the Populist movement was actually an abrogation of the greenback diagnosis, and he 
misrepresented how racism compromised the Populist movement in the same way that racist 
ideologies generally compromise popular movements: they divert antagonism away from the 
material basis of social conflict onto perceived outsiders, generally in the interests of local and 
national elites who benefit from exploitation but are not targets of racism.  
While Hofstadter’s argument about the inherent relationship between status-insecurity 
and popular xenophobia has often been criticized – however useful it has proven for liberal 
critics of populism – his argument that the Populist movement reflects a general incorporation of 
American farmers into capitalism at both the practical and ideological levels is more widely 
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accepted. In the most recent synoptic study of populist ideology, Charles Postel reflects a general 
historiographical consensus that the Populist movement represented an embryonic social 
democratic force, but he also doubts whether the Populist movement was grounded in a radically 
democratic vision of cooperation. At the outset of his account, Postel argues that, “The ethos of 
modernity and progress swept across the cultural landscape of late nineteenth-century America, 
driven by the winds of commercial capitalism. The Populists mainly shared this ethos.”72 The 
dominant trend in the Farmers’ Alliances, he argues, was not radical democratic cooperation, but 
the modernization of agriculture. Even as Postel acknowledged that Farmer’s Alliance literature 
professed a belief that the principle of cooperative organization, “may be successfully applied to 
most, if not all, the business pursuits and enterprises of the country”, he nevertheless claims that, 
“Perhaps only a minority of farmers who engaged in cooperation desired the full program of 
such a “cooperative commonwealth.” But by way of cooperation they did hope to organize 
agriculture on par with manufacturing and commercial interests.”73 Like Hofstadter, Postel 
understands rank-and-file Alliance-members as animated primarily by their material self-
interests, not by cooperation. According to these assumptions, agrarian cooperatives were not 
sites of cooperative democracy, but a sectoral pressure group, advocating for farmers’ self-
interest through collective means on the national political stage.74  
Despite their many differences, both Hofstadter and Postel misconstrue the radicalism of 
the Populist movement because they fail to reconstruct its roots: how the idiosyncrasies of 
American capitalist development re-shaped the social relations of farmers during the late 19th 
century, provoking a series of cooperative experiments and reformulations of inherited 
                                                      
72 Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.  
73 Quoting Alliance literature in ibid., 106. The second quote in the sentence is Postel. 
74 Figuring the Alliances as an agrarian “interest group” also inhibits our ability to appreciate their social alliances 
with labor organizations, which are generally under-emphasized in Postel’s account.  
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discourses of legitimation. Rather than sweep farmers along in general prosperity (no matter how 
psychologically dislocating), capitalist development not only suppressed agriculture regionally, 
but rendered farmers increasingly dependent on commodity-crop production, often in 
exploitative relations of debt that clearly undermined their status as “entrepreneurs.”75 
Particularly in the South where the Alliance movement was strongest, crop-lien and other 
tenancy arrangements meant that farmers’ earnings were not a product of their skill as 
entrepreneurs, but a struggle with creditors and landlords. According to one sociologist, their 
individual prosperity, “came to depend on how much they could wrest from the landlord rather 
than their success at lowering production costs and selling at higher prices.”76 Even for small 
farmers who owned land, market-dependence in the post-Reconstruction South also implied a 
general reliance on the outsized power of private merchants, who controlled supply chains by 
coordinating cotton sales, setting interest rates on loans, and inflating prices for consumer 
goods.77 Rather than open opportunities for individual self-advancement and progress, increased 
market dependence often meant increased dependence on monocrop agriculture and the 
unchecked power of private actors that isolated individuals had little power to confront.78  
As Goodwyn’s account of the Alliance movement demonstrated, these forms of 
exploitation offered a powerful stimulus to cooperation, and the formation of cooperatives was 
not only a practical response to these transformations, but the fruit of a search for an alternative 
political economy developed by mass participation in the creation of new popular institutions.79 
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76 Ibid., 21.  
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For the Populists and other cooperative organizations during the Gilded Age, cooperation was 
not merely an instrumentally designed business strategy to maximize their self-interest, but had a 
transformative meaning linked to both the experience of cooperative mobilization and a 
pervasive aspiration to transcend exploitation. In this sense, Goodwyn was right to present 
cooperation’s transformative meaning in broadly cultural terms, demonstrating how it did not 
merely reflect tactical alliances for the purposes of utility-maximization. He wrote, “The 
Alliance was more than a party and more than an ethos. It was, in fact, a new way of looking at 
things – a new culture, if you will, and one that attempted to shelter its participants from sundry 
indoctrinations emanating from the larger culture that was industrial America itself.”80 At the 
same time, his conception of Populist cooperative culture also tended to downplay its political 
and economic dimensions, including its critique of exploitation; he also claimed that Populism, 
“was also less than a fundamental social theory. Indeed, its achievements in the area of social 
criticism, while interesting and revealing, do not, in my view, comprise the essence of the 
passionate happening we call the agrarian revolt.”81 Even if cooperative theory could never 
capture all the dimensions of movement experience, the Populists’ cooperative culture had a 
social-theoretic component that not only shaped its integrated reform program, but emerged from 
a creative re-working of democratic ideological inheritances. By reconstructing the greenback 
theory, we can not only show how it abetted the cooperative experiments of a variety of agrarian 
and urban laborers, but how it gave them a way envision a transformed society – a cooperative 
commonwealth where, with equal rights secured and special privileges eliminated, “the merchant 
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and farmer, lawyer and artisan … [would] dwell together, not as warring enemies, but as kind 
friends, joining willing hands in the beneficent work of production.”82 
 
II. “The Power of Money to Oppress”: Radical Greenbackism and the Origins of 
Populist Political Economy 
It is notable that all of the political movements which have had origin among those who claim to 
be the “producing classes” – the Trades Unionists, Knights of Labor, Farmers Alliance, People’s 
Party, etc. – have regarded banks as their natural enemies and financial methods as a point for 
successful attack upon the bulwarks of money and privilege. – Ellis B. Usher83 
 
When Hofstadter attributed the Populists’ ideology to the “agrarian myth” and its vexed 
incorporation into liberal capitalist culture, he failed to concretely dissect their democratic vision 
and its relationship to an evolving critique of political economy rooted in the experiences of 
producers. The ideologies formulated to grapple with these experiences were dynamic and 
contested by multiple parties, and their most radical iterations expressed a vision of social 
cooperation that underpinned the Populist cooperative commonwealth. As Alex Gourevitch 
noted in his study of the Knights of Labor, cooperation was centrally bound up in workers’ 
radical demand, not for a “minimum wage” or a “living wage,” but for the full value of their 
labor. As he put it, “The defining feature of cooperation was that the worker controlled the value 
he created,” since full remuneration would materially express the reciprocity necessary for 
workers to enter into interdependent relations as equal co-participants.84 As Gourevitch might 
have emphasized further, this vision of cooperative reciprocity secured by fair distribution relies 
on the ideal of an exchange of equivalents: workers produce value for which they are due a full 
                                                      
82 Quoted in Bruce Palmer, “Man Over Money”, 20.  
83 Ellis B. Usher, The Greenback Movement of 1875-1884 and Wisconsin’s Part in It, (Milwaukee: The 
Meisenheimer Printing Company, 1911), 8. Quoted in Sanders, Roots of Reform, 108. 
84 Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 131. 
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return.85 In step with the Knights, agrarian cooperative movements centered this demand, and 
they utilized greenback philosophy to envision how labor could retain its full value, democratize 
access to capital, and exercise social control over the market. Again by contrast with 
contemporary progressive idioms, the radical greenback tradition did not seek “regulation” of a 
pre-existing, naturalized market; instead, they sought the active political construction of a market 
based on popularly authorized social infrastructure – from banks, to granaries, railroads, and 
communications technology. Cooperative movements descended from greenbackism also took 
the radical step of acknowledging that their reforms required a political challenge to ruling class 
power, based in an effort to mobilize the producing classes to claim their sovereign authority 
against the institutions upholding exploitation.  
While the basics of the greenback critique were developed in the mid-19th century, 
greenback ideology only emerged into public consciousness after the Civil War, when labor and 
agrarian reformers agitated to make the Union-issued “greenbacks” the exclusive national 
currency, obviating resumption of the gold standard.86 In the minds of radical greenbackers, 
resuming the gold standard not only heavily favored the interests of creditors over debtors, but 
would also sacrifice an opportunity to wrest control over currency from the hands of private 
                                                      
85 Marx critiqued this formula of “fair distribution” based on the full value of one’s labor for being ultimately 
incalculable, for neglecting the complexity of devising egalitarian social investments in infrastructure, and also for 
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ideology tend to express hostility to exploitation in distributional terms. See his Critique of the Gotha Program in 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 
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86 The classic account of the struggle over greenbacks is Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political 
History of American Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). For a more sympathetic 
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bankers, bringing these powers under the control of the sovereign people. Despite its democratic 
radicalism, many left-wing historians have lamented the influence of greenback ideology on the 
labor movement, given its apparently utopian preoccupation with financial reform and its 
commitment to a broad-based ideology of “producerism” that tended to collapse the distinction 
between small business owners and wage-labor.87 Yet we need not confuse evaluation and 
analysis; demonstrating the radicalism of the agrarian-labor greenback tradition is essential to 
grasp how it structured the vision of democracy behind rural and urban cooperative struggles. 
Only this reconstruction can clarify, first, that there actually was a radical tendency in 
greenbackism that probed deeper than the preoccupation with inflation, and second, why 
subsequent cooperative movements saw meaning it the critique, even as they substantially 
transformed its prescriptions.  
In general, greenback ideology had both a “entrepreneurial” and a “cooperative” 
dimension, both of which influenced the Populist movement.88 For pro-greenback industrialists 
like Alexander Campbell, greenback doctrine was alluring because it promised a stimulus to 
investment. By relieving loan-burdens through inflation and offering access to easy credit, 
greenbacks would encourage private economic activity and employment.89 At the same time, 
greenback theory was also appropriated by cooperative organizations that emphasized its radical 
aspiration abolish the poverty of the laboring classes through financial reform. Far from a 
reflection of a uniquely American tendency toward “classless” democratic ideologies, radical 
greenbackism belongs within a general international tradition of popular political economy that 
                                                      
87 See Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class 
(London: Verso, 1896), 14.  
88 In some ways, the ultimate turn to “free silver” and inflation as a solution to producer’s woes reflects the 
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was also essential for the formation European socialist and cooperative movements.90 When the 
Farmers’ Alliances and labor cooperatives failed to establish durable footing through their own 
self-organization, the greenback critique offered a way to envision an alternative political 
economy based on democratic, social control of the market that would not only allow their local 
cooperatives to develop, but that would render exchanges between cooperatives mutually 
supportive – forging truly social cooperation within and beyond the immediate sites of 
production and consumption. Greenbackers were active in forming the first Farmers’ Alliances, 
the National Labor Union, and the Knights of Labor,91 and their critique of “the money power” 
shaped how these groups understood the problem of exploitation and its possible remedies. The 
Populists’ financial program – the Sub-Treasury Plan – was itself the re-articulation of a long-
standing greenback proposal to replace the private banking system with a public network of 
locally-rooted banks that would operate in the interests of producers, giving practical form to one 
of the era’s central working-class hopes: “a people’s money.”92 For its trenchant attacks on the 
distribution of wealth and call for organized political action among workers, the labor historian 
John Commons acknowledged that the radical strand of greenback theory was not simply a 
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business-minded push for stimulants to growth; instead, “the greenback theory was the American 
counterpart of the radicalism of Europe” during the early phases of the industrial revolution.93  
Greenback theory originated in the writings of Edward Kellogg, a dry-goods merchant 
from Brooklyn, NY who developed an interest in political economy after falling into bankruptcy 
during a financial panic in 1837. In 1849, he published his theories in Labor and Other Capital: 
The Rights of Each Secured and the Wrongs of Both Eradicated, with the assistance of the social 
reformer Horace Greely.94 Kellogg not only aimed to diagnose the causes of financial panics, but 
directed his attention to a deeper problem: why money tends to accumulate in the hands of the 
few rather than circulate among the workers who produce society’s wealth. He argued that the 
origin of the problem resided in the sphere of circulation and was due to an artificial and “unjust 
standard of distribution” upheld by law.95 After his book’s publication, Kellogg sought attention 
for his theories, and even sent his proposals to the partisans of the Second Republic in France (he 
admired Proudhon specifically, whose proposal for a People’s Bank is akin to his own National 
Safety Fund),96 but his ideas only took hold after his death, when his daughter Mary Kellogg 
Putnam published a slightly revised version of his book called A New Monetary System (1861), 
whose arguments circulated throughout the agrarian and labor presses and permeated the 
ideology of popular movements in the wake of the Civil War.97 
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Kellogg’s writings contained the seeds of both the entrepreneurial and cooperative 
strands of greenbackism, both of which derived from different interpretations of central 
assumptions in 19th century American democratic ideology. While the core of Kellogg’s 
argument is his theory of money, there are three other components of his view that shaped his 
overall perspective and make his theory not simply a theory of currency, but a general account of 
a democratic society: first, a doctrine of popular sovereignty and equal rights; second, a theory of 
democratized capital; and third, a vision of a democratically shared social surplus primarily held 
by private individuals, but also collectively invested in the necessary functions of the state. Since 
Kellogg believed that money was a fundamentally legal invention created by the state, and that 
its value depended on the price of lending it (the interest rate) and not the value of its material 
(gold), he considered instituting money a function of political sovereignty that had wrongly been 
vested in private hands. If financial power could be made independent of the gold standard and 
brought under the control of the popular sovereign, producers could ensure that their equal rights 
were respected and that the state accorded no special privileges to a partial class of financiers, 
ensuring that money would cease to concentrate in the hands of the few, lose its “power to 
oppress,”98 and circulate freely throughout the body of the people. With finance under popular 
control, the people could maintain an evenly dispersed ownership of the nation’s productive 
assets while investing in a limited set of state functions, merging their independence as private 
individuals with their interdependence as citizens participating in the social division of labor. To 
grasp the appeal of this basic philosophy for rural and urban producers and explain their 
subsequent modifications, we first need to clarify each of these points in more detail.  
                                                      
98 This phrase comes from Harry Tracy, one of the authors of the Populists’ Sub-Treasury Plan. For a discussion of 
Tracy, see below. 
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Kellogg’s theory of political economy aimed to resolve a tension within his political 
theory of equal rights. He opened his treatise stating, “The laboring classes of all civilized 
nations have been, and are, as a body, poor. Nearly all wealth is the production of labor; 
therefore, laborers would have possessed it, had not something intervened to prevent this natural 
result. Even in our country, where the reward of labor is greater than in most others, some cause 
is operating with continual and growing effect to separate production from the producer.”99 
Explaining labor’s poverty in a democratic republic where all citizens are formally equal 
required a careful diagnosis. In the United States, “The laboring classes make their own bargains 
with capitalists, and one another; and are all equally protected in the property which they 
lawfully acquire. Why then do not laborers get all they are justly entitled to receive? Looking at 
the matter in this light, it wears an appearance of freedom and equal justice; yet results prove the 
existence of some radical wrong lying below this surface view.”100 Grappling with the gap 
between the formal profession of equal right and the reality of labor’s poverty, Kellogg argued 
that the root cause of labor’s poverty must reside behind the superficial reciprocity of market 
exchange. If laborers are all free, independent citizens entering into contracts voluntarily, why 
can they not individually ensure that these contracts preserve their right to receive the full value 
of their labor? For Kellogg, the imperative of full return for one’s labor in exchange is a cardinal 
republican principle and a demand of equal right, something that must be secured through law. 
As he claimed, “One of the chief objects for which governments are constituted, is to ensure the 
protection of the rights of property. The security of these rights is essential to the welfare of the 
people. … Such crimes as theft, gambling, fraud in business, bribery in courts of law, &c., 
consist in unjustly obtaining property without rendering an equivalent. To obtain labor without 
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rendering a fair equivalent, is also a violation of the rights of property.”101 Given the reality of 
inequality, Kellogg believed that these legitimating ideals were being constantly undermined, 
and new laws must be enacted to remedy the problem. Even in a country without aristocratic 
distinctions, where all citizens possess legal self-ownership, equal political rights, and the 
protection of their rights to property, an unjust standard of distribution had arisen that violated 
the equal rights of producers, making a mockery of the claim that the state universally protected 
property rights.102 
For Kellogg, producers were unable to receive the full value of their labor in exchange 
because the laws governing the institution of money – the basis of exchange – were not allowing 
currency to serve its proper function as a transparent representative of use-values.103 Instead, the 
value of money – which Kellogg measured by the average rate of interest – was chronically set 
too high, allowing financiers, merchants, and creditors to extract excessive value from 
productive labor by reaping high rewards from lending.104 In Kellogg’s view, while this 
accumulative power was embodied in the interest rate, it rested on the gold standard. Not only 
did the gold standard ensure that interest rates would be high by keeping money artificially 
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scarce, but the very idea that the currency’s value depended on the value of specie created a 
fetish of money that mystified its true social role. The gold standard made it seem like money 
had inherent value, when ideally money would only serve as a medium of exchange and 
representative of use values, with little accumulative power of its own. Moreover, since gold 
reserves were under the control of private banks, the gold standard also ensured that bankers 
possessed a general discretionary power over economic life that wrongfully superseded the self-
directing agency of producers. Kellogg believed that by replacing private banks with a new 
national bank, and by replacing the gold standard with government-issued currency, society 
could acknowledge that the true function of money is to provide a stable, uniform, and reliable 
means for the exchange of equivalents. With these reforms, money could become an instrument 
for just exchange, rather than the basis of an oppressive power wielded against labor.    
At the center of Kellogg’s argument was his contention that inequality derived from the 
ability to set interest rates higher than labor’s natural power of production, a power that he 
thought systematically favored a class of non-producers to the class of producers (conceived as a 
single industrial bloc) and had cascading effects throughout the economy. As he argued:  
There are but two purposes to which the yearly products of labor can be applied. One is the 
payment of yearly rent or interest on the capital employed, and the other is the payment of labor. 
If laborers pay to capital, as use or interest for the year, their whole surplus products, the 
laborers, as a body, work merely for a subsistence, and capital takes their whole surplus earnings. 
The laborer receives for his year’s toil, food clothing, and shelter only, and these, perhaps of the 
poorest kind; while the capitalist lives in luxury, increases the number of his bonds and 
mortgages, or with his income buys lands or builds houses to let, which will, in succeeding years, 
take a still greater sum from the laborer. … If interest on money be too high, a few owners of 
capital will inevitably accumulate the wealth or products of the many.105  
 
Kellogg’s treatise is filled with tables that demonstrate the effects of compound interest on 
productive workers, and he argues that only by fixing the interest rate equal to the value of 
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labor’s own productivity – which he estimates at about 1% per year by measuring growth in 
average annual productivity since independence – can labor retain the value of what it 
produces.106 If interest rates on loans for land and capital are set at 7%, as was common during 
his time, Kellogg claimed that workers would pay lenders the equivalent of the entire principal in 
10 years, ensuring that, over a lifetime of labor, a large percentage of workers’ surplus would 
merely enrich a class of creditors who performed no productive labor.107 Moreover, he claimed 
that money’s accumulative power did not only operate through individual loans, but had become 
a general organizing principle of economic life. The accumulative power of interest had already 
empowered an unrepublican strata of non-producers, who formed a parasitic “money power” that 
subsisted from exploitation, not so different from an aristocratic or feudal class. While Kellogg 
often illustrated the corrosive effects of interest through examples of mortgages and capital 
loans, he also claimed that the extractive power of interest was so entrenched within the 
economy that it pervaded the market, ensuring that even if an individual laborer does not borrow 
money at high rates, “a large per cent is taken from the price of his products by the purchaser, in 
order to enable the latter to pay his interest and live by the purchase and sale … This difference 
in price must be sufficient to support all who live upon income without labor.”108 The money 
power had become a general regime of accumulation, reproduced not by conscious design but by 
the ways that individuals and classes had become incorporated into social relations at different 
points in the process of reproduction. For this reason, the problem required a radical solution that 
challenged the very existence of the institutions reproducing the money power. 
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As a remedy for financial exploitation, Kellogg advocated abolishing private banks and 
establishing a national bank that would set the general interest rate equal to labor’s power of 
production. With these reforms, he argued that capital and labor would be remunerated according 
to strict equality, with the “equal rights” of each preserved: capital would still be loaned for a 
small fee, but that fee would match labor’s creative power, restraining the ability of money-
lending to accumulate value faster than labor could produce useful goods. Rather than seek to 
eliminate interest outright (as in Proudhon’s anarchist mutualism), Kellogg believed that lending 
was socially useful and that money would lose its value if it could not be lent for a fee. He 
argued that if the failed Continental currency or the French assignats had been the representatives 
of real property and recognized as national legal tender that could always secure an income by 
being lent, they would have never lost their value.109 With the interest rate set at a just level, 
laborers would be able to rise above the subsistence level, now in control the full value of their 
labor as a class, and their rights to property would be respected.  
To realize these reforms, Kellogg argued that the gold standard mystification needed to 
be unmasked. Then, workers would be able to appreciate the political (and therefore mutable) 
quality of money’s power to accumulate by interest, and they could call on their political power 
to re-shape financial institutions, which ultimately derive their legitimacy from the power vested 
in the democratic state by the popular sovereign.110 As he contemplated financial reform, 
Kellogg argued that requiring existing financial institutions to obey a new set of laws would not 
be enough. Popular sovereignty did not only mean that the people’s constituted authorities would 
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administer a distinct sphere (“the economy”) according to laws passed by established democratic 
procedures; instead, it meant invoking the people’s right to abolish existing financial institutions 
and create a new banking system that would valorize labor by the standard of equal right. The 
current banking system allowed a small group of capitalists to control the value, supply, and 
direction of currency, and not only would they refuse to voluntarily relinquish this power, but 
their economic power had already translated into political power deeply lodged within the state. 
As Kellogg put it, “Capitalists control the money, and through the money control the 
government.”111 Moreover, as long as specie was considered valid backing for currency, existing 
control of gold reserves would give the banking industry veto-power over any attempt to 
introduce a just monetary regime. If the federal government established a new United States 
Bank that issued paper currency at low interest, but did not abolish specie-backing, “our large 
capitalists would array themselves against it by collecting their debts in bank-notes, and 
demanding specie from the bank.”112 To overcome this financial power, workers had to 
recognize that it was the legal authority that they vested in constituted political bodies – not the 
value of specie – that gave money its value. To rectify the wrongs of an unjust monetary order 
that trapped them in poverty, neither uncoordinated individual action nor collective action within 
the economic sphere alone was enough. Producers needed to develop the capacity for political 
action, using their legislative authority to abolish the gold-standard and create institutions that 
could ensure a fair return for their labor: “It is impossible to secure to labor its earnings, under 
systems by which the government and the people depend on a few capitalists to furnish the 
medium and standard of exchange. In the plan about to be developed, the whole people, through 
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Congress, would hold the power, and fix the rate of interest. They can by a vote put the system in 
successful operation without consulting capitalists, banks, or brokers.”113  
Kellogg’s book culminated in a design for an alternative banking system – called “The 
National Safety Fund” – that would democratize capital and create the social basis of an 
egalitarian society of producers. However antagonistic to powerful interests, he considered the 
Fund compatible with the Constitution, which vests the power to institute money and regulate its 
value in Congress (it is technically only the State governments that are prevented from making 
“anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts.”)114 Rather than abolish private banks 
by revoking their charters, he designed the Fund to replace the private banking system by 
attracting mass support from productive workers through undercutting the money power’s 
usurious lending.115 In an aspiration often repeated in the Populist movement, Kellogg imagined 
that the money power would not be defeated by violent revolution, but would wither under the 
power of the ballot. Organizationally, the Safety Fund would be a national treasury with a central 
office in Washington and local branches distributed evenly throughout the country. It would print 
two kinds of notes: money and bonds (called Safety Fund Notes), and it would loan money 
directly to the people based on landed security. Producers would receive money based on the 
value of their land, owing only 1% interest per year for the loan. Money would be “inter-
convertible” for bonds that earned 1% interest, an arrangement that Kellogg thought would 
incentivize against over-issuing currency. Since drawing currency incurred a debt but converting 
it for bonds offered a return, producers would only withdraw and circulate the level of currency 
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needed for business at any given time. Safety Fund money would always be of uniform and 
enduring value because, “the money will be made a balance against the landed estate of the 
people.”116 Essentially, the people’s landed property, rather than the bankers’ gold reserves, 
would become the basis of economic value, eliminating the special privileges of the money 
monopoly.  
Kellogg’s vision of a democratic society of producers certainly borrowed heavily from 
the ideology of agrarian republicanism, with its emphasis on individualism and independence. In 
Kellogg’s view, the fundamental economic unit is the individual male settler and property-
owner, in charge of his family’s security, confident in his enjoyment of citizenship rights, and 
achieving prosperity through honest labor.117 Again in the dominant agrarian republican 
tradition, Kellogg emphasized reforms that amended property-arrangements in order to place 
property rights and the freedom of contract on surer footing; his proposals borrowed more from 
Jefferson’s repeal of primogeniture and entail than direct attempts to break up existing fortunes 
(landed or otherwise).118 While he was fairly clear-headed about the power behind the gold 
standard, Kellogg’s preoccupation with finance as the root of labor’s exploitation failed to 
grapple with the diverse forms of material, coercive power embedded in the evolving political 
economy – ranging from land-concentration to the development of permanent wage-labor based 
on private capital-ownership, not to mention the slave economy (clearly his most glaring 
omission).119  
                                                      
116 Kellogg, Labor and Other Capital, 256. 
117 See ibid., 80 for a discussion of the family as an economic unit.  
118 He wrote that his plan, “contemplates no agrarian or other similar distribution of property, nor any interference in 
contracts between laborers and capitalists, or in the usual course of business.” Ibid., xii. Against socialists, this 
means no expropriation, even if Kellogg believed that the original gains were ill-gotten.  
119 Kellogg suggests that, if the power of money to accumulate value is made equal to the power of labor to produce, 
there will be no general incentive to amass wealth and live off the labor of others. Even holding large estates will 
lose its allure, since speculating on land will be no more profitable than selling it to an industrious farmer. When 
productive labor is fully rewarded, he believed that landowners would voluntarily sell land to young farmers and 
 68 
Yet despite its limitations, the basic aspiration for democratic lending and popular control 
of finance provided real guidance for cooperative movements, and Kellogg’s intuitions about the 
unrealized cooperative nature of commerce even helped movements formulate a general 
ideology of “cooperation.” Too strong an emphasis on the idea of “independence” in discussions 
of the American republican tradition can push aside how the devotees of republican 
independence did not tend to treat individuals as private, competing social atoms (as posited in 
the formalism of many neoclassical theories of “the market”), but regarded independent 
individuals as operating within thick commercial forms of interdependence. In the agrarian 
republican case, while settlers constituted an economic unit, their activity was entirely 
conditioned by the interdependence facilitated by commerce.120 Kellogg’s vision of commercial 
activity stressed its interconnectedness, derived from his appreciation of the elementary social 
benefits arising from an equitable division of labor. “Men are social beings,” he wrote, “and 
mutually dependent. To appreciate this important truth, we must consider the inability of each 
man to provide for himself the numerous wants of his nature; and the ignorance and discomfort 
to which he would be exposed, were he not benefited by the labor of others.”121 Envisioned as a 
domain of mutuality, Kellogg thought that the importance of commercial interdependence in a 
republican society required an exacting commitment to ensuring the universal legitimacy of the 
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laws that shape that interdependence. As Kellogg put it: “All the objections to the proposed 
currency, upon the ground that it will lessen the incomes of capitalists who are supported by the 
labor of others, only serve to show the true working of the Safety Fund system; for its object is to 
furnish a standard of distribution which will cause men to sustain such mutually just relations as 
to render it generally necessary for all to render an equivalent in useful labor for the labor 
received from others.”122 Ensuring equal rights could only be realized if the institutional structure 
subtending the exchange of commodities could be democratically transformed. 
In Kellogg’s letter to the French revolutionaries in 1848 – appended to his book – he was 
clearly aligned with the social republicans. He implored French politicians to redress the 
grievances that had produced the revolution, which he claimed, “could all be traced to one 
source, inequality of condition.”123 Given the importance of social equality as an animating 
impulse for revolt, he worried that, “It is yet uncertain that the republic will discover and adopt 
such measures as will justly reward labor. It is clearly certain that the principle ground of 
complaint still continues, and may as easily exist under a republic as under a monarchy; and that 
unless important changes in the monetary laws are introduced, all the sacrifices yet made will 
have been nearly in vain, and another revolution may be expected.”124 For this goal, he 
recommended his Safety Fund proposal, arguing that the revolution need only liberate the 
producing classes from the accumulative power of financiers, merchants, and creditors to “render 
the republic stable, and to political, add social freedom.”125  
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III. Labor-Greenbackism: The National Labor Union, the Knights of Labor, and the 
Foundations of Labor-Agrarian Cooperation 
“The many must act, and they must act together in a system of cooperation that will stop the 
grinding process.” – Terrency Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor126 
 
As Chester MacAruthur Destler explained in his study of Kellogg’s influence on labor 
and agrarian circles, the impact of Kellogg’s theories after the Civil War was uneven and 
contradictory. Alexander Campbell, the Illinois industrialist regarded by Destler as the “Moses” 
of greenbackism, not only popularized Kellogg’s theories in pamphlets that he distributed 
throughout labor and agrarian organizations, but also drew up a bill for the legislative enactment 
of the Safety Fund, submitted to Republicans in Congress.127 Campbell and his ally Horace Day 
aligned themselves with the liberal Republicans, and Day in particular saw the people’s money 
and a new national bank as a way to “relieve the South, restore it to its proper relation to the 
Union, and “break the backbone” of the Radicals in Congress.”128 The ease with which a singular 
preoccupation with financial reform could be weaponized against Radical Reconstruction (and 
its aspirations for comprehensive land-reform and social assistance) shows the impotence of 
Kellogg’s theory of “the money power” to account for the dynamics of “the slave power,” and 
points to one of the several limitations of his theory as an orienting strategic guide in the struggle 
for a nationwide cooperative commonwealth. At the same time, Kellogg’s theories were also 
appropriated not to substitute financial reform for other popular causes, but to offer an 
explanation for why labor struggles required popular control over financial infrastructure, a goal 
that required political action independent from capitalist interests.  
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Even if Kellogg’s influence was not restricted to liberal republicans with conservative 
positions toward Reconstruction, his followers did not always fully adhere to the radicalism of 
his theories. While Greenback Party members were the most consistent devotees to his 
comprehensive program, insisting on the full overthrow of “the money power” in the interests of 
the producing classes as a whole,129 Kellogg’s theories also tended to be diluted into mere 
appeals for inflation. As Destler notes, “By 1877, approaching specie resumption, falling prices, 
and growing hostility to the national debt had lent added strength to inflation sentiment. More 
and more emphasis was placed upon the argument that the stamp of the government and full 
legal-tender powers were the sources of monetary value. The legal-tender theory had been 
propagated first by Kellogg and his followers among the post-war radicals. Now the growing 
strength of “fiat” money sentiment divorced it from his dictum that money must represent actual 
value.”130 Rather than the creation of a democratic banking system premised on limiting the 
gains that could accrue to lending and investment in the interest of producer’s equal rights, 
greenbackism could easily devolve into the demand for a per-capita increase in the volume of 
currency. This doctrinal tension would later shape Populist fortunes, when the inflationary 
demand for free coinage of silver won out over the radical demand for the Sub-Treasury system. 
The radical elements of Kellogg’s theory were not carried forward by industrialists and 
liberal republicans, but by the agrarian and labor organizations who fought for labor’s right to 
retain the full value of its contribution. The first labor organization to embrace Kellogg’s theories 
was the National Labor Union (NLU). In Beyond Equality, David Montgomery lamented the 
influence of greenbackism on NLU, claiming that it represented a stumbling-block on American 
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labor’s road to class-consciousness. Rather than root social conflict in the struggle between 
capitalists and wage-laborers, greenbackism encouraged the belief that, “employer and employee 
were natural allies, exploited alike by the financier.”131 Even as pro-greenback unionists like the 
NLU’s leader William Sylvis were engaged in intense experiences of class conflict, Montgomery 
claimed that NLU ideology reflected a widespread, anti-monopoly consensus in reform circles 
that the producing classes as a whole should guide the national economy – capital and labor 
cooperating together – rather than a non-productive strata of rent-seeking elites.132 By focusing 
on class consciousness before reconstructing the experiences of NLU leaders, we miss the 
idiosyncratic ways that greenbackism did make sense of experiences of class conflict, even if 
Montgomery was correct to stress its inherent limitations as a theory of capitalist power. Even 
more important, the difficulties opened up by the reformulation of greenback theory within 
cooperative organizations illuminate central dynamics of the politics of cooperation that require 
clear answers: how to imagine the united political action of workers, how to sustain and scale-up 
local cooperative experiments, how labor unions and cooperatives would relate to one another, 
and the social arrangements among cooperatives. These problems only shaped the activities of 
the NLU, but continued to be decisive for the later Knights of Labor. Each of these difficulties 
also reveals a dimension of the central problem that cooperative politics confronts: how local 
democratic collectives can generate the power to transform the structure of social relations they 
are embedded within – whether these relations flow from the dynamics of the market or the 
political power of ruling groups. While a number of Knights did dismiss currency reform,133 
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other important figures within the organization like Terrence Powderly found it an integral 
component of their program, relevant for the idea of cooperation in two ways: first, as a way of 
securing fair credit for cooperative enterprise, and second, as a way of envisioning what 
cooperation among cooperatives in a national economy would mean.134 Reconstructing 
greenback radicalism within the labor movement not only illuminates how workers sought to 
build popular power through cooperation, but also how they imagined the formation of agrarian-
labor alliances leading up to the formation of the People’s Party in the 1890’s. 
For workers like Sylvis to appropriate Kellogg’s theories, they not only needed to 
abandon the political aims of liberal republicans – Campbell, for instance, declared that financial 
reform should displace the formation of unions or cooperative organizations since it would, “do 
more to lift the weight from the backs of the industrial classes and encourage the development of 
our resources than all the co-operative associations that have ever been formed.”135 They also 
had to significantly alter Kellogg’s approach to labor. With Kellogg’s exclusive focus on land as 
the basis of economic value, the existing theory would fail to resonate with the experiences of 
workers who contributed to the value of goods through their labor. In a footnote to A New 
Monetary System, Kellogg had claimed that land was the basis of value because, unlike 
commodities or labor, it forms the natural bedrock upon which all use-value rests, rendering its 
own value perpetual and stable: “If a laborer who had no property to be represented except his 
power to labor, could borrow money from the Safety Fund, and his power to labor should fail by 
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sickness or death, the Safety Fund would still be bound to redeem this money with a Safety Fund 
note bearing interest, and this loss would fall upon the people.”136 With the Safety Fund in 
operation, Kellogg thought that land would become evenly distributed, and all industrious 
producers would become land-owners who could borrow off the value of their land to purchase 
capital goods, organizing production voluntarily on the basis of equal exchange. Sylvis’s 
experience in the labor movement – struggling directly against owners of capital who used their 
command over property to subjugate wage-laborers – made this aspect of Kellogg’s theory a 
non-starter. Even as Sylvis’s appropriation of the theory did reflect its presentation of 
“producers” as a single industrial bloc, his practical involvement in the formation of unions and 
cooperatives shows that Sylvis’s ambition was not to mute class conflict, but to devise a way to 
undermine the basis of the conflict between capital and labor through cooperative production, a 
task that required forging the political unity of all workers, regardless of trade, skill, or region.  
When the NLU endorsed greenbackism as an aspect of its slate of reforms, it rebuked 
Campbell by suggesting that monetary reform was necessary but insufficient for cooperation. 
Cooperation would not simply follow from currency reforms passed legislatively, but had to be 
practically developed as fully as possible within the existing social order. In making this move, 
the NLU foregrounded a central dimension of cooperation neglected until now: its practical 
dimension as a form of agency enacted by workers themselves. In its section called “Co-
Operative,” the platform affirmed the greenback critique by claiming that for cooperation to 
become a “sure and lasting remedy for the abuse of our present industrial system” it must be 
“based on just financial and revenue laws.” 137 Yet the platform also argued that “until the laws 
                                                      
136 Kellogg, A New Monetary System, 282.  
137 James C. Sylvis, The Life, Speeches, Labors, and Essays of William Sylvis (New York: Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers, 1968 [1872]), 290.  
 75 
of the nation can be remodeled so as to recognize the rights of men, instead of classes, the system 
of co-operation carefully guarded will do much to lessen the evils of our current system. We, 
therefore, hail with delight the organization of co-operative stores and workshops, and would 
urge their formation in every section of the country, and in every branch of business.”138  
Sylvis’s commitment to the cooperative movement entailed an appreciation for the 
transformative power of agency within both cooperatives and unions to sustain popular struggles, 
even if these movements’ goals could only be achieved by political means. Sylvis’s involvement 
in the cooperative movement existed alongside his career as a unionist. An iron-molder by trade, 
Sylvis joined the labor movement after participating in a strike against wage reductions. He rose 
through the ranks to head the Iron Moulder’s International Union, co-founded the NLU, and 
participated in the International Workingmen’s Association, where he was particularly keen to 
help coordinate immigrant entry directly into the American labor movement.139 By the time of 
the NLU’s creation, Sylvis had spent years as a union leader, agitating for reform, building 
membership, and coordinating strikes. Yet as Sylvis’ biographer notes, “In a decade (1859-1869) 
the molders had spent a million and a half dollars on strikes without permanent gain. Pouring 
money and effort into strikes seemed like pouring liquid into a leaky container.”140 While strikes 
could effectively combat employer injustice, they were also costly and potentially self-
destructive. Moreover, Sylvis began to worry that strikes were ultimately defensive maneuvers, 
and that “no permanent reform can ever be established through the agency of trade unions” if the 
roots of employer power were not challenged directly.141 Rather than abandon hope, Sylvis was 
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convinced that “Man is a progressive animal” and that “progress is destined to go forward 
until … all mankind shall be free,” so he dedicated himself to assessing the roots of labor’s ills 
and discovering a surer remedy to resolve them.142 Greenback theory seemed to provide the 
beginnings of an answer for labor’s struggles, because it explained why labor would never be 
able to receive the full value of its labor without a political challenge to the existing system. 
Citing Kellogg, Sylvis wrote to fellow laborers in the IMU press that for all of their local 
struggles, they would not be able to emancipate themselves from poverty when the nation’s laws 
permitted the monopolization of the legal representation of value (money) in the hands of the 
few. He lamented how workers often seemed unbothered by the fortunes of the rich, missing the 
fact that “no man can become rich without making another one poor.”143 Since all goods are 
produced by labor, and labor can only produce a finite number of goods, when a privileged few 
accumulate the bulk of the legal representation of value, they necessarily come to wield a 
disproportionate power over the products of labor. In an inherently finite pool of resources, such 
power directly presupposes the poverty of others, and with laws that allow non-producers to 
accumulate value at a faster rate than producers as a class, this inherently means the subjugation 
of labor. Following Kellogg, Sylvis believed that the laws upholding the gold standard and 
existing financial infrastructure were responsible for this condition: “The fault is in the law 
which governs the distribution of property … The evil is legislative, and the remedy must be 
legislative, or something worse.”144 Through self-organization and solidarity, unions could fight 
to prevent wage-cuts and coerce employers to secure better working conditions and shorter 
hours, but they could never halt the accumulative power of capital and the political power that it 
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vested in the hands of a privileged class. For Sylvis, the reigning economic system ensured that, 
“the very heart’s blood of the workingmen is mortgaged from cradle to grave,” and the only way 
out from this subjugation was a direct assault on the privileges that secured it.145  
Given his difficulties with the defensive character of strikes, and given the difficulty of 
coordinating a political assault on the money power, Sylvis began to see the formation of 
cooperatives as a superior strategy for building collective agency, anticipating this ultimate 
political challenge. The late 1860s saw a multiplication of cooperative experiments, from 
worker-owned enterprises to agrarian wholesale societies and cooperative stores.146 The Iron 
Molder’s International Union helped to sponsor one of the more successful cooperative 
workshops in Troy – a national center of the molders trade. The Troy cooperative followed the 
pattern of other late 19th century cooperatives and emerged in response to an employer lockout. 
With the IMU’s assistance, the locked-out workers purchased some initial capital and formed a 
worker-owned foundry; after eighteen months of operation it had earned a profit of $17,000 and 
served as a model for Sylvis and others. For workers, sharing profits not only increased labor’s 
return (even if it did not yet accord them their full value), but they also became a self-legislating 
body capable of jointly determining workplace policy.147 In a reflection on the Troy cooperative, 
Sylvis boasted that if its success could be duplicated, “there will be no attempts to reduce wages, 
no lock-outs, no offensive rules posted up in workshops, no display of tyranny. Every reasonable 
demand will be conceded, and a greater degree of equality will be established in society.”148 
Optimistic about future experiments, Sylvis also hoped that cooperative enterprise would 
develop working-class finances, creating a reservoir of resources that would not only assist in the 
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case of necessary strikes, but that would count among workers’ assets in a protracted fight with 
the money power. Even if workers would only achieve a pittance compared to capital, he hoped 
that their self-organization and self-financing would catalyze future growth: “The power which 
cooperation confers will be respected, and capitalist will be slow to engage in a tilt at arms with 
men doubly armed for the struggle.”149 
In his early optimism, Sylvis believed that workplace democracy in the cooperative shop 
allowed for collective autonomy, but the practical experience of cooperatives proved that local 
cooperative democracy was itself shaped by the broader social environment. How cooperatives 
would deal with problems beyond the workplace not only involved strategic questions, but also 
shaped what “cooperation” itself would mean. At the institutional level, cooperation for the NLU 
either implied joint-stock companies owned by workers through the apportionment of equal 
shares among worker-owners, or more ambitiously, cooperatives owned by the Molder’s Union 
and managed directly by associated workers with the coordination of the general Union.150 Sylvis 
favored the latter, more radical option.151 Cooperatively organized workers needed start-up 
capital for their enterprises (Sylvis’s biographer Jonathan Grossman calculated that the initial 
capital for an iron foundry in the 1860’s was $17,100 on average), which meant that workers 
needed investors.152 While this problem was slightly obviated if investment costs were lowered 
to the reach of a large pool of average workers (making workers within the cooperative and their 
local associates the primary investors), cooperatives on this model often faltered as they 
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struggled to not only retain profits, but deliver returns (falling even further short of realizing a 
return for labor’s “full value”).153  
On the other hand, funding cooperatives through union dues created a larger pool of 
small investments and could make sense for the union membership if cooperation could succeed 
financially. In such efforts, “cooperation” did not just mean joint ownership of the self-
determining workplace, but a general social project that animated the labor movement as a 
whole. For this strategy, unions had to persuade workers to contribute to enterprises where they 
were not employed, diverting finances from their own strike funds and mutual assistance 
programs. Sylvis ardently hoped that cooperation could not only inspire, but pay, making 
cooperative foundries a strategy for both investment and democratic empowerment.154 For 
cooperation to pay, though, it had to conform to the strictures of the capitalist market, where the 
competition of often larger, better capitalized firms imposed its own internal discipline on the 
cooperative. Moreover, cooperatives were also vulnerable to underhanded forms of competition 
specifically designed to undercut their success, as when local capitalist firms sold at a loss until 
the cooperatives went under.155 The background conditions for the experimental development of 
cooperatives was a terrain of social struggle, not a neutral plane for the practical testing of 
hypotheses and aspirations. 
Given the endemic problems of credit and capitalization, one can see why Sylvis yearned 
for financial reform that would democratize access to credit at low interest. Only political reform 
could deliver such a change, and Sylvis became an ardent supporter of the formation of a labor 
party. At the same time, Sylvis never appreciated how the local, relatively low capital-intensity 
                                                      
153 Ibid., 216. 
154 Ibid., 210.  
155 Grossman finds one incidence of this, unsurprising if cooperatives were formed after a lockout. See ibid.  
 80 
foundries that were the site of his experiences of cooperative labor were on the verge of 
extinction due to technological advances. Capitalists, not workers, controlled this technology.156 
As Grossman notes, given these constrains on the NLU’s experiments, the kind of large-scale 
cooperation imagined by Sylvis was never attempted under conditions that would have been 
sufficiently favorable to test the possibility of its success. As Grossman wrote, “A valid 
experiment would have had to have a cooperative financial structure on a scale large enough to 
reap the advantages of mass production.”157 Kellogg’s Safety-Fund, with its emphasis on land, 
could not, by itself, have provided the conditions for such a valid experiment; nevertheless, it 
was rational for Sylvis to see democratized credit alongside a direct restraint on accumulation as 
preconditions for exploring the development of cooperative association. 
Sylvis’s problem – how to create the background conditions for cooperative 
experimentation through the agency of a popular movement – was transferred to the Knights of 
Labor. Terrence Powderly, one of the Knights’ most prominent leaders, referred to Sylvis in his 
autobiography as “one of the brightest minds in the labor movement” and celebrated his efforts 
to form cooperatives.158 Moreover, the Knights straightforwardly inherited Sylvis’s basic 
dilemma: cooperation offered a local experience of democratic autonomy, but this empowerment 
alone was incapable of exercising social control over the conditions of its further development. 
More than within the Iron Molder’s International Union or the NLU, the Knights engaged in 
deep strategic and philosophical debates about the meaning of cooperation. In essence, the 
Knights’ divided into three positions, each with a different sense of the politics of cooperation: 1) 
the proliferation of local, joint-stock cooperatives owned and operated by workers; 2) the 
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creation of a parallel cooperative economy under the tutelage of the Knights as an order; 3) 
connecting trade union and producer organizations in broad-based political alliances intent on 
structural reforms that would abet the development of cooperative social relations. While this 
last, social-democratic iteration was the most clear-headed and would seek a productive (if 
insufficiently potent) alliance with the People’s Party,159 it would also lose some of the 
radicalism of the second option, whose concerns would be later taken up by socialists.  
The experience of voluntary, de-centralized cooperatives often crystallized aspirations for 
a better social order, but these organizations could not deliver workers what they sought – the 
full value of their labor – and were frequently wrecked on the shoals of competition, under-
capitalization, and mismanagement.160 These problems were already confronted by the NLU and 
quickly diagnosed within the Knights, pushing one radical local to insist that, “productive co-
operation carried out by only a small number of individuals is subject to the competition of 
private enterprises, which will compel co-operators to fall back upon the wage system,” and 
encouraging their fellow Knights to believe that, “co-operation, in order to benefit all humanity, 
must be universally applied.”161 At the same time, how would cooperation develop if it did not 
begin from the imperfect conditions of the existing social order, based on the initial, local 
initiatives of workers themselves? One of the first, full-scale attempts to resolve this problem 
came from Henry Sharpe, a president of the Knight’s Cooperative Board starting from 
September of 1883, and the author of a monthly series of articles on cooperation in the 
organization’s major journal.162  
                                                      
159 On the consequences of the decline of the Knights for the People’s Party and American labor overall see Sanders, 
Roots of Reform, 30. “The decline of the KOL after 1886 was thus a more critical turning point for both the labor 
movement and the shape of American democracy than the ebbing of electoral socialism after 1912.” 
160 See Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor, 1859-1889 (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967 [1890]), 230-239.  
161 “L.A. 1562 vs. Cooperation,” The Journal of United Labor, 4, no. 4 (August 1883), 537-538.  
162 On Sharpe’s role in the Knights see Leiken, The Practical Utopians, 60-66.  
 82 
Sharpe believed that the only way to develop the cooperative commonwealth was through 
the formation of a parallel, self-contained economy superintended by the Knights as an 
organization. In Sharpe’s view, the fact that the cooperative workplace remained embedded in a 
competitive market necessarily reproduced the subjection of the laborer. Wage-laborers, in other 
words, were not merely dominated by the boss, or by the competition of the labor market; even 
when cooperatively self-organized, the pressure of capitalist competition ensured that their 
organizations would have to direct their labor process according to its discipline. As he wrote, 
“A large number of co-operative institutions are established in which the participants become 
self-governing, become educated, and get all that their labor is worth in the market. Yes, in the 
market; but it is a competitive market, and in it co-operative institutions must compete with 
wages, labor and capitalistic organization; in short, must be part and parcel of competism.”163 
Being “part and parcel of competism” meant that labor cooperatives would reproduce the high 
production quotas, labor discipline, low wages, and firm-specific self-interests endemic to profit-
seeking capitalist firms, failing to achieve a fully social form of cooperation that could achieve 
more ambitious goals that more fully realized cooperation’s aspiration to egalitarian mutuality: 
tailoring production directly to need, utilizing labor-saving technology to maximize laborers’ 
free time and self-education, and creating reciprocity throughout society as a whole. While 
Sylvis saw financial reform as the solution to this problem – since it would ensure that the 
market was governed by an initially equitable balance between the gains to capital and the gains 
to labor – Sharpe imagined that a cooperative market could be created by and for the Knights of 
Labor as an organization. 
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 Instead of decentralized localism, Sharpe advocated “integral cooperation,” and argued 
that his proposal could provide a depth of collective autonomy that local cooperatives in a 
capitalist market were unable to reach. For Sharpe, while decentralized cooperation was too 
fragile to develop cooperation’s potential and reproduced many of the self-seeking habits of 
capitalist enterprises, integral cooperation “teaches us to hope in the beneficence and 
sufficiencies of nature, the final equitable arrangement of the labors of mankind, and the 
attainment of a condition in which, freed by art from base drudgeries, man shall have leisure to 
cultivate his higher nature and unfold the divinity within him.”164 In part, the utopian aspirations 
behind Sharpe’s vision derived from how he imagined the site of cooperation as a world apart 
from the existing social order. No longer centered on the democratically controlled workplace, 
Sharpe shared earlier colonization movements’ idealization of independent cooperative colonies. 
Only after having exited capitalist society entirely would workers be able to liberate themselves 
from its demoralizing constraints, and “produce by their own labor all those things necessary to 
the comfort of their lives; they can arrange their labors and distribute their products according to 
their own ideas of equity; producing all that is necessary to their comfort, they are not compelled 
to buy or sell; they become self-supporting, they become independent of capital, they become, in 
fact, the arbiters of their own fate … Upon themselves and nature depends their condition in the 
world.”165 “Cooperation” for Sharpe thus meant the liberation of labor from the artificial 
constraints of both master and market, unshackling the creative self-development made possible 
by equitably sharing the burdens of associated living in a collectively self-made society. 
Sharpe attempted to convert the Knights into the organizational basis of a colonization 
project, financed through dues. This project required persuading a majority of Knights that the 
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project was worthwhile, which Sharpe failed to do. When outlining his program, Sharpe claimed 
that the Knights’ membership was sufficiently large and contained a sufficiently diverse set of 
skills among its members to create the possibility of a truly “integral” experiment, meaning that 
willing Knights could form a comprehensive nucleus of a parallel economy capable of satisfying 
the bulk of its own needs. In the past, he believed, colonization experiments lacked sufficient 
diversity of skill to produce a parallel economy, so they needed to concentrate too much energy 
on creating a surplus to purchase goods from outside sources, re-embedding them from a 
vulnerable position in the competitive market.166 In Sharpe’s view, the key to resolving this 
problem was persuading a diverse set of willing workers to colonize western territory, and then 
organize remaining workers in the Knights as consumers, creating an internal market between 
the colony and other Knights. Sharpe hoped that enthusiasm for cooperation would encourage 
the membership to get behind these efforts, and in return for subsidizing the colony’s formation, 
he proposed that the Knights sponsor new benefit programs, specifically retirement housing for 
elderly workers and schools for workers’ young children.167 If it could succeed, Sharpe thought 
that the Knights would liberate workers from competition by creating a cooperative market based 
on full reciprocity. In an integrally cooperative society, he wrote: “behold the market is there, 
and it need not be a competitive market, for the producers and consumers being one and the same 
people, and all parts of this great system, the exchange of products would be upon an equitable 
basis ordained by themselves.”168 Such a market would be cooperative if the integral economy 
could truly satisfy the needs of its members, ensuring that the people, “are not compelled to buy 
nor sell; they do not live on the labor of others; they seek no exchange of products except on an 
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equitable basis; they have established social and industrial equity for themselves in their dealings 
with the world.”169 In Sharpe’s vision, banking reform and other political interventions were 
unnecessary if a parallel market based on the exchange of equivalents could be created through 
voluntary self-organization alone. 
In Steve Leiken’s attempt to account for Sharpe’s failure to persuade Knights of the 
viability of his plan, Leiken opposes Sharpe’s centralizing tendencies to the Knights’ attachment 
to a traditional “working-class republicanism” inherently skeptical of concentrated authority.170 
However, Sharpe did not imagine the Knights reproducing the centralizing tendencies of modern 
society, and he explicitly rejected what he called “State Socialism” since he believed that making 
the state the guiding agent behind cooperation would supplant cooperation among workers by the 
coordination of a central authority. Even though his vision for a cooperative colony shunned 
political involvement, Sharpe nonetheless accepted other Knights’ political agitation as a general 
part of the labor movement, though he insisted that cooperation itself could not be effected by 
the agency of the state. In his words: “Political action can abolish wage-slavery by handing over 
to the general government all the industries of the nation, but that would establish a despotism 
far more tyrannical and hopeless than anything the world has ever seen. That can never be. If the 
individuals are to be allowed to carry on their industries, then political action to clear the 
obstacles away should go on vigorously; but, side by side with it should go on the work of co-
operation among individuals to establish a new industrial system.”171 A far more likely 
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explanation for Sharpe’s failure to persuade the Knights is that he was asking the Knights to 
divert significant resources toward a highly risky enterprise with a uniform track record of 
failure, and in which workers themselves would not actively participate. Sharpe’s vision of the 
ennobling potential of cooperation would be restricted to the few pioneering colonists; other 
cooperators sought to find a way to imagine cooperation as a self-transforming practice 
accessible to all workers in the movement.  
A more perspicacious critique of Sharpe’s plan was not the return to voluntary 
decentralization, but the recognition that even Sharpe’s deeper vision of collective autonomy in 
the cooperative colony was insufficiently comprehensive. According to two members of Local 
Assembly 2913, even integral cooperation is “but partial co-operation at the best, and will never 
do the working classes any good as a whole.”172 Instead, these Knights argued that only political 
change – for them, reforms focused on “land, finance and transportation” – could deliver all 
workers the full value of their labor, ensuring a future where, “all men own and dress the earth 
till golden grain and fruit bend o’er it, from want receive, none rich none poor.”173 Sharpe’s 
response to this charge – to reiterate that cooperation needed to grow somewhere and that it 
could only grow if it sets out from a sufficiently “integral” basis – missed the point. His critics 
claimed that cooperation had to center political struggle – not the strategy of exit – as the basic 
premise of labor struggle. This turn toward political struggle shifts the parameters of the 
movement’s vision of democratic agency: the way to achieve agency over the infrastructure 
shaping social relations is not to re-create society by escaping on the frontier, but to struggle 
against the contradictory tendencies of social evolution that had shaped the contemporary 
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arrangement of power.174 For these workers, cooperation is not an exodus from capitalism, but a 
political struggle within and against capitalist society.   
The Local’s emphasis on land, finance, and transportation not only reflects the resurgence 
of the greenback idea of democratic banking, but also concerns about transforming other 
economic infrastructure alongside finance, acknowledging that financial power is not the 
singular root of inequality. In Powderly’s reflections on the Knights cooperative efforts, he not 
only targeted financial power, but all the distributive channels that extracted value from 
productive labor. He wrote, “The odds will be against co-operation as long as the avenues of 
distribution are in the hands of monopoly, for it is in the interest of the upholders of the present 
system to discourage every attempt at co-operation, so that the workman will abandon the idea of 
becoming his own employer … Until industrialists learn to co-operate in the affairs of 
government, co-operation in any other channel, or business, will be attended with many risks, 
doubts, and fears.”175 While itself still limited, Powderly’s focus on distribution was echoed by 
others within the organization and shared with agrarian organizations – forming a locus of 
common diagnosis and common struggle. As Imogene Fales argued in The Journal of United 
Labor, “The great avenues and highways of life, which should be superintended by the 
Government, in the interests of the people, are controlled by a few individuals for their 
immediate benefit, and with but little regard to the welfare of the social state.” 176 Behind Fales’ 
assertion was the further development of the political ideal of cooperation, carried forward into 
both the Populist and socialist movements. For her, the people have a fundamental claim to 
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supervise all of the infrastructure that subtends their own association, and a clear interest in 
ensuring that those to whom that supervision is delegated work for the public welfare, not their 
private benefit. In this mature Populist trajectory, rather than center finance as the singular locus 
of reform, the greenback push to democratize banking could become one among a plurality of 
ways to bring market infrastructure under the supervision of the popular sovereign, a tendency 
ultimately carried out in the Populists’ “Omaha Platform,” which integrated their proposal for a 
new federal treasury system with the demands for public, democratic control of the means of 
distribution.177  
 
IV. The Populist Cooperative Commonwealth: From the Alliance Movement to the 
People’s Party 
 As a matter of fact, progress has been effected by the slaves, or serfs, co-operating to resist 
tyranny. In fact, it has always been the only means of escape from its unbearable exactions; and 
when labor’s resistance has been crowned with success it has always resulted in a higher 
civilization. – Harry Tracy, “Freedom or Serfdom?”178 
 
While greenback reformers had a presence in labor organizations like the National Labor 
Union and the Knights of Labor, the Greenback Party had its strongest electoral success among 
agrarian constituencies.179 Like the labor movement, the Alliance movement was influenced by 
former Greenback Party members, and like labor cooperators, agrarians combined local 
cooperative experiments aspiring to secure producers their full value with greenback diagnoses. 
As noted earlier, interpreting the Populist cooperative commonwealth is complicated by a 
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persistent tendency to see the Populists’ social vision as ultimately compatible with capitalism.180 
Yet to say with Jeffrey Sklansky that the Populists’ goal was “an “equitable capitalism” in which 
labor and capital could be harmoniously united,” is to miss that the Populists did not seek to 
unite capitalists and laborers by suppressing exploitation, as a defense of capitalism would 
require.181 Instead, they believed that capital (often understood purely as financial investment) 
and labor could only be united if labor retained its full reward, which, by organizing the 
economy around the private profit of capital-owners, capitalism makes impossible. Moreover, 
while analysts are primed to see workers’ joint-stock cooperatives more “anti-capitalist” 
institutions than agrarian buying and selling cooperatives, Populist cooperatives were not only 
imagined as qualitatively different from capitalist institutions, but embedded in a general project 
of cooperative market reconstruction that sought goals incompatible with capitalist development, 
posing a concrete challenge to ruling class power that was lodged both in the state and in a wide 
array of social institutions. While Populists did seek to reform property relations and the market, 
they did not base these reforms on a defense of all forms of private property (capitalist or 
otherwise), but instead, on an immanent critique of how existing property relations undermined 
the exchange of equivalents. Like any subset of social relations, they believed that property 
relations are amenable to reconstruction by the conscious agency of the politically organized 
people. As Harry Tracy put it, “It should be remembered that all human institutions are but 
experiments,” and amenable to the people’s own creative self-determination.182   
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Despite the shared cooperative aspirations of proto-industrial and agrarian labor, workers 
and farmers confronted different obstacles and possibilities given their locations within the 
national economy. Even if we cannot equate the average Populist farmer with an idealized vision 
of “the entrepreneur,” farmers possessed immediate access to the fruits of their labor in ways that 
allowed different kinds of leverage over merchants and creditors than wage-laborers had against 
employers. Additionally, the imbrication of family farms within the supply chains and debt-
relations that coordinated commodity-crop production created a form of exploitation utterly 
distinct from that experienced by wage-laborers. As Sklansky observed, “The reconstruction of 
cotton cultivation in the postwar South, like the explosive growth in grain production from the 
Midwest, depended largely on farm families working land that they owned, rented, or managed 
themselves, rather than on the waged workforce mobilized by modern industry. … the tethers 
that bound the labor of isolated farm families to the capital and landlords and merchants were not 
wages but debts. Debt, moreover, gathered together grain growers and cotton cultivators, 
whether yeomen, tenants, or sharecroppers.”183 Still, and against the idea that the relative 
isolation of agrarian labor undermined their incentives to cooperation, these debt-relations not 
only organized the social relations of farmers, but were a powerful stimulant to cooperative self-
organization, as farmers developed their own independent counter-force to the power of 
merchants within their voluntary institutions of self-help.  
As in the case of labor organizations, the meaning of “cooperation” shifted as the 
Alliance’s cooperative institutions expanded, and the ideal of cooperation hinged on the 
foundational demand that the producing classes require a full return to their labor, a demand that 
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was simultaneously social and political. As Evan Jones put it in one of the first issues of one of 
the Farmers’ Alliance’s central journals, The National Economist: 
If the people create wealth they certainly would enjoy prosperity if there was a just distribution 
of the values created by them; but under an unjust system of distribution the producer fails to get 
his fair and proper share of the product of his own labor … From this we conclude that one of the 
questions for the people to solve is a means of bringing about a just distribution of the values 
created by labor … if we should perpetuate our free institutions and the general welfare and 
prosperity of our people, it is of vital importance that the conservative and industrial classes have 
a well-defined system of organizations, educational and co-operative, through which they can 
again obtain control of the products of the farm and prevent their passing into the hands of the 
great corporations who are now absorbing all the profits from the labor of the producing 
masses.184   
 
While rooted in experiences of local self-help, the agrarian cooperative movement rested on a 
broad set of social and political aspirations that crystallized a vision of social progress. While 
Postel attributed their ideas of progress in an important way to the agency of capitalist 
development itself, it would be more accurate to say that the Populist vision of progress emerged 
out of their struggle with and against this process, particularly the subjugating tendencies of 
debt-structured market dependence. Such a focus better reveals the particular nature of their 
vision of a cooperative economy, premised on what one Alliance member called “equivalence of 
service.”185 Creating such a cooperative, democratic economy required reflection on the 
progressive potential immanent to the current social order, alongside a search for an integrated 
reform program that could transcend its limitations. One of the Alliance’s major leaders, Charles 
Macune, wrote a number of serialized essays on history, government, and political economy that 
elaborated a general philosophy of transformative structural reform that emerged from the 
concrete experiences of forming and struggling to preserve cooperative agrarian economies. As 
he wrote,  
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Now when we speak of progress we refer to these necessary changes of structure in the social 
organism which contribute to the establishment of a higher moral and social condition of life … 
The nature of social development is to increase the complexity of the social organism, and 
consequently the requirements of the individuals composing society. The development of those 
characteristics of our nature which tend most certainly to fit us to enjoy this complex social 
condition is the end to which the social and moral training should tend, and the best means of 
building up these characteristics is the secret of which we are in search.186 
 
These integrated aspirations were generated within an initial push by farmers to organize their 
way out of debt by forming institutions to collectively control their place within commodity and 
credit markets. 
The Farmers’ Alliances initially flourished as a cooperative warehousing system that 
gave farmers an alternative to relying on merchants for credit, supplies, and access to commodity 
markets. In other words, their cooperative organizations were premised on an underlying social 
conflict with merchant and were organized directly to circumvent their power. According to 
Michael Schwartz, the proliferation of debt relationships as a means to control labor emerged 
during Reconstruction, when efforts to resume cotton production through labor gangs under the 
control of landowners failed, due to both black and white workers’ refusal to accept the proposed 
wages and conditions of labor and the (temporary) Reconstruction-era legislative defeat of laws 
oriented toward gang-labor control. Instead, “Farms were rented to tenants, who were financed 
by the new country merchants. These merchants could control Black and white tenants through 
the leverage of the credit system.”187 This control manifested in the merchants’ monopoly over 
necessary supplies (from food to medicine) which tenant farmers often purchased on credit, as 
well as their control over the cotton crop.188 Merchants control over crops derived not only from 
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their ownership of liens on farmers’ cotton, but also from their role as intermediaries between 
farmers and the national market. Through their position in the social division of labor, 
merchants’ control allowed for a variety of ways to exploit of the value of farm labor, whether 
through high interest rates on loans, setting high prices for consumer goods purchased on credit, 
or controlling the sale of the crop. As Goodwyn claimed, merchants power within the system 
guided the social activity of farmers in ways that went beyond economic coercion, but “ordered 
life itself.”189  
To begin to work their way out of these relationships, Alliance cooperative warehouses 
gathered members’ crops to sell straight to consumers, undermining the merchant’s power in the 
supply-chain by offering purchasers the opportunity to buy directly and in bulk. Cooperative 
buying and selling programs could bring higher returns, but they also created an empowered 
collective that gave farmers more control over their product than negotiating individually with 
merchants. Contesting merchants’ power over the supply chain immediately brought the 
Alliances enemies, and they could choose to respond either by direct challenge or evasion. When 
local mills refused to process Alliance grain because of their hostility to cooperation, for 
instance, one purchasing agent advocated organizing cooperative mills under the Alliance 
banner: Alliances could “get up a cooperative mill” and even “have cooperative stores in 
connection with the mill to handle their own produce.”190 The glimmer of a self-created 
cooperative economy emerged through concrete experiences of working together in hostile 
conditions. Evading powerful adversaries through self-organization had initial traction, and 
began to give members a renewed sense of their collective capacity. If they could get out from 
under the merchant’s thumb, why not extend their movement into new areas that promised more 
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shared control over resources? As Populist organizers noted, local experiences of cooperation not 
only developed social power and political awareness, but also operated to “break up the isolated 
habits of farmers, improve their social condition, increase their social pleasures, and strengthen 
their confidence in and friendship for each other.”191 New experiences of political possibility 
created a new citizenry capable of collective action where there were previously atomized 
individual producers.  
The extent of the movements’ difficulties implied that a larger organization was 
necessary to ward against hostility, coordinate information and political education, and develop 
the capacity to push for larger-scale reform.192 As in the case of cooperative workshops, local 
cooperation could not reliably guarantee higher returns for farmers or relieve the entire farming 
community’s dependence on the merchant, and while initial decentralization allowed Alliances 
and sub-Alliances to proliferate through voluntary activity, centralization was necessary to scale 
up farmers’ efforts. In part, scaling up also meant developing the ability to include more farmers 
in the Alliance fold.193 Farmers deeply indebted to merchants needed an alternate source of 
loans. The Alliance could have remained an institution for wealthier farmers on the model of 
other self-help organizations like the Grange, but the movement’s politics attracted the entire 
class of rural producers, who made claims on leaders for solutions that could benefit all. In their 
words, the imperative was not only to narrow the merchants’ scope of control, but to “make a 
crop independent of the merchant.”194  
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In response to these demands, Alliance president Charles Macune invented a “joint note 
plan” that offered indebted farmers a way out of corrosive crop-lien mortgages without yet 
turning from self-help to politics. In the fall of 1887, the Alliance announced that it would issue 
its own credit to poor farmers in advance of their 1888 crop. Starting at the local sub-Alliance 
level, all members would estimate their consumption needs for the coming year and issue a 
“joint-note” that pledged a cotton crop worth three times their requests. As the plan was 
described in the National Economist, “Where there are some in a neighborhood that can not in 
any possible way trade for cash they will meet together in their sub-Alliances and exchange such 
pledges as will make each one perfectly safe and jointly secure, by borrowing, if necessary, 
sufficient funds to carry those who are worthy and in need.”195 These “joint notes” – the result of 
democratic planning of production and consumption – served as collateral that the Alliance could 
use to borrow money for supply purchases, and Macune eventually received a $6000 loan from a 
Houston bank by pledging $20,000 in joint notes.196 Sub-Alliances would owe interest on these 
loans at 1% per year – the rate that Kellogg calculated as labor’s natural power of production. If 
it could work, the Alliance’s new system would essentially replace the merchant system. Rather 
than loan their crops to private individuals who wielded power outside any collective control, 
farmers would pledge their crops to a membership-based institution that strove to secure an 
adequate return for all producers. The Alliances’ goal was the reverse of the merchant’s goal of 
skimming profit off the yearly crop. As Macune claimed, the Alliance, “does not aspire to, and is 
not calculated to be a business for profit in itself.”197 And as he clarified further, even as the 
Alliance grew beyond its local origins, it did not intend to become merely one business interest 
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among others. He responded to allegations that the Alliance’s growth would simply repeat the 
problems of the modern trust by stating, “Trusts are wholly combinations of capitalists made for 
the purpose of using the power of money to oppress labor in order to extort all that labor 
produces over a bare subsistence, to the end that the capitalist may secure large and unearned 
accessories to his wealth thereby.”198 Manifest in practices like the joint-note plan, the Alliance 
system, “is exactly the opposite of a trust. … Selfishness is in no sense the object of its effort, but 
pecuniary gain up to a standard of exact justice to labor is demanded as a right. Instead of 
pooling the wealth of its members, it pools their heads and hearts, their strong right arms, and 
leaves the property of each undisturbed.”199 Through pooling farmers’ latent capacities for 
democratic self-organization and mutually beneficial economic activity, cooperation created a 
qualitatively different kind of organization grounded in labor’s right to retain the value it 
produced, while also making associated workers within the sub-Alliance, rather than individual 
farmers, a basic unit of production and consumption.  
Even though farmers promised a product worth three times their consumptive needs, their 
joint notes were rarely taken seriously as a form of collateral (and were precipitously devalued 
when they were), and the joint-note plan failed to bring the Alliance the necessary revenue to 
cover farmers’ needs. After recovering from the internal crisis that the plan’s failure produced, 
Macune drew up a new plan – one that required political action in addition to economic 
cooperation. When the joint-note plan failed, Macune realized that the Alliance system could not 
persist in the current economic environment and continue to serve the whole class of producers. 
For farmers to work their way out of the merchant system, they needed an alternative source of 
credit, and the banks simply refused to back that credit. Politicizing the movement to challenge 
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these arrangements required pushing for legislative change, either by petitioning existing 
legislators or forming their own party.  Following the greenback critique, Macune thought that 
the people’s legislative organ – Congress – could be entrusted to pass legislation that would 
implement reforms that furthered cooperative possibility. The plan he devised – the Sub-
Treasury Plan – was a modified version of Kellogg’s National Safety Fund, and while Macune 
would resist the third-party push, the adoption of the Plan as a central demand propelled the 
formation of the People’s Party as an independent political force.200  
While the joint-note plan intended to make the Alliance system a replacement for the 
merchant system through voluntary cooperation, the sub-treasury system would institutionalize 
the Alliance cooperative system as an aspect of the democratic state. With the Sub-Treasury 
system, “cooperation” again developed a new layer of meaning. It was now not only a form of 
local self-help, but also a political conception of how constituted authorities could facilitate 
citizens’ ability to exercise shared control over social reproduction. The Alliance’s inability to 
develop cooperation’s potential through economic collective action revealed how the existing 
social order restricted the people’s capacity for free association and collective self-determination. 
In their case, bankers’ refusal to acknowledge Alliance collateral while they freely operated with 
merchants revealed how the merchant system was upheld by economic and political coercion, a 
set of arrangements that farmers had a basic democratic right to reconstruct. These limitations in 
their social environment inclined Macune and other Alliance members to target banking reform 
as a central political demand, and primed them to assert the importance of indexing economic 
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value directly to the fruits of productive labor (as greenback theory insisted), both of which 
crystallized in the Sub-Treasury proposal.  
In their annual Almanac in 1889, an Alliance committee wrote that the Sub-Treasury 
system would not only free farmers from the despotism of local merchants, allow farmers to 
withhold their crops after harvest-time to balance prices, or standardize storage and the grading 
of farm produce; it would also, “emancipate productive labor from the power of money to 
oppress.”201 In their view, both political parties had come to believe, “that the masses were 
passive and reconciled to the existence of this system whereby a privileged class can, by means 
of the power of money to oppress, exact from labor all that it produces except a bare 
subsistence.”202 At the root of merchants power was not only their control of credit and their 
connections with local bankers and cotton-purchasers; it merely showed one face of a financial 
system that exploited all productive labor. Concretely, the Sub-Treasury proposal would 
transform the Alliance cooperative warehouse into a public institution, vested with the authority 
to directly pay farmers cash for their commodity crops (ranging from cotton to grain, corn, wool 
and sugar), cutting out both merchants and private bankers.203 While mass sales to merchants at 
harvest time (often a direct consequence of the need to pay down debts) created a glut that 
depressed crop prices, the Sub-Treasury system would allow farmers to receive 80% of the 
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market value of their crops upon delivery to the warehouse, withholding the full sale until the 
market price suited the farmer. With the authorization of a sale, the farmer would receive the 
difference between their initial 80% and the final sale-price, putting the agricultural economy on 
a cash basis (rather than a credit basis), and ensuring a direct relationship between buyer and 
seller, mediated only by the public institution of the Treasury.204 Sub-Treasuries would replace 
both the private banking system and the merchant system, issuing greenbacks directly to farmers 
whose value was secured by the basic agricultural commodities on which the nation depended. 
Rather than land value – as Kellogg had insisted – Macune and the Alliance saw agricultural 
commodities as the basis of the people’s money. Since the Sub-Treasury plan would displace the 
private banking system, non-productive investment would cease to reap outsized rewards 
premised on the subjugation of productive labor, stripping money of its “power to oppress.” 
While it preserved the individual farmer’s relationship to the market, Macune did not 
intend to restore the independent yeomanry of the Jeffersonian imaginary or create a society of 
small entrepreneurs. Instead, he sought to create the social basis for a cooperative agrarian 
community. With the growing capacity of factory production in mind, Macune claimed that the 
Alliance was following contemporary trends that better harnessed the productive power of 
cooperative labor. He argued that the rural community should be understood as the seat of a 
cooperative division of labor that related to markets as a single unit, through the public 
institution of the Sub-Treasury. He wrote, “many occupations are considered as independent 
from agriculture” ranging from the school-teacher to the blacksmith and carpenter, “and as such 
the existing relations with agriculturists would be that of an exchange of the products of their 
labor, but this is not the true situation. The agriculturists, by raising the only surplus that is 
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exported or exchanged with distant communities, for commodities or their equivalent, are 
engaged in the leading productive industry, that adds to the aggregate value of the wealth of the 
community, and consequently all these other occupations are subsidiary or auxiliary to and 
dependent upon it.”205 Rather than subject community relations to the strictures of the market, 
the goal of the Sub-Treasury plan was to secure a return for agricultural production that would 
allow for the rural community as a whole to benefit from the agricultural surplus.   
In their attempts to justify this alternative vision of cooperative democracy, agrarians did 
not reflect an atavistic attachment to community harmony opposed to outsiders, nor did they 
passively conform to the social vision promulgated by the leading ideologists of their day. As 
one writer for The National Economist stated clearly, the dominant, social Darwinist ideology 
that free competition allows the survival of the fittest to elevate the community was a thin 
rationalization of inequality and a corrupted vision of social progress. Contemporary inequalities 
are not the result of thrift and savings, the author claimed, but force and fraud: “It is well known, 
however, that it was not difference in ability, enterprise, and thrift that produced the vast and 
fatal inequalities of wealth in the past. It is equally well known that it is not disparity in natural 
ability, energy, and frugality that has produced the extreme inequalities in wealth that now 
exists.”206 The Populists did not believe that competition formed the natural basis of society; 
instead, their organizations strove for a society where labor was always rendered its full 
equivalent, making the basis of social reproduction an “equivalence of service” rather than the 
exploitation of one by another.  
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While the Sub-Treasury program was one of the Populist movement’s most distinctive 
proposals,207 it existed alongside their aspirations to convert distributive infrastructure and 
natural monopolies into democratically accountable public institutions. While their rhetoric often 
targeted finance and “the money power,” these proposals also demonstrate a deeper ambition to 
democratize the infrastructure governing exchange generally. Macune himself extended his 
anxieties about financial power to all monopolistic tendencies, particularly those that made new, 
modern infrastructure into an oppressive power over labor, rather than a series of tools useful to 
productive labor. He considered the origin of monopoly to be the private control of new 
technologies of interconnection that should rightly be “the property of the world”: “the vast 
strides made in invention, the application of steam to industrial pursuits, the increased facilities 
for transportation, and the transmission of intelligence.”208 Alongside finance, he believed that 
these technologies had become the controlling heights of industry, and their monopolization by 
uncontested corporate power permitted a small class to reap unprecedented financial rewards 
from their use. In his view, a primary reason to subject these technologies to strong democratic 
supervision was not only so that they could be utilized in the interests of all productive workers, 
but also that no individual or set of individuals could legitimately have an exclusive property 
right to “that which is needful to the life of all.”209 For him, rights to these assets did not respect 
property and production, but merely licensed the “unlimited private accumulation” that had 
permitted “the control of the state by a wealthy class,” effectively turning the Congress and 
Courts into its own property.210 While Macune was clearly hesitant to extend his reasoning 
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beyond distribution channels into the emerging technologies of mass production, it is clear that 
both labor and agrarian workers shared a common aspiration for the democratic control of major 
social infrastructure, a common philosophy of cooperation premised on the ideal of an exchange 
of equivalents, and common aspirations to reverse the poverty of labor, creating the social 
conditions for the free ethical and cultural development of the producing classes, liberated from 
what Powderly had called “the grinding process” of exploitation.  
 
V. Conclusion: The Contradictions of Fusion and the Ambiguities of Producerism 
The formation of the People’s Party was a culmination of the cooperative effort, though 
not without controversy within the movement. Efforts to forge “the general consolidation of all 
the industrial organizations in the United States” directly in the economic domain were also 
attempted within the movement, when the Alliance itself attempted to consolidate with a 
weakened Knights of Labor.211 As one author wrote, encouraging the effort at economic 
consolidation, the movement had to overcome,  
the jealousy and distrust between the different classes of producers and workers created by the 
mistaken belief that their interests were antagonistic. … The thinking mind readily recognizes 
the fact that every honest producer is equally interested in the establishment of equitable 
economic and industrial systems; that no honest man will ask or claim more than he is entitled to 
receive; that no other honest man will seek or desire to prevent him from obtaining this; that no 
honest many will knowingly support a system that exacts unjustly from one individual in favor 
of another.212 
 
United by a commitment to social cooperation and industrial equity, many within the movement 
concurred with the Omaha Platform’s claim that “the interests of rural and civic labor are the 
same; their enemies are identical.”213 
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Translating this unity into a political party and a political program meant something 
different. W. Scott Morgan insisted that there was a natural bridge between economic 
cooperation and political cooperation in the form of a new party. In his history of the movement, 
he recalled addressing an Alliance meeting stating, “That there should be uniform and concerted 
action on the part of the members of the Order in buying and selling, in the establishment of co-
operative enterprises and the advancement of our social and financial condition, no one has ever 
for a moment doubted … Why then, the same unity of action is not as desirable and as 
imperative in the overthrow of the vast monopolies that are fattening on the profits of our 
industry, is a question that remains yet to be satisfactorily answered.”214 As his statements 
indicated, political action meant taking a constitutively adversarial posture toward existing 
officeholders and institutions, calling out both parties for their support of unaccountable 
privilege, and moving the movement away from self-help and toward a direct confrontation with 
political power. While Macune’s analysis of monopoly and the obstacles to creating popular 
economic infrastructure through voluntary cooperation both justified the turn to politics, doing so 
not only asked farmers and other laborers to abandon their fidelity to the two major parties, but 
opened onto larger-scale public conflict on the national stage over the future direction of social 
development. For these reasons, the turn to a new party catalyzed a deeper sense of popular 
constituent power that fed off the earlier cooperative experience. As Ben Terrel put it, workers 
did not only need to assume cooperative control over whatever social resources they could, “We 
must create public opinion; it controls the world – vox populi, vox Dei, the voice of the people is 
the voice of God – and we must make that voice. How will we do it?”215  
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In the left populist view of Laclau and Mouffe, this process of creating public opinion – 
constructing a new hegemonic ideology to crystallize popular grievances – is the central 
dynamic of populist struggles. To motivate political action, the discourse of “the people” needs 
to be polarized against elites, a dynamic that, in Laclau’s terminology, creates an “antagonistic 
frontier” that divides the people from its enemies. He argues that movements must actively 
cultivate this frontier against an enemy, and that “if this frontier collapses, the ‘people’ as a 
historical actor disintegrates.”216 Yet the Alliance movement did not disintegrate for lack of 
antagonism to merchants and financiers; these elements of their experience remained constant. 
Terrel was encouraging Alliance members to read the Alliance press, debate its contents, 
communicate the Alliance vision to their fellow workers, and uphold the standard of their Party. 
What disintegrated this process of collective action was not a lack of antagonism, but the 
impossibility of securing credit for a national system of Alliances that would allow the 
cooperatives to displace the merchant system. As Macune understood clearly, the Alliance 
system suffered organizational defects imposed on it by the broader society. Merchants and 
bankers organized commodity-crop production through the coercive power of debt, and only 
politics could undermine this power.  
The imperative of political action to secure the rudiments of a cooperative 
commonwealth led to a number of difficult decisions. While the People’s Party had a number of 
electoral successes, the party itself was never fused to the Alliances sufficiently to make it a 
vehicle of the cooperative commonwealth. The height of Populist radicalism – the Omaha 
Platform – mobilized an electoral constituency, but the People’s Party did not hold its nerve as it 
built its electoral power, and its decision to fuse with the Democrats and attempt an internal take-
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over of their party meant that it sacrificed its independent posture and its independent mission. 
The political organ constituted to build the cooperative commonwealth abandoned the effort to 
institutionalize their experiments, sacrificing the radical demands of the Omaha Platform for 
bimetallism as opposed to the Sub-Treasuries and regulation of commercial infrastructure as 
opposed to nationalization. 
Even so, while greenbackers had also inspired the labor movement, and while Populists 
and the Knights of Labor often had close organizational connections, the Sub-Treasury plan was 
also an agrarian plan with no clear connection to the interests of other workers. As one Alliance 
member candidly acknowledged, the Sub-Treasury plan was not for the producing classes as a 
whole, but was a farmers’ program. Even so, “it has the merit of applying to an almighty large 
class, embracing as it does, all the wealth producers of the republic in its influence.” For this 
member, “Wealth producers” can apply in a singular way to farmers since, “every other class is 
absolutely dependent upon the class to be benefited by this plan.”217 Such a statement merely 
expresses the lack of close organizational connection within the party between the social-
democratic forces of groups like the Knights of Labor – who also aspired to democratized 
finance and had experiences coordinating cooperative experiments – with the social-democratic 
agrarian forces. Rather than a generic proposal for democratized finance, Sub-Treasury 
warehouses were an institutionalization of the Alliance cooperatives, and by making agriculture 
the locus of the productive surplus, the plan offered little to cooperators whose control over their 
own labor remained the subject of tense struggles with employers.  
At the same time, the agrarian/labor alliance need not have entailed this deficit of 
interconnection. Later European socialists often overlooked these possibilities of alliance, given 
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their experiences of capitalists appealing to farmers based on a common attachment to the 
centrality of private ownership for the social order as a whole. As Karl Kautsky wrote, “The 
capitalist parties themselves seek this coalition [with farmers], in part because they need votes, in 
part because of more profound reasons. They know that today the private property of small 
producers is the strongest support of the principle of private ownership in general, and therefore 
of their whole system of exploitation.”218 If this were uniformly true, labor’s goal should be to do 
as the Socialist Labor Party had done, to agitate against the People’s Party for the sake of a 
purely proletarian movement of property-less wage-laborers, encouraging radical Populists to 
abandon the People’s Party and join the electorally insignificant SLP.219 Yet even Engels, from 
the vantage of London, bemoaned the doctrinaire and socially weak trajectory of the SLP. Engels 
claimed in a letter to Friedrich Sorge that the SLP and a similar British party had, “managed to 
reduce the Marxian theory of development to a rigid orthodoxy, which the workers are not to 
reach themselves by their own class feeling, but which they have to gulp down as an article of 
faith at once and without development. That is why both of them remain mere sects and come, as 
Hegel says, from nothing through nothing to nothing.”220 What would have made the SLP not 
merely a “sect” would be matching the radical democratic quality of the Populist movement, 
which was rooted primarily in the creative experimentation of workers’ struggling directly 
against their own exploitation. Rather than a failure to conform to the definite interests of 
sociologically pure social classes, the impasses of agrarian/labor unity came from the inability of 
party delegates to synthesize popular demands in a shared program for cooperative democracy. 
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In other words, the struggles of American workers to forge social cooperation as a strategy for 
democratic self-determination were able to achieve a number of local successes, but they never 
created a political vehicle adequate to confront the political powers arrayed against them – the 
powers that governed the reproduction of the people’s own social relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The Protracted Struggle”: Eugene Debs, Socialist Unionism, and the Struggle for Cooperation 
“I am not a Labor Leader; I do not want you to follow me or anyone else; if you are looking for a 
Moses to lead you out of this capitalist wilderness, you will stay right where you are. I would not 
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lead you into the promised land if I could, because if I led you in, someone else would lead you 
out. YOU MUST use your heads as well as your hands, and get yourself out of your present 
condition; as it is now the capitalists use your heads and your hands.” – Eugene Debs221  
 
Eugene Debs was among the most prominent trade unionists to support the Populist 
movement. Not only did an anti-fusion contingent within the People’s Party support his 
nomination as the Party’s Presidential candidate in 1896, but Debs also lent active support to the 
Populist cause throughout the 1890’s. As early as 1891, he published the Omaha Platform in the 
Locomotive Fireman’s Magazine – a craft union journal he edited as part of his first work in the 
labor movement. In appended comments, he welcomed the possibility that, “a party is coming 
which will discard and anathematize class legislation and inaugurate a reign of justice,” but he 
was not yet prepared to endorse public ownership of the railways (at the time he believed the 
cost of administration would be borne by taxes on labor) and he considered the Sub-Treasury 
plan in need of further refinement if it were to serve labor’s interests or avoid excessive 
inflation.222 Even though Debs had been active in Democratic Party politics in Indiana since 
early adulthood, serving as both City Clerk in his hometown of Terre Haute and as a State 
Senator, by the early 1890’s he began to consider a political party independent of the power of 
wealth as the only democratic political force capable of capable of improving workers’ 
conditions. 
By August of 1894 – reeling from defeat in the Pullman strike and on his way to prison 
for violating a federal injunction – Debs’s commitment to the third party intensified. In a speech 
reproduced in the Kansas Populist journal People’s Voice, Debs declared, “I am Populist and am 
in favor of wiping both the old parties out so they will never come into power again. I have been 
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a Democrat all my life and I am ashamed to admit it.”223 As he claimed, he could not support a 
two-party system in which both parties keep their doors open for corporate bosses, while 
Populist leaders during Coxey’s march were arrested when they tried to give a speech on the 
steps of the Capitol.224 Nevertheless, when the Populists endorsed William Jennings Bryan on 
the Democratic ticket during the 1896 Presidential election, Debs softened his position toward 
the Democrats and actively campaigned for Bryan. When Bryan lost, Debs again picked up the 
third-party effort, and formed the Social Democracy of America (SDA) in 1897, an 
organizational embryo of the Socialist Party of America (SPA) founded four years later, which 
featured him as its Presidential candidate during the next two decades.  
As in the case of the Populists, interpreting Debs and the Socialist Party has been 
complicated by historical frameworks that fail to illuminate their theory and practice of 
cooperative democracy. In Debs’s case, these historical frameworks have often revolved around 
the relationship between socialism and iterations of American liberal nationalism developed 
during the Cold War. Looking back on Debs’s legacy during the 1950’s, Arthur Schlesinger 
introduced an edited volume of Debs’s writings and speeches that celebrated him as “a great 
American democrat. The radical passions of the Jacksonians, the Free Soilers, the Populists 
spoke through Debs – now only in the unaccustomed vocabulary of Socialism.”225 For 
Schlesinger, though, the goal of linking Debs to an American tradition of radical democracy was 
to vindicate American democracy, not socialism. In his view, Debs was an honorable figure not 
only because he courageously stood up for liberal rights like free speech when irresponsible 
leaders had sacrificed their Constitutional principles to the demands of expediency, but also 
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because he rejected “the conspiratorial disloyalties of the American Communist Party,” proving 
his commitment to America’s “democratic traditions of change through debate and consent.”226 
For Schlesinger, what mattered about Debs’s connection to the Populists was not their shared 
politics of cooperative democracy, but their shared politics of national allegiance, embedded in 
culture of dissent that fought “the political aspirations of the business community” without 
undermining the competitive pluralism of liberal governance or the imperatives of national 
security.227  
While Debs’s connection to the Populists is often noted by historians, his role in the labor 
and socialist movements often places him outside the parameters of many theories of populism. 
To the extent that theories of populism oppose populist politics based on the majoritarian ideal of 
“we, the people” to the more narrow class politics of industrial workers, they obscure both the 
continuities and discontinuities between Populism and Debsian socialism. A left-populist 
perspective gets us closer to grasping these relationships, but again, its focus on the discursive 
construction of a popular adversarial identity misses the nuance of Debs’s evolving critique of 
political economy grounded in an ideal of cooperation. From the left-populist perspective, an 
examination of Debs would emphasize whether he was able to transcend the economistic 
“workerism” of the Second International that Laclau and Mouffe claim narrowed socialists’ 
vision, preventing them from developing a genuinely “popular” coalition that mobilized 
antagonism based on anti-elite sentiment. According to this frame, the ability of Debs and the 
Socialist Party to construct the basis of a new cultural hegemony in opposition to the self-
justifications of capitalist elites would depend on how well he articulated the antagonisms latent 
in American political culture, mobilizing collective action toward the socialist project. Such an 
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approach might resonate with figures who admire Debs for both his socialism and his 
Americanism, and who understand the relative success of Debsian socialism as an effect of its 
cultural resonance with American workers. For Debs’s biographer Nick Salvatore, Debs was 
unique among radical figures for his capacity to translate American ideals of individualism and 
civic participation into a compelling vision of democratic socialism.228 
As we saw in the case of the Populists, a central emphasis on the discursive construction 
of collective identities within movements not only displaces conflict from the socio-economic to 
the cultural sphere, but it also tends to push aside the connections between self-transforming 
democratic agency and critiques of political economy that diagnose how exploitation structures 
social relations. Such approaches miss how the Populists and those who carried their legacy 
connected democratic agency and social-theoretic diagnosis in a politics of cooperative struggle. 
In Debs’s case, left-populist preoccupations also tend to reinforce an unfortunate tendency in the 
Socialist Party itself, which emerged primarily from its struggle to connect with the labor 
movement: a tendency to see the goal of socialist organization as ideological conversion to 
socialism measured by votes for Socialist politicians, rather than cooperative praxis embodied in 
the specific organizational activities of socialist unions. Continuous with the Populists and 
Knights, Debs and other socialists did not just proselytize for social change, but encouraged 
various forms of cooperative self-organization – in workers’ councils, agricultural coops, and 
mass strikes – which served as catalysts of collective empowerment premised on social struggle. 
Cooperative agency was not simply a pre-condition for political mobilization, but an effort to 
build the embryo of a democratic economy within the compromised conditions of the status quo, 
a necessary component of the Socialist Party’s struggle for political power and core ingredient of 
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how Debs understood democratic, egalitarian social transformation. Debsian socialists and 
radical Populists shared this radical democratic emphasis, which centered participatory, self-
forming agency in struggles against exploitation. As Debs’s quote at the opening of this chapter 
indicates, he understood the people developing their capacity to act as a constituent force as an 
elementary precondition of democratic, socialist change – a capacity that is always latent, and 
can emerge when empowered collectives come to see themselves as capable of reconstructing 
their own social relations. As Debs understood, eliciting this agency was not only a struggle 
against the ideas in workers’ heads, but a struggle against how capitalist society organizes social 
relations. As he indicates in the passage above, the capitalist labor process implies that it is 
capitalists who put workers’ “heads and hands” to use, and as his own aspirations for the labor 
movement show, the ability to recover the capacity for cooperative self-organization was a 
central way that workers could re-capture this alienated power. For this reason, one of Debsian 
socialism’s major stumbling blocks was the failure of the labor movement to institutionalize 
these practices of cooperative workplace democracy on a wide scale – practices that were 
nevertheless concretely developed by socialist unionists who sought to transform the despotic 
cooperation of the capitalist labor process into free, social cooperation.229  
Despite Debs’s continuities with the Populist radical democratic, cooperative legacy, his 
vision of democratic socialism also departed from the Populists’ vision of cooperative market 
reconstruction in important ways. At the center of these changes was the move from the radical 
greenback focus on distributional inequality to the socialist focus on the primacy of production 
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and property-relations in organizing society. While this shift was transformative – it called into 
question the meaning of popular “equal rights” to property as well as how social cooperation in 
the cooperative commonwealth was imagined – Debsian socialism was also in many respects an 
extension of the Populist ideal of achieving social control over “the great highways of life” to all 
socially necessary and collectively operated infrastructure, not an abrogation of Populism’s basic 
democratic principles.230 Even so, Debs departed from basic Populist conceptions of property 
rights and the market. Since Debs believed that the root of capitalist exploitation is capitalists’ 
control over means of production that can only be operated socially, allowing them to control the 
labor process and extract a surplus within the process of production by extending labor time 
beyond the cost of reproducing the worker, the very idea that private property rights represent a 
cornerstone of society needed to be challenged. Instead of a society built on “equal rights” to 
laborers as well as capitalists, Debs’s vision of socialism was premised on the ideal of shared 
enjoyment of socially produced wealth, manifest not simply in a more equal distribution of the 
surplus to individuals, but in the creation of forms of public affluence that elevate society as a 
whole.231 Significantly, the turn to socialism also implied that the “commercial” quality of 
Populist cooperation was transformed into an ideal of democratically organized industry, 
significantly altering the socialist perspective on the market. While we are accustomed to 
associating the socialist critique of the market as entailing a grey, “bureaucratic” or 
“economistic” ideal of a planned society, Debs himself envisioned democratically controlled 
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industry as a site of creative self-fulfillment. As he put it, in a socialist society, “The industrial 
dungeon will become a temple of science.”232   
These changes of focus do not simply result from the innovations of Debs or other 
socialists, but from concrete responses to the organizational and political difficulties of workers 
at the turn of the 20th century. For this reason, illuminating Debs’s innovations as a thinker does 
not just require comparing him to other intellectual figures, but reconstructing how he responded 
to the concrete problems thrown up by changes in the capitalist labor process, in the political 
balances of power confronted by organized labor, and the organizational capacities of workers in 
different locations in the scheme of social reproduction. In what follows, I show how Debs’s 
vision of socialism was not just a cultural artifact of a trans-historical “Americanism” 
hypostatized as the mythical-ideological basis of national unity, but the product of his concrete 
attempts to wrestle with, reconstruct, and occasionally reject inherited democratic expectations 
as he confronted new experiences of exploitation and collective empowerment. Too often, many 
have agreed with Debs’s biographer Ray Ginger that, “Debs was never the brains of his party.” 
As Ginger noted, “This description was endorsed by most Socialist leaders, whether radical or 
reformist. Although they acknowledged Debs’ “spiritual” leadership, they steadfastly contended 
that the was no thinker or theoretician.”233 Even though Debs did not write treatises, he did edit 
magazines, write articles and pamphlets, intervene in controversies, and give speeches 
throughout his entire adult life. Failing to accord Debs his intellectual due limits our ability to 
learn from his experiences. As Debs entered the labor movement in the 1880’s and 1890’s, he 
shared the Populist hope of securing parity between capital and labor by agitating for labor’s 
rights, a project that eventually inspired his association with the third-party effort. After his 
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defeat in the Pullman Strike, Debs began to reformulate his diagnosis of the obstacles to 
workers’ democracy, and developed a revolutionary ideal of cooperation that animated his hopes 
for a cooperative commonwealth. After the formation of the SPA, Debs’s struggled to transform 
the labor movement into a site of cooperative agency and the social basis for a political struggle 
against capitalism. In so doing, he had to wrestle not only with new capitalist technologies of 
labor discipline (predominantly the spread of Taylorist scientific management), but also the 
AFL’s domination of the labor movement and a divided working class. Ultimately, the SPA 
sought the hegemonic power to lead society in a new direction, not only by redefining common 
understandings of the general interest, but by forging social alliances among workers and by 
proving that the possibility of their comprehensive self-government existed in embryo in the 
current order. Nevertheless, business elites and their allies succeeded in locating the general 
interest in the nexus of private capital, economic growth, and consumer welfare. Despite their 
political failure, socialists developed an alternative vision that has not lost its persuasive power: 
capitalist interdependence reveals the inherently cooperative nature of social reproduction, but 
because it rests on exploitation, it ensures that the majority of its participants will never fully 
benefit from the fruits of their cooperative labor. A truly social form of cooperation would self-
consciously begin to ensure the reverse: that the common labor of all elevates everyone, so that 
society truly ‘works together’ for its common good.   
 
I. Capital, Labor, and Workers’ Control: The Idea of Workers’ Democracy in Debs’s 
Early Years 
To understand how Debs developed his vision of cooperative democracy, we first need to 
describe the social context in which his initial political struggles occurred. Debs came to political 
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consciousness as an active participant in the railway workers’ movement, and his initial ideology 
merged democratic aspirations descended from the American revolutionary heritage with the 
specific problems that defined workers’ craft organizations in the late 19th century. Based on the 
political assumption that all citizens are equal participants in popular sovereignty, how should 
their equality manifest within both the workplace and the broader economy? What kinds of 
property rights, patterns of ownership, and forms of association allowed power to be shared 
among the people and the majority to rule? In his early years, Debs accepted that both “capital” 
and “labor” have legitimate social roles with corresponding rights and duties. For workers’ 
organizations, the labor problem revolved around how to uphold workers’ civic equality and 
their capacity for political participation by re-adjusting the relations between capital and labor 
through both collective organization and political action. In these early years, the ideal of a 
cooperative commonwealth did not yet structure Debs’s politics. Experiences of egalitarian 
cooperation animated Debs’s political struggles, but they did not crystalize into a revolutionary 
political ideal until a series of impasses persuaded him that power between capitalists and 
laborers could never be freely shared. Rather than provide a stable structure for Debs’s 
worldview, national ideological expectations and narratives were transformed through Debs’s 
attempts to wrestle with the craft-union movement’s contradictory sources of power and 
vulnerability. 
To understand Debs’s early trajectory, Salvatore’s biography offers crucial insights, but it 
also reflects the limitations of a framework that centers national culture in an explanation of 
Debs’s career and working-class history more generally. Salvatore productively examines how 
Debs’ worldview was shaped by the social composition, political ideology, and ethical norms 
that defined his hometown of Terre Haute, Indiana and similar Western towns during the 19th 
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century. According to Salvatore, communities like Terre Haute tended to embrace an ideology of 
“deferential democracy,” a vision of politics and social harmony that united workers and 
business leaders around common project of community uplift and individual opportunity.234 As a 
hegemonic project, deferential democracy had clear economic underpinnings and social 
consequences. Despite the power that local business elites wielded over their neighbors, many 
citizens in rapidly developing towns believed that those elites’ private initiative brought common 
advancement. As long as their power did not solidify into permanent class distinctions that 
offended civic equality or hampered social mobility, most citizens accepted their entrepreneurial 
leadership and the opportunities it might create. For workers, aspiring to social mobility within 
this framework required deferring to business power. As Salvatore explains, local school 
systems, churches, and other cultural institutions enforced norms that straddled both democracy 
and deference within a general ideology “that stressed individual potential and community 
progress within the context of the political traditions of the American Revolutionary heritage.”235 
Just as that heritage emphasized equal opportunity and equality before the law, it counseled 
obedience to authorities and the imperative of hard work to justify individual advancement.  
Deferential democracy was also the ideological effect of business elites’ need to secure 
broad community support as a condition of their own prosperity. In the mid-19th century, “One 
could not aspire to financial greatness in a small Midwestern backwater,” so local elites were 
particularly keen to nurture an ideological consensus that ensured workers’ active participation in 
projects of economic development.236 Often, this meant embracing the “classless” elements of 
the American Revolutionary heritage for their own purposes. To maintain the ideological 
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consensus derived from Revolutionary ideals, elites not only had to deliver material benefits, but 
they also had to guard against allegations that their status derived from systemic factors that 
favored them as a class and erected barriers to the individual achievement of all. Since private 
ownership of capital could be perceived as one such factor, separations in the community 
between capitalists and laborers could not be seen to rend the civic bonds that made everyone a 
part of the same democratic people.  
The success of small entrepreneurial capital’s hegemony can be seen in the extent to 
which workers, including the young Debs, embraced it. In a US Senate hearing on labor 
conflicts, one worker expressed a widespread view when he asserted, “Now my view of capital 
and labor is that a community should exist between the capitalist and the laborer, instead of 
antagonistic feelings.”237 Statements like these were based on specific assumptions about 
political economy. Since laborers needed capitalists to provide employment, and capitalists 
needed laborers for production, they key to the labor problem was figuring out how to prevent 
each party from injuring the other while divining the shared interests that unite them in a 
common social project. As we saw in the last chapter, greenback theory was centered on this 
project, even as it transformed the apparently conciliatory ideal of equality between capital and 
labor into the radical demand for cooperative market reconstruction; though public control of 
banking and distributive infrastructure, the Populists sought to ensure that financial capital would 
receive a reward no greater than labor’s own power of production.  
Salvatore argues that Debs was right when he began to criticize this conception of class 
harmony, but he also claims that Debs was right to never depart from it completely, particularly 
its distinctively midwestern-American combination of civic idealism and communitarianism. In 
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his view, Debs’s ultimate ideal for a socialist society – the cooperative commonwealth – was 
deeply tied to his memory of the participatory democratic community of Terre Haute and the 
values of social harmony it instilled. When a fully industrial, capitalist United States undermined 
that vision of social harmony, he claims, Debs turned to socialism as an alternative vision of 
regenerated community.238 Yet to what extent did the “social harmony” of Terre Haute positively 
influence Debs’s mature vision of cooperation? Reconstructing his early work in the labor 
movement demonstrates how Debs’s mature vision of cooperation was one component of a 
general rejection of the ideal of “democratic” class harmony between capital and labor, and it 
shows how that rejection emerged from the evolution of his understanding of capitalism, 
democracy, and the kinds of political struggles necessary to bring about a cooperative society. 
Rather than an atavistic attachment to community harmony, Debs’s philosophy of cooperation 
developed out of an evolving diagnosis of material changes in American society and their social 
and political consequences. For this reason, “cooperation” did not imply the re-creation of 
harmonious community bonds that were rent by industrialism; instead, it named an egalitarian 
practice of power-sharing within both workplaces and communities that had to be actively 
created by social movements and could only develop its full potential in a political struggle that 
challenged the power of society’s ruling classes.  
To understand why Debs initially operated with the expectation of equal rights to both 
capital and labor, it is crucial to remember that this ideology was not a static system that simply 
denied class conflict; instead, it gave workers powerful outlets for class struggle and shaped 
specific forms of self-government that corresponded to the structural power accessible to 
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different groups of workers. Rather than deny that capital and labor can develop antagonistic 
interests, it only denied that conflicts between workers and capitalists derive from a fundamental 
antagonism rooted in capitalist social relations. While radical greenbackism expressed the 
egalitarian hopes of a number of farmers and proto-industrial workers who sought to strip 
financial despots of their accumulative power, 19th century craft workers on the railroads and 
within other industries sought to achieve parity between capital and labor by controlling 
workplace organization through their unions. While these workers often pushed the boundaries 
of their deference to capital during conflicts, their claims ultimately rested on criticism of 
specific injustices committed by capitalists rather than a systemic critique of capitalist society. 
Within this paradigm, class struggle takes the form of workers organizing to directly correct 
these injustices, and, if these efforts were impeded or failed, using their rights of political 
participation to change legislation and restore justice.  
Debs’s introduction to the labor movement was bound up in this basic theory and practice 
of trade unionism, and it permeated his work as a clerk and magazine editor for the Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Firemen (BLF), a fraternal society for railway workers that he joined in his mid-
20’s after a short stint working on the rails as a teenager. The Brotherhood was initially 
organized as a fraternal order and mutual insurance society, and like the Farmer’s Alliances, it 
was founded on the values of self-help and moral uplift. Railway workers formed the 
organization to protect themselves and their families from the catastrophic consequences of on-
the-job injury. As Ginger notes, “The wages of firemen did not permit them to pay the premiums 
charged by private companies; so, if they were injured or killed, their families were forced to rely 
on charity. The sole escape from this impoverishment rested in a co-operative insurance order of 
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the workers themselves.”239 In addition to providing insurance, the order hoped that by utilizing 
self-organization to improve workers’ character and provide for their common needs, they would 
improve their public image, control access to jobs, and garner higher wages from employers as a 
return for good performance. Through their organizations, they devised a vision of cooperation 
that revolved on the one hand around workers’ relationship to others members of their trade, and 
on the other hand, a vision of power-sharing between workers and employers rooted in a theory 
of the appropriate relationship between labor and capital.  
An essay called “Mutual Obligations” published when Debs was editor of the Magazine 
made clear that workers bore a heavy responsibility to uphold capital/labor harmony, reflecting 
the shared interest of both parties in efficient production. The essay stated that, “The locomotive 
fireman is to a certain extent the custodian of the property of his employer … He can be 
extravagant or economical in the use of fuel, which in the course of a year amounts to a 
considerable sum of money. If a fireman neglects his duty in this, if he is unmindful of his 
obligations in such cases, he falls short of being a first class fireman, he does not recognize 
mutual obligations.”240 Reciprocally, if firemen operate the property of their employers with 
economy and skill, employers must uphold their side of the bargain: “The railroad manager is 
under weighty obligations to treat the fireman as a man, a gentleman – honorably, justly … every 
right and privilege due to manhood should be recognized.”241 If employers fail to do so, workers 
had a duty to stand collectively against the injustice. 
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While these rights and privileges were often embedded in cultural norms tied to 
masculinity, religion, and public duty, they also reflected a democratic vision of workers’ 
cooperation, manifest in their shared control over the labor process. In general, by negotiating 
wages, regulating pacing and output, and educating new members, craft organizations protected 
a fair share of profits and preserved joint control over the workplace. In part, craft-workers’ 
ability to exercise shared control derived from an asset that employers did not possess: skilled 
knowledge of the production process, what the historian David Montgomery called “the 
manager’s brain under the workman’s cap.”242 Through their organizations, “Technical 
knowledge acquired on the job was embedded in a mutualistic ethical code, also acquired on the 
job, and together these attributes provided skilled workers with considerable autonomy at their 
work and powers of resistance to the wishes of their employers.”243 When craft unions 
formalized these codes, they often referred to them as “legislation,” a term that “denotes a shift 
from spontaneous to deliberate collective action, from a group ethical code to formal rules and 
sanctions, and from resistance to employers’ pretensions to control over them.”244 Workers’ 
legislation set wage levels, established terms for apprenticeship, regulated the calendar, and set 
output targets that not only governed the firm’s operation but often set the duration of the 
working day.245 The collective autonomy derived from self-legislation, combined with an ethical 
vision of preserving workers’ dignity alongside that of employers, was a resource for democratic 
self-determination and class conflict, although it often remained compatible with employers’ 
property rights and the authority that those rights implied within the firm. Even without 
ownership of the means of production, skilled workers could run a significant portion of the 
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labor process according to their own democratic legislation. When employers refused to 
acknowledge their rules, organized workers could strike, slow down production, or turn to 
politics.246  
BLF workers operated within this basic paradigm of craft union democracy, harnessing 
the structural power of their skills, ethical code, and capacity for self-organization. As for similar 
craft organizations, this power was accessible without federating in a common organization with 
other railway crafts, and it required a sympathetic posture toward employers for the purposes of 
negotiation. As Montgomery explains, “In general, where a union was strong enough to defy its 
employers alone and where no major technological innovations threatened its members’ work 
practices, it tended to reach an accommodation with the employers on the basis of the latter’s 
more or less willing recognition of the union’s work rules.”247 Within craft-union democracy, 
workers’ cooperation therefore had a limited scope. Cooperation linked experiences in the shop, 
where new workers were conscripted into the trade’s ethical code and developed the capacity to 
participate in workplace legislation, to industry-wide organizations that defined the practices of 
the trade. Unlike for workers in the more radical Knights of Labor, cooperation in the Railway 
Brotherhoods remained restricted to the specific work experience of the designated craft. 
Cooperation did not extend into the domain of ownership, nor did it seek to transform exchange 
relations among workplaces. Instead, workers’ control meant the collective legislation of work 
rules for distinct trades in privately owned firms. 
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While the BLF did find real power in a combination of deference to employers, 
organizational capacity, and mutualistic ethics, the organization radicalized during Debs’s 
tenure, spurred by the experiences of its rank and file. In 1877, railway workers had played a 
leading role during “the Great Upheaval,” the first mass strike wave in United States history. A 
nationwide series of strikes began when railway workers stopped the freight lines in response to 
a 10% pay cut issued by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. When the Brotherhoods did nothing to 
respond to the cut or support those on strike, workers formed a secret organization called The 
Trainmen’s Union to coordinate work stoppages along the railway line from Baltimore to 
Chicago.248 In response to the violent suppression of the strike by both state and federal 
authorities, a wave of strikes spread throughout the country, ranging across dozens of trades in 
cities from Chicago to Buffalo and Galveston. During a general strike in St. Louis that endured 
for days coordinated by the socialist Workingmen’s Party, railway workers re-opened the 
passenger lines under their own authority independent of management.249 By the end, President 
Rutherford B. Hayes admitted that “The strikers have been put down by force”, leaving more 
than 100 workers killed, including at least one railway fireman.250  
The Brotherhoods responded to the Great Upheaval by cautioning workers against risky 
strikes that undermined their public standing and invited repression. Organizations like the BLF 
wanted members to uphold craft rules and direct their self-help organizations toward relatively 
isolated negotiations with employers. In 1880, Debs himself echoed these ideals at a BLF 
convention, stating, “In times gone by, laboring men who had been imposed on, formed 
themselves into a mob and with a recklessness that makes us shudder, began to burn and plunder 
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the property of the corporations they were working for … While we always sympathized with 
these deluded and miserable wretches, we have always felt that they were wrong in acting so 
violently.”251 Statements like these issued in part from the imperative to protect the real 
negotiating power with employers that allowed workers to control significant aspects of the 
parameters of their own labor.  
Debs did not hold these views for long. Foremost among the factors that moved him 
away from the BLF’s cautious approach to conflict was his antipathy to the ways that capitalist 
power manifested politically – that is, how the power of wealth corrupted democratic procedures 
that were supposed to allow the majority to rule. While craft-union democracy often focused on 
redressing particular injustices (a wage cut, unfair dismissal, speed-ups), the actions of capital, 
labor, and the state during events like the Great Upheaval did not seem to point to particular 
injustices, but to systemic corruption. During the strike wave, the state had clearly sided with 
capital over labor; the B&O Railroad President’s request for the violent suppression of the strike 
was swiftly granted, while workers did not even get a hearing. Were railroad workers no less 
citizens of the republic than a railroad president? Capital proved not only that it was continually 
willing to act unilaterally and despotically toward labor, but that it would freely call on violent 
state aid to ensure that labor conflicts were resolved in their favor. If the state was more 
accountable to back-room dealings with capitalists than workers and their representatives, were 
the people sovereign in name only? In Debs’s view, labor organizations needed to prove 
themselves adequate to these challenges if they were to remain true to their democratic mission. 
Not only did this imply re-thinking labor’s posture toward politics, but it required challenging 
craft exclusivity to create common organizations capable of coordinating mass labor action and 
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effectively representing all workers. Not only did craft-union localism alone lack the 
organizational capacity or political weight to get to the root of these problems, but the forms of 
cooperation they nurtured seemed under threat without a change in strategy.  
By the mid-80’s, Debs became convinced that labor needed to learn how to strike 
peacefully to protect its interests, and he sought to develop labor’s strike capacity through larger 
federations among the Railroad Brotherhoods. Eventually, he was able to successfully organize a 
Supreme Council of The United Orders of Railway Employees, which would ensure that if a 
strike were required to protect the rights of a particular craft, all workers would be ordered off 
the job. Without ever having to order a strike, the mere existence of the united organization 
helped to prevent unionized workers from being fired, secure wage increases, and enforce 
contracts.252 While united effort based on a federated principle clearly worked for some aims, it 
retained a vulnerable underbelly. Excising that vulnerability came at a cost, though, since it was 
linked to some the federation’s sources of power. Craft codes – derived from the concrete 
experiences of performing specific tasks in the division of labor with integrity and expertise – 
were essential to workers’ ethical norms and their ability to exercise collective control over the 
labor process. At the same time, particularistic craft identities also entrenched contradictory 
interests between firemen, engineers, and switch and brake operators, not to mention other 
railway workers like porters and maids who were excluded from the federation entirely.253 
Rather than stay off the job, resentful workers might even scab when an isolated craft called a 
strike, often to retaliate for the corrosive effects of inter-group competition.254 Initially, Debs 
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imagined that the Council would allow full craft autonomy while maintaining collective 
discipline for negotiations and strikes. Yet in many respects a loosely federated organization was 
not a common organization. A large-scale organization needed its own ideology that would not 
entrench but transcend craft interests, that would be willing to organize disciplined strikes when  
necessary, and that would provide an industry-wide and ultimately broadly popular vision of 
social change.  
These aspirations were embodied in the American Railway Union (ARU), which Debs 
co-founded in 1893, breaking from the Railway Brotherhoods. During the ARU’s first national 
convention, Debs declared,  
The forces of labor must unite. They dividing lines must grow dimmer day by day until they 
become imperceptible, and then labor’s hosts, marshalled under one conquering banner, shall 
march together, vote together and fight together, until working men shall receive and enjoy all 
the fruits of their toil. … Such an army would be impregnable. No corporation would assail it. 
The reign of justice would be inaugurated. The strike would be remanded to the relic chamber of 
the past. An era of good will and peace would dawn.255  
 
While the move to form an industry-wide labor federation was considered “dual unionism” and 
treason by some labor leaders like Samuel Gompers,256 Debs’s aspirations were more concretely 
egalitarian than ever before. He hoped that large-scale industrial unions would tend “to eliminate 
the aristocracy of labor, which unfortunately exists, and organize them so all will be on an 
equality.”257 At this point, Debs conceived of the ARU as a vehicle of a form of industrial 
democracy that realized workers’ civic equality on the job, not as the vehicle of a cooperative 
society. Successful organization and political participation would make labor the equal of capital, 
institutionalizing a form of capital/labor corporatism that could ensure both social justice (the 
wages, working hours, and on-the-job authority that made workers co-participants in industrial 
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management), and democratic representation in politics (insulated by labor’s strong hand from 
the corrupting influence of capitalist power).  
To forge a common ideology for labor, Debs often appealed beyond craft-workers ethical 
codes and sought to connect the labor movement to transformative moments in American 
history, constructing a vision of the labor movement as a broad, popular movement that included 
all American workers within its ranks. Even if they were not always successful, these appeals to 
a broad hegemonic vision demonstrate Debs’s commitment to focusing labor’s attention both 
within and beyond the workplace, tackling fundamental questions about the direction of 
American society. Even before the ARU’s formation, Debs’s encouraged the workers’ 
movement to see its work as continuous with the abolitionists. In the Locomotive Firemen’s 
Magazine, he wrote, “There are abolitionists now … those who behold every day other wrongs 
which they have set out to abolish, wrongs of a character which will admit of neither truce nor 
compromise, nothing will answer the requirement but their abolition.”258 Like some anti-slavery 
abolitionists, Debs considered abolition as the fulfillment of political citizenship. In Debs’s view, 
labor was wronged by capital not only because workers were kept poor in a wealthy society, but 
because capitalist injuries “sap the foundations of citizenship” and undermine the social 
infrastructure that permits workers to engage in self-government. Such political inequality 
undermined what Debs called “fair play” between workers and managers on the job, and it also 
allowed capitalists to wield disproportionate power over the courts and the political system.259 In 
Debs’s view, workers’ struggles needed to target both economic unfairness and political 
corruption: “The men who do the work demand fair pay for their labor, decent food, decent 
clothing, decent shelter, homes, such as become American sovereigns, clothed with the high 
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responsibilities of shaping the destinies of the great American Republic.”260 Much the way some 
imagined abolition as a corrective to the American political system cleansed of the evils of 
slavery, Debs argued that, “The revolution now in progress is not to change the form of 
government, it is not to abolish courts, overthrow institutions, but rather to make government, 
courts, institutions subserve the happiness of the American people. We have sovereignty of the 
people, we have equality of conditions and responsibilities. We have made the ballot the 
standard. The majority must rule.”261 While this connection failed to persuade a majority of ARU 
workers on the imperative of racial equality, it reflects both Debs’s vision of abolitionism as a 
common labor struggle and their connection as an orienting frame for a fully popular movement. 
While Debs intensified the radicalism of his political critique of industrial relations, he 
did not yet embrace socialism or break with a cardinal element of the “class harmony” thesis: 
that antagonism between capital and labor emerged from a breach of justice, not from the 
inherent social relations structuring production. In his essay on the abolitionists, he claimed that 
the conflict between capital and labor is not a conflict between social classes, but “a conflict 
between right and wrong, truth and error, justice and injustice, a conflict between citizens who 
make everything, build everything and the men who simply supervise and manage.”262 
Nevertheless, the head of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) Daniel DeLeon greeted the formation 
of the ARU as, “a step in the direction of clasping hands with the whole working class in other 
industries,” and claimed that rather than advance narrow vision of workers’ craft democracy, it 
raised, “the real question … – the abolition of the capitalist system of production, the 
establishment of the co-operative commonwealth.”263  
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II. Populism, Socialism, and the Cooperative Commonwealth 
Despite their enthusiasm for the ARU’s founding, the SLP was clear that the new union’s 
vision was not socialist. An editorial in their journal The People welcomed the organization’s 
break from the craft Brotherhoods’ conservatism, but objected to its hope that labor could be 
made into capital’s equal bargaining partner through organization. While the ARU claimed that 
in the long run, “if the whole trade is organized the company will yield without first awaiting the 
strike,” the socialists argued that capital’s social power and its relationship to the state would 
never allow labor to develop such power. For labor to develop the power to organize and direct 
society along democratic and cooperative lines, it would not only have to undermine capitalists’ 
capacity to treat labor unjustly, but abolish capital’s power over labor entirely. For the SLP, 
“Capital and labor do not stand in the relation of brothers, not even in that of partners, but in the 
relation of Exploiter and Exploited, of Master and Slave.”264 In this struggle between exploiter 
and exploited, labor’s appeal to the neutral arbitration of the state and the courts will always be 
compromised as long as political power is shaped by capitalist economic power. In the socialist 
diagnosis, the centrality of labor exploitation for the reproduction of society as a whole meant 
that political and legal power derive fundamentally from economic power. This implies that the 
state not only would not, but could not function as neutral party between workers and employers. 
Since the reproduction of society depends on the normal operation of capitalist industry, which 
directly presumes the subjugation of labor, the existing state has an elementary imperative to 
buttress capital against labor. The strike wave of 1877 had demonstrated this. Paralyzing the 
railroads caused a general social crisis, and combined elite and popular clamoring for the 
restoration of commercial activity resulted directly in state violence. Instead of an arbiter 
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between capital and labor, the state functioned as “the citadel of capital,” meaning that, “While 
the Government is in the hands of capitalists, labor has no chance of emancipation.”265 While 
industry-wide organization was a step in the right direction, the SLP argued that the only solution 
to the labor problem was for labor to develop economic organizations attached to a political 
party. The ARU’s own goals could not be realized “until the economic and the political 
movement are recognized as inseparable … until Labor marches, its left hand protecting it with 
the shield of economic organization, and its right hand armed with the sword of its own political 
party.” While the SLP argued that the ARU’s diagnosis failed to recognize the full extent of 
labor’s problems, its writers claimed that, “there is a prospect they will soon be.”266 
While Debs would later accede to much of this criticism, he only embraced socialism 
after confronting the ARU’s own impasses. And while the SLP envisioned the labor movement 
defensively (as a “shield”) and the real political struggle as a contest for control over the state, 
Debs’s vision of socialism hinged on the labor movement’s constructive qualities, specifically on 
unions’ ability to recover workers’ capacities for democratic self-management, preparing them to 
operate society’s means of production cooperatively. How to transform the labor movement into 
a site for the formation of cooperative agency, how the experiences of cooperative labor within 
capitalism would relate to the socialists ideal of a cooperative commonwealth, and how labor 
unions would relate to the Socialist Party were all subjects of serious debate and even 
organizational splits among the burgeoning socialist movement. To appreciate the role of 
cooperation in Debs’s turn to socialism, we need to move beyond doctrinal explanations of his 
conversion (the often-repeated idea that he became a socialist after reading Marx in prison), and 
show how the ideal of socialist cooperation emerged out of an immanent critique of the 
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economic and political dilemmas of craft-union democracy and industrial unionism. Ultimately, 
Debs believed that cooperation not only meant shared decision-making in the workplace, but a 
new organization of society – the cooperative commonwealth – that would invest the social 
surplus in the cultural elevation of all of society’s members considered as equals. Concretely, 
this vision of the cooperative commonwealth manifested in a series of anticipatory demands that 
could be articulated by workers, but only realized through the political victory of the Socialist 
Party: the conversion of workers’ coerced surplus labor into liberated free time; the cooperative 
organization of the labor process according to collective deliberation; production for social use 
rather than for private profit; and democratic investments of the social surplus that prioritize the 
res publica (“public things”) to private affluence. 
Before Debs developed these views, the ARU’s aspiration for industrial peace between 
big capital and big labor appeared plausible, and Debs had immediate reasons to keep the SLP’s 
criticism at arms’ length. The ARU’s first victory in a non-violent, highly disciplined strike 
against the Great Northern Railroad soon after its formation seemed to validate Debs’s hope that 
when “Labor can organize,” it would be able to “demand and command.”267 Yet soon after the 
Great Northern victory, the ARU’s defeated strike against the Pullman Palace Car Company 
revealed to Debs how thoroughly the state and capital were interpenetrated and how remote the 
ideal of state neutrality between capital and labor truly was. Not only did the federal government 
break the strike through an unprecedented arrogation of power to the federal judiciary 
(consolidated when the Supreme Court in “In Re Debs” unanimously upheld the legality of the 
federal injunction), but Debs was also sent to prison directly by a judge, without jury trial.268 In 
the Pullman strike, strikers had the representation of an industrial union that had proven its 
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capability to organize disciplined strikes and bring companies to the bargaining table. Even so, 
the state did not act as a neutral arbiter in the conflict. Instead, the Attorney General Richard 
Olney coordinated directly with an employers association formed by Pullman executives and 
other major railway officials to break the strike, who were able to secure the use of federal troops 
to break the strike against not only the ARU’s protest, but the protest of the mayor of Chicago 
and the Governor of Indiana.269 From Debs’s point of view, when the majority opinion in “In re 
Debs” declared that Debs’s punishment should serve as, “a lesson which cannot be learned too 
soon or too thoroughly that under this government of and by the people the means of redress of 
all wrongs are through the courts and the ballot box, and that no wrong, real or fancied, carries 
with it legal warrant to invite as a means of redress the co-operation of a mob, with its 
accompanying acts of violence,” the Court had only proved how safe these institutions had been 
made for capitalist control.270 
In a speech delivered after his release from prison, Debs still believed that, however 
corrupted, American institutions were based on popular sovereignty and amenable to democratic 
transformation under majority rule. In a speech delivered upon his release, he said of the ballot,  
There is nothing in our government it cannot remove or amend. It can abolish unjust laws and 
consign to eternal odium and oblivion unjust judges … It can sweep away trusts, syndicates, 
corporations, monopolies, and every other abnormal development of the money power designed 
to abridge the liberties of the workingmen and enslave them by the degradation incident to 
poverty and enforced idleness, as cyclones scatter the leaves of the forest. The ballot can do all 
this and more. It can give our civilization its crowning glory – the co-operative 
commonwealth.271  
  
While in prison, Debs did not lose his faith in the power of electoral democracy to fight systemic 
corruption, but he did begin to re-consider the economic assumptions on which his strategy for 
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the labor movement had been based.272 In a retrospective essay about his discovery of socialism 
written in 1902, Debs called the Pullman strike his “first practical lesson in Socialism, though 
wholly unaware it was called by that name.” By 1902, he had come to regard his aspirations for 
the ARU as naïve, specifically, his hope that “if [workers] were only organized in every branch 
of the service and all acted together in concert they could redress their wrongs and regulate the 
conditions of their employment.”273 Before his encounter with socialist theory, he wrote that “no 
shadow of a “system” fell athwart my pathway,” and he believed that strong unions and 
democratically accountable politicians could harness the power to institute and enforce just labor 
relations. After his encounter with socialist theory, Debs believed this strategy could only lead to 
“perfecting wage-servitude,” since corporatist arrangements between big capital and big labor 
failed to uproot the source of capitalist power over labor: their private ownership of means of 
production that could only be operated collectively.274 These insights, he claimed, began to 
appear in the midst of the Pullman strike itself, during “a swift succession of blows that blinded 
me for an instant and then opened wide my eyes – and in the gleam of every bayonet and the 
flash of every rifle the class struggle was revealed.”275  
When Debs wrote that “the class struggle was revealed” he was not only referring to the 
state’s violence against strikers, but to the socialist critique of political economy that he first 
encountered in prison. After this encounter, Debs no longer believed that conflict between capital 
and labor resulted from injustices committed by either side, but that it was rooted in capitalist 
society’s basic property relations. More specifically, this meant that he no longer understood the 
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relationship between capital and labor as a relationship between labor’s instruments and living 
labor. Capital is not merely a set of tools – productive machinery, investment, and finance – that 
laborers should master and use. Instead, capital is a form of social power over labor. Properly 
understood, capital is not an object of utility, but a social relation that governs how society’s 
productive assets are deployed in the process of social reproduction.276 Capital’s social power is 
rooted in private ownership and control of productive assets that could only be operated 
collectively, which vests capitalists with the authority to direct production and become the 
masters of laborers, control the surplus they produced, and transform themselves into a ruling 
class. In other words, capital and labor stand in the relation of exploiter and exploited, and are 
not partners in a common enterprise whose interests unfortunately tend to conflict. Politically, 
this means that capital does not need to be mastered by labor; it needs to be abolished.  
 Despite this retrospective assessment, Debs did not join the existing socialist party after 
leaving prison – the Socialist Labor Party – but allied his work with the ARU to the People’s 
Party. What connected Debs to the People’s Party was not only their common enemies in the 
ruling elite, but a common interest in organizing the majority of society’s workers in a political 
project to construct a cooperative society. Even before Debs’s release from prison, The Railway 
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Times had published essays, poetry, and reports on cooperation and had forged alliances with 
Populists. One poem crystallized a central aspect of how both Populists and Socialists 
understood cooperation, namely that each individual’s effort should not be directed toward their 
merely private gain, but should contribute to the general elevation of all: “He is not truly great/ 
Who does not elevate/ As he toils on and upward, all his fellow-men./ Rise, then, by raising 
others;/ Co-operate my brothers;/ You speed your own and all men’s evolution then.”277 In 
similar fashion to the radical greenbackers, one writer for the ARU’s magazine not only 
challenged capitalists’ domineering power, but their prerogative to dramatically accumulate 
value, which the author castigated as a criminal effect of the competitive system and 
incompatible with democracy. Similar to the Populists, the essay lamented how a small minority 
possessed such an outsized portion of the legal representation of economic value (money), in a 
country that nominally respected the “equal rights” of all (including their rights to property). In 
all cases, the author argued, lawful management of property requires some regulation for the 
public’s health and safety, implying that “the abstract rights of the one man [the property owner] 
are abridged for the good of all men.” If we accept that basic principle, why is “the absorption 
and gathering in of capital” exempt?278 Such absorptive power is similarly injurious to the public 
good, manifest in the “undue, unhealthy, and autocratic power” it vests in capitalists; “millions 
today are feeling its lash in the restriction of liberty.”279 For the author, capital’s crimes are not 
the result of bad actors or simply the results of private control of banking, but are “the effects of 
the doctrine of competition run wild.”280 Yet at this point, how and why “the competitive 
system” produced such dramatic inequalities was still unclear. Did competition just imply that 
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the strong unfairly trampled the weak, in a generic sense? Or were there mechanisms in the 
competitive economy that could be directly traced to labor’s exploitation and its political 
domination?  
When Debs allied with the Populists, he was closest to the most cooperatively oriented 
anti-fusionists within the Populist movement, who considered him a potential Presidential 
candidate on their independent ticket. The Railway Times not only encouraged ARU members to 
vote for Populist candidates, but also advertised a “Cooperative Congress” called by members of 
People’s Party, which proposed, “the inauguration of measures that will tend to supersede the 
present competitive system and usher in a co-operative civilization.”281 Opposing the 
“competitive system” to “a co-operative civilization” revealed the direction in which Debs was 
heading, but he did not yet formulate what that would mean concretely. After Debs refused to 
stand for nomination as the People’s Party’s presidential candidate,282 he actively encouraged 
railway workers to support Bryan. In his address to railway workers on the Democratic 
campaign, Debs claimed that, however important the gold standard may be to some financiers, it 
was not at the root of ruling class devotion to McKinley. The battle of the standards, he claimed, 
would not inspire railroad executives to “turn earth, heaven, and hell” in their effort to 
discourage votes for Bryan; instead, it was Bryan’s promise to curb the courts’ power to issue 
injunctions that led to railway executive panic.283 The money question, Debs claimed, had been 
seized on by the Republicans to frighten workers that departure from the gold standard would 
wreck the national economy and lead to wage-cuts and unemployment; in truth, the ability to 
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freely receive injunctions was actually what Debs called “the milk in the cocoanut,” and Bryan’s 
opposition to that power made him a true friend of the working class.284 If Bryan could begin to 
transform the Democratic party in the interests of labor, Debs considered his candidacy worth 
active support. To help rally railroad workers behind his campaign, Debs claimed that, 
“American railroads consist largely of British gold and American labor. Government by 
injunction crowns the former king, and makes the latter his subject. The platform upon which 
William J. Byran stands is pledged to abolish this despotic usurpation of judicial power, and 
restore to railway employes [sic] their lawful right to resist reduction and injustice by the lawful 
means provided by their organizations.”285   
Debs’s claim that “American railroads consist largely of British gold and American 
labor” might have generated affective antagonism among workers who admired their 
revolutionary heritage, but as he likely knew at the time, his statement was not only a fraction of 
the story, but it actually deflected workers’ attention from the roots of their oppression: the 
private ownership and control of the capital they set into motion on a daily basis. After Byran’s 
defeat, Debs co-founded The Social Democracy of America, which began to formulate a 
program based on the specific socialist critique of exploitation. In an interview with Debs about 
the organization’s founding, the interviewer reflected the deep connection that Debs drew 
between socialism and a cooperative society. They wrote that, “as a cure for the evils which he 
claims are inherent to the system, Mr. Debs proposes co-operation – co-operation so wide in its 
applications, so general in its nature, so all pervading in  its scope, that altogether different 
conditions would surround human life and human effort under its control.”286 While he had 
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called the cooperative commonwealth civilization’s “crowning glory” after his release from 
prison, Debs now belonged to an organization intent on achieving a comprehensive form of 
social cooperation, dismantling “the competitive system” that had kept workers subjugated, and 
overturning how ruling classes had colonized the power of the state, undermining its connection 
to the sovereign people.  
For this task, Debs found essential resources in the socialism of the Second International. 
In the 1902 essay on his discovery of socialism, Debs singled out Karl Kautsky as a particularly 
important guide. As he put it, “the writings of Kautsky were so clear and conclusive that I readily 
grasped, not merely his argument, but also caught the spirit of his Socialist utterance – and I 
thank him and all who helped me out of darkness and into light.”287 While there is no confirmed 
account of everything Debs read in prison, if he read anything by Kautsky in 1894, he would 
have read his explanation of the German Social Democratic Party’s Erfurt Program, published in 
English as The Class Struggle, and first translated by DeLeon.288 By offering a “systemic” theory 
of capitalism, Kautsky helped Debs grasp what capitalist competition implied for both workers 
and capitalists, and it also helped account for the democratic possibilities Debs saw within labor 
organizations and capitalists’ powerful resources for combatting them. Crucially, Kautsky’s 
theory also clarified a central task of the socialist movement, even if his own answer was often 
unclear: how to convert the forms of mass cooperation created by the capitalist labor process into 
free and empowering social cooperation. Or, as William Clare Roberts has put it recently, how to 
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negotiate the dynamic where, “the cooperation imposed despotically by capital compels laborers 
to search for a new form of cooperation.”289 
A brief exposition of Kautsky’s argument will help clarify what Debs inherited from his 
analysis and how his later activity in the Socialist movement expanded upon it. Following Marx, 
Kautsky argued that the imperative of economic competition is not the result of capitalists’ 
avarice or their propensity for injustice, but follows from capitalist society’s basic property 
relations. As he explained, private ownership of the means of production implies economic 
regulation by “the blind force of free competition” since the combination of private title and the 
profit motive structurally inhibits regulation through common deliberation:  
Never yet did any system of production stand in such need of careful direction as does the 
present one. But the institution of private property makes it impossible to introduce plan and 
order into this system. While the several industries become, in point of fact, more and more 
dependent upon one another, in point of law, they remain wholly independent. The means of 
production in every single industry are private property; their owner can do with them as he 
pleases.290  
 
Private ownership of capital implies that decisions about production and exchange respond to the 
profit interest of capitalists, and since capitalist enterprises live and die by profit, competition for 
market share, technological superiority, and other advantages ineluctably shapes capitalists’ 
decision-making. Crucially, though, even as competition saturates inter-capitalist economic 
relations, Kautsky argued that competition had already begun to exhaust itself, as a few firms 
had begun to systematically win out over their rivals, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of 
industrial concentration. Not only are victorious enterprises incentivized to suppress competition, 
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but they have a variety of ways to do so. Some, for instance, develop the ability to bring distinct 
branches of industry under their control, like American railroad companies that had recently 
begun operating coal mines. And when invested well, the increased profits of large firms can 
grow proportionally faster than the smaller profits of weaker competitors, augmenting both their 
economic and political power.291  
Despite the fact that competition based on private profit leads to both coordination 
problems and monopoly power, Kautsky believed that capitalist competition has a positive side, 
insofar as it lays the groundwork for a new society based on free cooperation. Competition 
incentivizes the development of labor-saving technologies, integrating “the natural sciences and 
their practical application” into economic development more than any previous economic 
system.292 These developments were clearly positive, and could benefit everyone insofar as they 
lessen labor’s burden. Additionally, industrial concentration constitutes an inherent, partial fix 
for the problems of capitalist coordination, since it helps to rationalize production and 
distribution, paving the way for socialist planning. In the meantime, though, Kautsky was clear 
that competition was socially corrosive, and his critique of competition constituted an ethical 
core of his positive vision of socialism. Unlike many contemporary economists, Kautsky did not 
just analyze competition as a regulator of economic interaction, but as a general aspect of 
capitalist social relations and ideology. Looking at the labor side of the capital/labor divide, 
Kautsky explained that one of capitalism’s distinctive aspects is that economic competition 
becomes generalized beyond its prior boundaries in pre-capitalist forms of commerce, which 
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transforms society’s overall culture. In pre-capitalist societies, subsistence production and 
various forms of moral economy had once regulated the provision of basic necessities among the 
poor, and commerce was the provenance of the wealthy. Yet in capitalism, “Commerce today no 
longer caters simply to superfluity and luxury. The whole system of production, yes, even the 
sustenance of the people, in a capitalist country, depends on the free and unrestricted action of 
commerce.”293 In this way too, capitalism departs from all previous forms of social organization, 
since generalized commodity production and general market dependence means that workers 
must rely on wages to secure the necessities of life. Access to wages depends on access to work, 
which also implies competition among workers for the jobs they need to survive. Since the labor 
market ensures that workers compete with one another for work, competition not only pervades 
the calculations of mine owners, railroad managers, and merchants, but all members of society.  
For Kautsky, as well as for Debs and the SDA, injecting competition so deeply into 
public culture produces ideological distortions that have a corrosive effect on morals. These 
distortions often manifest in one or another form of social Darwinism, where competition is 
understood as the basis of society because it is imagined as the basis of all natural interaction: 
‘the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence.’ In Kautsky’s view, only a scientific 
analysis of capitalism can counter these false ideologies by demonstrating the system’s 
artificiality; it is not natural, but the social product of the long, internal collapse of European 
feudalism and its forms of politics, social organization, and empire. Seen clearly, there is nothing 
natural about capitalist competition, and it does not punish the naturally unfit. Instead, it 
punishes those who do not or cannot conform to the social power it recognizes and rewards: 
“The fact is, however, that competition crushes, not so much the truly unfit, as those who happen 
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to stand in the wrong place, and those who either happen to lack the special qualifications or, 
what is more important, the capital to survive.”294 For Kautsky, the alternative to this 
arrangement was to harness the possibility for cooperation that capitalism created within a labor 
movement that sought to transcend capitalist production entirely, substituting competitive 
“production for sale” with cooperative “production for use.” Though still vague, this distinction 
denotes the difference between a market system that measures need by ability to pay and where 
patterns of consumption are shaped by private actors’ ambition for profits, and a cooperative 
system where social utility (rather than market demand) is the criterion of distribution.295  
The SDA’s newspaper, The Social Democrat, reflected the influence of socialist theory, 
and its authors published a number of critiques of competition alongside essays that imagined a 
cooperative system of production in which society’s labor would elevate everyone, rather than 
merely serve to empower a privileged class. In its first Declaration of Principles, the SDA argued 
that that the class struggle was rooted in labor’s exploitation by capitalists: “While in former 
times the individual labored on his own account, with his own tools, and was the master of his 
products, now dozens, hundreds, and thousands of men work together in shops, mines, factories, 
etc., co-operating according to the most efficient division of labor, but they are not the masters of 
their products.”296 In line with Kautsky, Debs and the SDA were clear that a system of 
cooperative production for use would not emerge fully formed, but would instead emerge out of 
a struggle within the un-democratic and exploited forms of cooperation developed by capitalist 
society. Yet how and where new forms of cooperation would develop, and defining what exactly 
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made socialist cooperation qualitatively different from capitalism became core problems for the 
new organization.  
Difficulties arose in part because answers to the problem offered by prominent socialist 
theorists like Kautsky left a number of important problems unaddressed – most centrally, 
problems related to agency. A form of agency needed to be devised that would not only mobilize 
workers, but leverage their collective power to disrupt the capitalist labor process, and at the 
same time create the seedbeds of new practices of non-exploitative cooperation. While Kautsky 
did stake socialism’s possibility on the political agency of the labor movement, it was unclear 
from Kautsky’s text how exactly the activities of socialist unions would begin to transform the 
despotic cooperation of the capitalist labor process into social cooperation. A rift in the SDA 
opened up around how these goals could be achieved between advocates of the formation of a 
cooperative colony and trade unionist advocates of political action. Debs sided with the political 
actionists, who joined defectors from the SLP to form the Socialist Party of America (SPA) in 
1901. Before discussing how Debs imagined socialist unions could develop this form of 
cooperative agency, it is worth reviewing the debate between these two camps, since it sheds 
light on the distinct politics of cooperation that Debs favored and the nature of the ambitions 
behind the SPA’s formation. 
The colonists believed that the only way to build a cooperative future was to build 
cooperative organizations in the present that put their ideals directly into practice. In its first 
Declaration of Principles, the SDA claimed that as part of its strategy for building a cooperative 
society, it planned to form a colony in “one of the States of the Union, to be hereafter 
determined,” oriented toward ensuring an opportunity for labor’s self-employment in cooperative 
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industry.297 Debs himself initially supported the colonization plan for pragmatic reasons and out 
of a typical ecumenical spirit. He did not stake the cooperative commonwealth on its success, but 
he thought it might provide genuine relief for union workers who had been blacklisted and were 
in desperate search of work, and he generally supported the use of a variety of means in the 
context of a common struggle.298 Advocates of colonization targeted an important problem, even 
if they did not have the right solution. For democratic cooperation to develop, workers needed to 
be more than passive subjects of the forms of cooperation that evolved under capitalism, 
awaiting its terminal crisis. Sociological examination of capitalism’s contradictions alongside 
ethical appeals to the ideal of a better future were insufficient to develop the collective agency 
that could actually change society. As one writer put it, “Newspaper and book Socialism is all 
right to awaken and appeal to the sleeping intellect, but for practical Socialism we must have a 
practical school where men and women live Socialism every day … We all need a practical 
education in co-operation. The human race has been going in a wrong direction for many 
centuries, and we must not expect that all will turn at the word of truth and reason and go 
cheerfully in the right direction.”299 As another advocate of colonization argued, the imperative 
of educative practice also derived from the inherent limitations of theoretical prediction, 
specifically when it came to the question of agency: “We are constantly running up against the 
results of imperfect generalization in politics and governments, through failure to properly 
predict all the movements of Alexander Hamilton’s “Great Beast,” the people.”300 Even if 
Marx’s diagnosis of industrial concentration was a great aid to the movement – it clarifies the 
reasons behind what “we can see with wonderful distinctness, being worked out under our very 
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eyes”—the author claimed that, at a fundamental level, the forms of collective agency that 
develop in the struggle for cooperation could not be predicted:  
The class consciousness, the discipline and organization which result from the development of 
the capitalistic labor process is [sic] potential to act in a number of different directions; it may 
assist and hasten the progress of human emancipation, and it may set back the hands of the clock 
of human progress … Wisdom would seem to dictate some provisions for the control of this 
mess, so that its potentialities may be directed into the proper channels. Now this is the mission 
of the Social Democracy.301  
 
Crucially, for colonization advocates, that guidance could only be holistic. Cooperators needed 
to experience the kind of cooperative production by and for the community that they had 
envisioned, and that they felt confident could become an engine of social progress if they could 
begin to practically assess its potential and work through its difficulties. 
Despite confronting the imperative of clarifying what cooperative, democratic agency 
would look like, colonists erred on two major fronts. First, in spite of generations of evidence, 
they believed that, this time, a parallel economy could begin to grow through committed, 
collective voluntarism. As one critic accurately observed, even if the colony could be successful 
for a length of time, “it certainly can be so only by virtue of its members’ utmost perseverance, 
self-sacrifice and intrepidity.”302 The cooperative community, “would have to contend against 
more obstacles than the capitalist in a capitalist community,” because it would have no ready 
access to municipal, state, and national support, and because it would have no ability to 
challenge the corrosive power of “national and state authority, transportation and communication 
corporations and the money-lender.” Truly realizing “production for consumption” rather than 
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“production for sale” required a nationwide political movement; the real work of cooperation 
could not get started until socialists achieved political victory and undermined the basis of 
exploitation.303 Second, colonists failed to note the connection between their concerns and those 
of their adversaries, moving the debate onto common terrain. Advocates of socialist trade 
unionism were also determined to build a bridge between theory and practice, but they 
understood the nature of that bridge as a process of social struggle within the existing capitalist 
institutions that already saturated society. Given the constraints of capitalist society, socialism 
could not be experimentally tested in a ‘neutral’ territory on the frontier, but needed to be created 
through the active struggles within capitalist institutions by the workers who suffered from the 
ramifying effects of exploitation. 
While colonists wanted to experience cooperation in completed form, socialist unionists 
wanted to guide existing struggles in the labor movement with anticipatory ideals, which 
practically crystallized the real dynamics of workers’ experiences, a systematic critique of 
exploitation, and a constructive vision of a cooperative future. At an basic level, this does not 
imply exit, but a direct challenge to capitalist society’s self-legitimation, which was not only 
discursively constructed and disseminated in ideology, but embodied the direct organization of 
production and consumption, encoded in law, and upheld by force. Central to this challenge was 
undermining how capitalist ideology portrayed private property as the basis of social order. 
While capitalists’ private right of ownership is rationalized as essential for individual liberty in 
general, socialists demonstrated how those arguments mask capital’s actual social despotism. 
Capitalist private property does not mean the liberty to control one’s destiny, but means “private 
ownership by the individual in the means of production used by co-operative labor,” inherently 
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divesting wage-labor from their title to property.304 As one writer echoed in The Social 
Democrat, “Competitive ownership means not the right of personal enjoyment and control, but 
the right to prevent others exercising such ownership. It seeks the control of machinery in order 
to seize the earnings of those who operated it.”305 By making a generic commitment to “private 
property” the foundation of social order, capitalist ideology clouds how the private property of 
capitalists presumes the property-less status of the worker. More specifically, while the ideal of 
private property-ownership is supposed to underpin individuals’ free exercise of agency, 
capitalist property undermines wage-labors free self-direction, since they can only engage in 
cooperative labor when brought together by the agency of a single capitalist employer, who 
retains their surplus and only returns a minimal amount of the social value of their labor as 
wages.306 Such an immanent critique of the capitalist labor process could speak to the daily 
experience of all workers, and could serve as a strong catalyst in the search for an alternative 
form of free, self-directed cooperation where workers’ surplus would redound to their mutual 
benefit. 
At the same time that it proposed colonization, the SDA’s platform also contained 
elements of this diagnosis. A survey of SDA literature reveals four central ideals that defined its 
vision of the cooperative commonwealth: the full remuneration of workers; the conversion of 
surplus labor into evenly distributed free time; the democratic organization of work by collective 
deliberation; and social investment directed toward public luxury instead of private affluence. 
Continuous with the Populists, socialists hoped that cooperation would give workers the full 
value of their product, minus only the socially necessary infrastructure for production and 
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distribution. For one commentator, this was the main reason why socialism did not require 
escape to the frontier, but was the logical extension of trade unionism. The author argued that 
when workers were artisans, they were able to secure the full value of their product in the 
market,307 but when they became employees,  
the workmen no longer received the full product of their labor, as formerly, but only such part of 
it as the employers chose to give them; and this was usually but a small portion of their 
product. … The object of the Social Democracy in no way conflicts with the efforts of the trades 
unions. On the contrary, it aims to do what trades unionism can never do, guarantee to every 
worker not a part, but all the product of his toil. The trades union is the economic class 
movement. The Social Democracy the political movement to abolish class, and place all men on 
economic equality. These two movements should work side by side.308 
 
While socialists hotly debated what it would mean to secure labor its “full value” when 
exploitation ceased, the author clearly drew the connection between workers’ demands for higher 
pay and the anticipatory ideal of a society where workers’ labor directly redounded to their 
benefit rather than the benefit of a privileged class. As Kautsky had put it, “Only socialist 
production can put an end to the disparity between the demands of the workers and the means of 
satisfying them.”309 
As a corollary of the demand for full remuneration, the SDA also aspired to the liberation 
of workers’ free time. Its Declaration of Principles stated that, “Human power and natural forces 
are wasted by this system which makes “profit” the only object in business” and argued that 
society’s wasted potential could only be recovered by a movement that “will give to every 
worker the free exercise and full benefit of his faculties, multiplied by all the modern factors of 
civilization,” represented in the demand for “Reduction of the hours of labor in proportion to the 
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progress of production.”310 Claiming that developments of labor-saving technology should 
correspond to a reduction of work challenged both the logic of inter-capitalist competition (the 
goal of production should not be to out-compete rivals by amassing profit), as well as the 
specific nature of capitalist exploitation (it rests on the appropriation of surplus labor time rather 
than a direct “tax” like under feudalism or ownership of labor as property, like under slavery). 
Just like competition is not a ‘merely economic’ regulator of capitalist enterprise, exploitation 
does not only rob workers of the full value of their product. Instead, it shapes their abilities for 
individual and collective self-cultivation beyond work. Like the Knights of Labor, American 
socialists imagined a new dawn of labor’s freedom as the proliferation of opportunities for self-
cultivation and collective progress that included everyone – society truly, ‘working together’ for 
its common cultural elevation.311   
The ideal of socialist cooperation would also revive an element of the early craft-union 
movement: workers’ ability to determine the labor process according to their own collective 
deliberation. Capitalist ownership and their competitive need to maintain profitability vests 
managers with both the ability and the imperative to regulate the labor process to maximize their 
ability to extract the surplus as profit, which they both consume privately and reinvest for their 
competitive advantage. Workers’ self-government could only exist alongside these imperatives 
in limited forms. The problem was not simply that managers dominated workers – they could fire 
employees at will, control the parameters of their labor, and unilaterally make decisions about 
workplace organization – but that these practices derived from an underlying systemic logic: the 
imperative of surplus extraction. While Debs occasionally protested against the “arbitrary 
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power” of bosses, strictly speaking, their power was anything but arbitrary. If the imperative is to 
produce and distribute as efficiently as possible in the competitive quest to maximize profit, 
workers’ democratic organization – which, in the case of the craft-union movement, revolved 
around things like designing the work flow, regulating pacing, setting output targets, and 
collectively determining the norms of work – could only either interfere or conform. Instead of 
the comprehensive democratic organization of work, capitalist society ensured that the moments 
available for workers’ self-government either existed in a limited “political” sphere functionally 
separated from the economic sphere (i.e. participation in elections, referenda, etc.), or at the 
interstices of the workplace (like within in the union). To undo these arrangements, capitalist 
competition among firms needed to be replaced with cooperative arrangements organized toward 
directly satisfying social need. Within such a cooperative arrangement, Debs argued that even 
competition would be restored to its proper place, since it would no longer function as the 
incentive structure organizing social reproduction, but could become a productive stimulant to 
collective cultural growth. In his words, “There will still be competition among men, but it will 
not be for bread, it will be to excel in good works. Every man will work for the society in which 
he lives, and society will work in the interests of those who compose it.”312 
In its Declaration of Principles, the SDA acknowledged that social cooperation did not 
only require democracy at work, but a democratic society. It claimed that, “The Social 
Democracy of America will make democracy, “the rule of the people,” a truth, by ending the 
economic subjugation of the great majority of the people.”313 Capitalists’ economic and political 
power derives from their monopoly (as a class) of society’s resources and the direction of its 
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evolution. This power underlies both their public power and their private luxury. Ridding 
workplaces of exploitation through the organization of cooperatives could begin to undermine 
this tendency at the point of production, but social cooperation did not simply imply that workers 
control their surplus as a private collective (what Henry Sharpe had called “the cooperation of 
competism”) but that the common labor of social reproduction redounds to the benefit of all. 
While the problem of how to democratically administer the surplus is very significant (it raises 
the issue of bureaucracy and its democratic accountability, what Debs less specifically called 
“socialist administration”314), Debs’s vision of cooperation itself provided criteria to assess what 
such democratic, socialist administration of the surplus would look like. In capitalism, the 
surplus is reinvested according to the profit imperative, and shapes a society organized around 
private luxury. A democratically shared surplus would not abandon provision for private leisure, 
but would heavily emphasize public as opposed to private affluence. Against aristocratic critics 
of socialism who argued that its ‘leveling’ aspirations would destroy high culture, social 
investment in the commons provides a basic, alternative way to imagine how a commonly shared 
surplus can serve as a catalyst for general cultural progress. While Debs is often identified with 
the small town environment of Terre Haute, he also admired the utopian urbanism of Edward 
Bellamy, with its transformation of urban space around abundant opportunities for public 
gathering and social leisure alongside the ability to enjoy modern conveniences in the home.315  
Such revolutionary change was certainly a high aspiration, but its justification not only 
rested on an immanent critique of existing social relations, but also basic insights about social 
science. According to one author in The Social Democrat socialism was in line with scientific 
                                                      
314 Debs, Unionism and Socialism, 30.  
315 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward. For an excellent analysis of this theme through a study of the Paris 
Commune and its afterlives see Kristin Ross, Communal Luxury: The Political Imaginary of the Paris Commune 
(London: Verso, 2015).   
 153
trends that acknowledged the material constraints of the social environment in determining social 
relations, morality, and progress: “Socialism stands firmly on the ground that no true and 
permanent moral reform can be effected in society or the individual that is not based on 
economic betterment, change in environment – that is, in the ideas, principles, circumstances, 
conditions and things by which the individual is made what he is, and by which society is formed 
and directed as it is.”316 Only socialism, SDA members argued, could harness the power of the 
railways, telegraphs, mines, and factories transforming the national economy for the common 
elevation of society as a whole, ensuring that scientific and technological progress is also an 
agent of social progress. S. H. Comings argued that the next “co-operative age” would “educate 
the coming generation in all the grand conceptions of our scientific age, and to make our 
citizenship equal to maintaining the honor of an age of mutualism and a society, where the 
highest aim shall be great usefulness instead of the vulgar greed for dollars, as now.”317 With 
these claims, socialists did not seek to create a cooperative commonwealth in an isolated 
experiment, but sought to re-orient society’s legitimating ideals around a hegemonic project of 
cooperative democracy. 
At a fundamental level, realizing these aspirations not only required winning consent, but 
undermining the ability of capitalists to extract and control the surplus. That project required 
coercion; capitalists were not going to willingly give over their spoils, let alone their golden 
goose. For the expropriators to be expropriated effectively, the socialists could not simply form 
parallel societies, but had to wield political power. As Kautsky wrote, “The state will not cease 
to be a capitalist institution until the proletariat, the working-class, has become the ruling class; 
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not until then will it become possible to turn it into a co-operative commonwealth.”318 The 
debate over how the working class would come to political power is one of the most divisive 
debates in socialist history.319 While the question of the means to political victory was indeed 
crucial, what was equally crucial is how socialists imagined the relationship between their 
anticipatory ideals and the concrete practice of the labor movement, which built the constituent 
power among the people necessary for any political victory. For some socialists, the capitalist 
labor process itself was already generating the possibility for socialist success. As SDA member 
Margaret Haile put it, “The change of the new order will not be an abrupt one, for the new order 
has been growing up inside of the old ever since its inception, like the chick in the egg. We have 
learned under it to produce collectively; it only remains now to break the shell of capitalist 
ownership, to take over and hold and operate the machinery of production for the common good 
and to step forth into the new life of the co-operative commonwealth.”320 Yet history would 
never do socialists work for them, and socialist politics would not be nearly so straightforward. 
As colonization advocates and advocates of socialist unionism both stressed, cooperative praxis 
needed to develop in the present, precisely because the cooperation instilled by the capitalist 
labor process rested on the alienated direction of a class of masters and the disaggregating effects 
of production for profit. For socialist unionists, the anticipatory ideals of the cooperative 
commonwealth – full remuneration, liberated self-fulfillment, democracy at work, and a 
democratic organization of the surplus – needed to find a way to inspire the concrete practices of 
labor organization. Only then could a constituency for socialism could be forged that was not 
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only electoral, but also in possession of the constituent capacity to cooperatively re-shape the 
direction of social development. 
 
 
 
III. “The Protracted Struggle”: Socialist Unionism and Socialist Politics 
Throughout Debs’s years with the SPA, one of the party’s dominant issues – an issue 
arguably responsible for its major strategic divisions and splits – was determining the 
relationship between the party and the labor movement.321 What was perhaps Debs’s most 
important pamphlet, Unionism and Socialism: A Plea for Both (1904), centered on this issue. In 
broad terms, Debs’s pamphlet advocated transforming the labor movement into a site of the 
formation of cooperative agency, and at the same time, ensuring that the Socialist Party 
supported the labor movement, remained independent from alliance with capitalist parties and 
committed to socialist transformation, and articulated a hegemonic vision of the general interest 
that could win majority support and justify suppressing capitalist exploitation. In his words, “The 
Union is educating the workers in the management of industrial activities and fitting them for co-
operative control and democratic regulation of their trades, – the party is recruiting and training 
and drilling the political army that is to conquer the capitalist forces on the political battlefield; 
and having control of the machinery of government, use it to transfer the industries from the 
capitalists to the workers, from the parasites to the people.”322 Here, and more explicitly than 
Kautsky, Debs was clear that capitalist production alone did not educate workers in cooperation; 
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labor unions themselves had to take on this task. Debs’s hopes for labor depended on the 
evolution of the movement, which was defined not by the Socialist Party, but by the AFL. This 
was unfortunate, because it was not the AFL, but workers within the Socialist Party and the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) who devised the means to counter Taylorist scientific 
management with a new form of social cooperation that connected empowering self-organization 
to the aspirational ideal of a society without exploitation. Rather than keep workers passive 
subjects to how capitalists controlled their ‘heads and hands,’ radical unionists imagined the 
large-scale industrial union – organized into nested federations of workers’ councils from the 
shop floor to the industry-wide and regional levels – as a site for the formation of cooperative 
self-organization and the democratic beginnings of a new order of social reproduction.  
 Given the centrality of the relationship between the Party and the unions, the power of 
the AFL was decisive in shaping socialist fortunes. Debs railed against its leader, Samuel 
Gompers, so consistently because, in many respects, the AFL’s conservatism was among the 
SPA’s most formidable obstacles and a major reason for its failure on the industrial front. In 
trying to transform union practice, the SPA confronted three possible options. First, it could 
strive to become a labor party on the model of the British Labor Party. In this case, it would 
partner with the AFL to earn the electoral support of the working class, displace one of the two 
major parties, and to institute reforms that could gradually introduce socialism without 
challenging capitalist ownership at the outset. Partnering with the AFL meant compromising 
with its strategy, as well as the capitalist interests that its strategy protected to ensure access to 
collective bargaining. Second, socialists could work to transform the AFL from within – called 
“boring from within” – by earning leadership positions within unions and converting workers to 
socialism, hoping that a socialist rank and file would eventually buck their conservative 
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leadership. Third, socialists could support the creation of a parallel labor movement based in 
industry-wide unionism – called “boring from without” – a movement that, unlike the AFL, 
sought to include all workers, from immigrants and under-skilled labor to the whole class of 
productive workers.323 For his part, Debs often gravitated toward the third option, but never 
dissuaded committed socialists from boring within the AFL. 
Debs’s insistence on forging cooperation within the labor movement derived from one of 
his differences with Kautsky. While both Debs and Kautsky clearly understood the labor 
movement as a process of developing popular, collective agency – what Kautsky called the 
“gradual elevation of the working-class” facilitated by their “protracted struggle” in the labor 
movement324 – Kautsky’s analytical focus gravitated toward the contradictions within capitalism 
that directly prefigured socialist advance. Such a focus entailed a strong commitment to the 
historical power of proletarian agency that, while it need not regard socialism as inevitable (since 
barbarism or ‘the common ruin of the contending classes’ was always a possible result of crisis), 
this focus nevertheless attributed an underlying power to proletarian agency that derived 
fundamentally from historical predictions about capitalism’s own development. The 
consequences of resting analysis on these predictions were serious; as Kautsky once stated, “[If] 
the conception of the proletariat as the motive force of the coming social revolution were 
abandoned, then I would have to admit that I was through, that my life no longer had 
meaning.”325 While Kautsky clearly saw structure and agency as interlocking aspects of social 
processes, his analytical focus did not center on the unique difficulties that workers’ faced as 
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they collectively struggled to recover their capacities for democratic self-organization under the 
constraining conditions of capitalism. While Debs at times made rhetorical reference to the 
inevitability of victory, his writings and his activism do not evince the same commitment to 
socialism’s place in a progressive historical teleology.326 While he sometimes echoed the 
determinist assumptions of the dominant Marxist view, like when he claimed in a campaign 
speech that, “The capitalist system is no longer adapted to the needs of modern society. It is 
outgrown and fetters the forces of progress. Industrial and commercial competition are largely of 
the past. The handwriting blazes on the wall. Centralization and combination are the modern 
forces in industrial and commercial life. Competition is breaking down and cooperation is 
supplanting it,” he did not address the labor movement with a tone of historical complacency.327 
Unionism and Socialism was not a theoretical mediation on history, but a direct intervention in 
the practice of the labor movement, a plea to workers to recover their own alienated power from 
the despotic cooperation enforced by capitalism. While he found essential resources in Marxism, 
Debs did not understand or address the working class as an agent driving the dialectical 
unfolding of history; instead, he saw the people as a creative agent of their own self-
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determination, and their capacity for free cooperation as a latent power that required active 
practical struggle to develop. 
While Debs’s emphasis on developing the capacity for “cooperative control and 
democratic regulation” of industry revealed how he understood that mass cooperation in 
capitalism would not simply set the groundwork for socialist cooperation, the nature of the 
cooperation enforced by capital was not itself static. Instead, in the early 20th century, large-scale 
industry was steadily transformed by new managerial technologies that undermined skilled 
workers’ own practices of self-determination, institutionalized within the AFL. In other words, 
while capitalist development brought workers together in greater numbers, it also undermined 
how workers’ attempts to assert their democratic capacity for cooperative self-management had 
become institutionalized within their organizations. In The Fall of the House of Labor, David 
Montgomery traced how the AFL began as a movement for workers’ control of their own labor, 
morphed into a significant (however junior) partner in collective bargaining, and ultimately saw 
much of its organizational capacity eclipsed by the mid-twenties. He argued that the major 
reason for the AFL’s fall was that workers’ main source of structural power in the craft union 
movement – their skilled knowledge of the production process (“the manager’s brain under the 
workman’s cap”) – was undermined by the new technologies of scientific management. While 
these developments homogenized the labor force by turning the majority of workers into 
machine operatives, “that homogenization had not unified the working class” nor had it provided 
workers with the skills of cooperative self-management that could simply flower when unfettered 
by exploitation.328 Instead, these skills needed to be created within fragile movements pitted 
against the most powerful forces of their time.  
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Taylorism was itself premised on a vision of cooperation that offers a productive contrast 
to the socialist vision of the cooperative commonwealth. A brief discussion of Taylor not only 
demonstrates some of the effective, discursive power of capitalist ideology that socialists had to 
counter, but also illuminates the nature of the labor process that socialist unionists sought to 
transform. In his book-length discussion of his managerial reforms, Frederick Taylor pit the 
general interest of society as a whole against the self-seeking individualism of both workers and 
bosses. By displacing workers’ self-directed control over pacing and work rules with planned 
coordination based on scientific study of engineering and efficient motion, Taylor sought to 
create a system of “the most elaborate cooperation” oriented toward the common welfare.329 In 
Taylor’s view, the seat of the common welfare was not the working majority, but consumers, 
“the third great party, the whole people,” who depended on the efficient production of goods at 
low cost.330 Moreover, Taylor claimed that scientific management would not only ensure the 
welfare of “the whole people,” but could even, “secure the maximum prosperity for the 
employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each employee.”331 While maximum 
prosperity for employers implied “large dividends to the company or owner” as well as “the 
development of every branch of business to its highest state of excellence,” prosperity for labor 
meant “higher wages than are usually received for men of his class” alongside, “the development 
of each man to his state of maximum efficiency.”332 On this basis of this instrumental, common 
interest in utility and capacity maximization, Taylor believed he could ground “friendly 
cooperation between the management and the men.”333 To realize these ideals, scientific 
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management required dispossessing workers of whatever power over the production process 
their skilled knowledge had accorded them. Taylor’s time and motion studies broke down the 
habits of skilled workers into a series of discrete motions, devising techniques for maximizing 
the efficiency of workers’ use of their own bodies, a set of practices taught to new workers 
directly by management and often incentivized by the introduction of piece-rates instead of flat 
wages. These practices simultaneously institutionalized the social atomization of workers within 
their own individual experiences, promoted de-skilling and speed-up, and ensured the formation 
of new workplace hierarchies. As Montgomery explains, “With the worker so carefully 
instructed and supervised, it would no longer be necessary for him to possess a broad 
understanding of the processes in which he was engaged. The ablest craftsman could be 
promoted from the ranks to the many new foremen’s positions, and the rest could be replaced 
with unskilled men and women, instructed by the foremen in the “one best way” to perform their 
tasks.”334 The craft culture of transmitting skills alongside the ethical code of unionism was 
replaced by the direct authority of management who enforced a form of cooperation designed to 
maximize profits. As Taylor put it, “It is only through enforced standardization of methods, 
enforced adoption of the best implements and working conditions, and enforced cooperation that 
this faster work can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the adoption of standards and 
enforcing this cooperation rest with the management alone.”335 Not only did this undermine the 
associational fabric of workers’ organizations, but it rendered their ethical code meaningless. As 
Montgomery noted, “Such a setting made a mockery of craft-union practice. What meaning had 
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a standard machinist’s wage there? What worker could pledge to abide honorably by union work 
rules?”336  
While Debs had criticized the limitations of craft-union democracy at least since the 
formation of the ARU, the spread of scientific management (itself a deeply contested process) 
clearly demanded a reformulation of the theory and practice of workers’ democracy. At the time, 
a number of innovative workers responded to these transformations by developing forms of 
social cooperation that began to reclaim workers knowledge of the production process and their 
capacities for self-directed agency on the job, primarily among de-skilled operatives in large-
scale factories. Not AFL leaders, but socialists and syndicalists organizing industrial unions 
developed these cooperative practices to assist workers in their efforts to re-claim their capacities 
for cooperative agency. Debs was one of the major socialist leaders to actively encourage these 
efforts, and they were intimately connected to his hope that the self-directing agency of workers’ 
would not only define union practice, but also point toward a broader cooperative horizon that 
only Socialist politics could fully articulate and advance. As he claimed in a speech in Chicago 
in 1905, advocating for the movements for industrial unionism,  
The workingman today does not understand his industrial relation to his fellow-workers. He has 
never been correlated with others in the same industry. He has mechanically done his part. … 
Now, we teach him to hold up his head and look over the whole mechanism. If he is employed in 
a certain plant, as an Industrial Unionist, his eyes are opened. He takes a survey of the entire 
productive mechanism, and he understands his part in it, and his relation to every other worker in 
that industry. The very instant he does that he is buoyed by a fresh hope and thrilled with a new 
aspiration. He becomes a larger man. He begins to feel like a collective son of toil. Then he and 
his fellows study to fit themselves to take control of this productive mechanism when it shall be 
transferred from the idle capitalist to the workers to whom it rightfully belongs.337 
 
The advent of new technologies of mass coordination and supervision might have encouraged 
de-skilling, but nothing could rob workers of their capacity to subject the social relations in 
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which they participated to their shared, self-reflective control. As Mongomery clarifies, the 
design of large industrial plants brought into being a new site of self-determination – the 
workers’ council – and a new kind of revolutionary politics – the mass strike. In his words, “By 
1919, “council” and “delegate” were words with revolutionary resonance similar to what 
“convention” and “citizen” had carried in 1789.”338 While craft union stewards had previously 
worked alongside their peers, ensured that work rules were obeyed, and notified headquarters in 
the event of infractions by workers or employers, new mass production industries required a 
different relationship between workers and their delegates. The experience of new forms of labor 
control taught mass production workers that they, “needed the permanent presence of an active 
group representative right there on the production floor, all day every day, and they had to be 
prepared to defend these representatives against management’s reprisals.”339 Skilled toolmakers 
could not serve these roles, since they often worked separately from machine operatives, who 
required their own council delegates to express their grievances. Council movements within the 
IWW and other industrial unions emerged largely out of the experiences of machine operatives, 
immigrants, and inclusively-oriented workers throughout industries, and they set their sights on 
winning over “the whole business” by developing power primarily among the least organized.340  
One advocate of this theory and practice of cooperative unionism was an ironworker and 
shipbuilder from Portland named James Robertson. Robertson wrote a pamphlet circulated by 
the IWW that theorized the workers’ council not only as a locus of direct democracy or a site of 
deliberation, but also as a locus of social cooperation. In Robertson’s view, “the natural 
development of the labor movement in America will not be a reform instituted by the “top” for 
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the “bottom,” but a transforming process, now taking place in the rank and file of labor in the 
workshop, an organic development which constantly strives toward the conscious co-operation 
of the whole working class – One Big Union.”341 While the relationship between the SPA and 
IWW was generally fractious, Debs supported the IWW initially and for significant reasons. In 
1905, he claimed, “The revolutionary movement of the working class will date from the year 
1905, from the organization of the INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD. … The old 
form of unionism has long since fulfilled its mission and outlived its usefulness, and the hour has 
struck for a change.”342 While Debs ultimately broke with the IWW over disagreements about its 
strategies for sabotage and its ideal that “direct action” in the economic arena alone could break 
the power of capital,343 his vision of unionism as a form of cooperative agency shared far more 
with syndicalists than AFL craft-union leaders. Elaborated alongside Debs’s theory of socialist 
politics, Robertson’s pamphlet nicely illuminates a series of aspirations that he and Debs shared.     
The “organic development” Robertson referred to was the emergence of councils of 
workers’ representatives that operated independently of major unions, and that began to 
proliferate along the entire division of labor in large factories. When scientific management 
undermined craft practice, it had only reorganized the social composition that workers’ 
democratic agency had to confront, inciting the development of new creative strategies. When 
Robertson introduced his pamphlet, it was not on a note of defeat. He claimed that, with mass 
production, the council movements, and the mass strike, “a new sovereign power now enters 
upon the field of human affairs. That power is the Crowd, the Masses, Labor.”344 
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For Robertson, the goal of labor unions was not negotiating between workers’ 
representatives and capital, but creating a site for the formation of cooperative self-
determination. “A Labor Union is a living organism having its roots in the soil of industrial 
conditions. Its conscious purpose is to develop its power from the basis of productivity, along all 
paths of economic and democratic advancement, finding its culmination in an “Industrial 
Administration” of the producers, by the producers and for the producers.”345 Rather than 
represent labor’s inevitable self-interest in higher wages, shorter hours, and better work rules, 
Robertson argued that the AFL’s ideal of collective bargaining was simply the ideological 
rationalization of its specific practices of organization and compromise, which blunted labor’s 
more radical interests in a full return for its social contribution and the democratic organization 
of work. For Robertson, collective bargaining was “a fungus of the dollar psychology, a 
stumbling block in the pathway of human progress, and stern necessity demands its removal and 
replacement with the “direct” participation of the rank and file of labor in the management of 
their own affairs, in accordance with the known laws of mass co-operation, and in the interest of 
the economic and social progress of humanity.”346 Like Debs, who also claimed in 1905 that the 
interests of capital and labor, “can and never will be harmonized permanently, and when they are 
adjusted even temporarily it is always at the expense of the working class,”347 Robertson 
opposed any negotiation between capital and labor, insisting on labor’s independent cooperative 
self-organization: “even if labor could secure ninety-five per cent of what it produced, the 
“bargain” would still be with the social parasites, who gain a living by virtue of their ownership 
of the natural sources of wealth and the machinery of social production and exchange.”348 For 
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Robertson, at least in principle, socialist unionism did not require any cooperation with 
management, allowing workers to maintain the independence of their organizations. While 
Taylor had posited a shared interest in utility-maximization uniting workers, capitalists, and the 
consuming public in common cooperation, Robertson insisted that maximizing utility within 
capitalist infrastructure presupposed the exploitation of labor, and that any surplus-appropriation 
resulting from private ownership undermined cooperation and made free power-sharing between 
capital and labor impossible. Instead, as Debs put it, socialist cooperation implies that “all will 
receive their socially due share of the product of their co-operative labor.”349 
 By “the known laws of mass co-operation,” Robertson had a specific set of practices in 
mind. He argued that, “In order to develop its power the Unions of Labor must bring into 
conscious operation two sets of activities, Communication and Reaction.”350 Shop stewards 
would act as relays of these activities. “Reaction” implied that all grievances by workers should 
be registered and assessed, a process that clarified the nature of the working experience through 
the independent, constructive formulations of workers. After collecting grievances, stewards 
would coordinate in council meetings and strategically present demands based on these 
grievances to foremen. If the demands are rejected, “the matter then concerns all workers in that 
industrial plant” and lays the groundwork for collective action.351 To support these activities, all 
unions need to maintain a continuous press (“Communication”) that not only publishes 
information about disputes, but propagates, “Technical instruction of members in the process of 
their industry” beyond their assigned tasks.352 Contra Taylor, cooperation did not only require 
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individuals performing their roles in the division of labor effectively under the watchful eyes of 
management; instead, it required amassing as much of the skilled knowledge of earlier craft 
workers as possible, ensuring that all workers understood the entire industrial process and 
became capable of collectively legislating on matters of concern for the entire plant. In other 
words, the motive force of cooperation was workers’ direct participation in decision-making as a 
collective, not managerial knowledge tied to the maximization of profit.  
In addition to these practices of communication and reaction, Robertson imagined the 
labor union as the site of workers’ comprehensive self-education, revealing how social 
cooperation was not simply instrumental collective action toward a discrete goal, but a form of 
association oriented toward shared self-fulfillment. He criticized labor union leaders – usually 
outsiders to the plant – who tried to hold procedural meetings for workers that failed to catalyze 
their creative energies. Opposed to this tendency, Robertson argued that unions needed to 
mobilize “sentiments” that were suppressed in the capitalist labor process. He claimed that, 
“Sentiment is a tremendous factor in human evolution … Used in a scientific manner by the 
labor press, at mass meetings, social gatherings, etc. it promotes the indirect method through 
which the workers’ intelligence is reached, thereby enlarging their social vision. This is 
necessary in order to dissolve beliefs, opinions, and ideaology [sic] implanted in the minds of the 
workers by the paid agents of parasitism.”353 These “sentiments” were not restricted to 
grievances and ideological antagonism toward parasitic bosses and managers; instead, Robertson 
insisted on the creative, constituent power of aspirational experiences that fed off of the power of 
labor itself. Rather than see “unskilled” labor as uniformly dulling, he saw workers’ ability to 
operate powerful industrial machinery as a catalytic experience that could augment their sense of 
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collective power. But without creating parallel experiences of organization both within and 
outside the plant in workers own institutions, this collective potential would not find an 
emancipatory outlet. As he wrote: 
Experience is the great teacher of the working people … The district council of workers is 
destined to be the hub of all local labor activities, not only for district solidarity in strikes, but for 
educating and organizing the workers for the purposes of handling and solving the economic and 
social problems of the present and future: local press, educational meetings where scientific 
lectures are given and social problems discussed; a modern library with a full complement of 
literature from the standpoint of proletarian science; mass meetings, for the purpose of general 
education and the arousing of the kinetic power of the masses for social progress; gymnastics, 
health, culture, amusements, music, drama, art and general aesthetic culture. What! dreams you 
say, fellow workmen. Well, yes, dreams … Marx, Morris, Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Abe 
Lincoln … Humanity owes a debt of gratitude to the memory of these pioneer thinkers and 
dreamers.354   
 
For Robertson, the basic connection between industrial labor and empowered self-management 
was a fundamentally constructive experience that had to be recovered from the dynamics of 
capitalist labor-discipline. He claimed that, workers’ “reasoning processes operate best today 
where their creative energy operates. They are familiar with the shop environment and no others 
in human society are better fitted to deal with the conditions of that environment than the 
workers themselves. Their conditions are material facts, not beliefs and opinions.”355 While 
workers’ mere embeddedness in the production process only reflected the despotic cooperation 
coordinated by capital, the formation of independent institutions that began to subject the plant to 
the self-conscious regulation of workers cultivated the beginnings of socialist cooperation. While 
full socialist cooperation based on the liberation of free time from the imperative of surplus-labor 
extraction, the democratic organization of work, and the investment of the social surplus in the 
shared self-fulfillment of all would not be possible until capitalist title no longer conferred the 
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power to exploit, well-organized council federations could serve as the embryo of cooperative 
self-management that set the elementary building blocks for the cooperative commonwealth.  
While Robertson’s ideal for unionism did not come to predominate, his hope that 
workers’ councils and larger district councils could serve as sites of these experiences was not 
mere fantasy. District councils that institutionalized a parallel workers’ culture were formed by 
the Knights of Labor, and at the time of Robertson’s writing, some existed in major cities, where 
they provided durable spaces for the cultivation of workers’ self-directed agency. Even if it was 
not as democratically rooted or independent of management as Robertson would hope, the San 
Francisco Building Trades Council was a potential site for the development of cooperative 
workers’ culture, and occupied “a large building that served as a library, meeting hall, and hiring 
center for all construction workers of that compact city.”356 Far from superfluous, investing in 
these spaces and these experiences could be clearly justified in a theory of socialist strategy that 
emphasized the imperative to synthesize cooperative self-organization and socialist aspirations. 
Alongside than the party meeting, picket, or other forms of popular engagement, district councils 
directly tied to the daily experiences of workers could have formed more a part of the SPA’s 
overall institutional infrastructure than they did.  
While Robertson and Debs shared common aspirations for the labor movement, they 
departed over the issue of political action. For Debs, the Socialist Party was a central organ for 
reaching workers’ in the political arena, taking positions on the major issues of the day, working 
to undo inherited ideological assumptions, and creating a constituency for electoral mobilization 
that could not only win local victories, but keep the ideal of socialist transformation perpetually 
in public consciousness. In Unionism and Socialism, Debs emphasized that union agitation could 
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not simply take the form of “guerilla war against the effects of the existing system” but that 
workers in the labor movement should use “their organized forces as a lever for the final 
emancipation of the working class,” a task that required political confrontation with the 
representatives and defenders of capitalist interests.357 Ultimately, Debs believed that the trade 
union struggle for cooperative self-education was essential for the possibility of democratic 
social transformation, but that only a political party could leverage demands that represent the 
class interests of workers as a whole, and only a party could present itself as a plausible agent of 
these demands. While socialist unions could articulate political demands for, “The collective 
ownership and control of industry and its democratic management in the interest of all the 
people,”358 only a political party could connect these demands to a plausible agent for their 
institutionalization. Moreover – absent a revolutionary crisis – only a democratic majority 
secured by elections could authorize the Socialist Party to, as Debs put it, “wipe out the wage 
system and make the workers themselves the masters of the earth.”359 The syndicalists believed 
that once the workers’ organizations were powerful enough on the economic terrain to challenge 
capital (once the “One Big Union” was formed), political struggle at the level of the state would 
be unnecessary since the direct economic coercion of the many by the few would no longer be 
tolerated. For Debs, this position missed how economic action and political action were inter-
penetrated. The labor movement cultivates cooperative power among workers, which itself 
requires keeping the political horizon of a society without exploitation in view, cultivated in the 
public sphere by the party; and the political struggle organizes the workers into a cohesive 
coalition, which is impotent without the organized material power built in the trade unions.  
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IV. Conclusion: Dilemmas of Political Unity  
At the same time that Debs sought to connect the economic and political struggles by 
showing how the demands of both are imbricated, he also occasionally veered toward the belief 
that socialist unity was primarily political in an electoral sense. This implies that even if workers 
in unions might not act as socialists (they might belong to unions that foreground collective 
bargaining as the end of labor’s struggle, for instance), they could nonetheless vote as socialists 
if they identify with the aims of the Socialist Party. This was a genuine tension in Debs’s thought 
and also in the practice of the Socialist Party. In Unionism and Socialism, Debs quoted a 
prescription by SPA member George D. Herron that counseled SPA members not to focus too 
much attention on reconstructing the unions, since unions were ultimately “merely a capitalist 
line of defense within the capitalist system” because they could not interrupt the political power 
of the capitalist class alone, which was derived both from its economic power, but also from its 
control of the state.360 If this is the case, votes for Socialists can actually become more valuable 
than socialist practice, since it is ultimately the political challenge with capital and the level of 
the state that can deliver a workers’ republic based on cooperative industry. To the extent that 
these commitments predominate in the socialist movement, the cooperative, radical democratic 
core of Debs’s aspirations (focused on the direct transformation of patterns of association shaped 
by capital) could take a back-seat to the ideological operation of persuading workers to vote the 
socialist ticket. The problem with this view is that it misses how ideology is itself a material 
practice, reproduced not only by the ideas in workers heads, but how legitimating ideologies 
rationalize the actual patterns of social relation that workers’ participate in on a daily basis. 
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Cultivating agency requires struggle on both ideational and practical fronts: working through the 
forms of immanent, aspirational, and aesthetic critique that catalyze ideational transformation, 
and facilitating efforts to transform engrained patterns of association along democratic lines. 
At the same time, the SPA’s abstraction from the direct experiences of particular subsets 
of workers could also facilitate necessary synthesis between distinct experiences of economic 
conflict and exploitation. Such synthetic power is required for any popular party in a complex 
society, where experiences of exploitation and domination are multiple and diverse. Negotiating 
this plurality is essential for a hegemonic social project that crystallizes broadly popular 
aspirations. Incipiently, SPA members tried to achieve such a synthesis in their attempts to retain 
the movement’s connection to Populist agrarianism. While Debs’s lifelong effort to connect 
industry-wide unionism to socialist politics did incline him toward primary involvement with 
industrial labor, the Party was able to synthesize a plurality of experiences within a common 
organization, proliferating and connecting sites of struggle. From its formation, the SPA was 
imbued with an appreciation of the struggles of poor farmers, and a number of leaders sought to 
include farmers’ demands as integral components of the Socialist project. In the early years of 
the Party’s formation, Morris Hillquit acknowledged that even if “The interests of the farmers 
are not identical with those of the wage workers,” both are “a victim of the capitalist system”:  
The condition of the farmer as it is to day is practically that of a hired laborer of the capitalist 
class. Whether the capitalist appears as a landlord or mortgagee, he virtually owns the farm. … If 
the farmers are not interested in the same immediate demands, in the same progressive steps that 
the workingman is, the farmer is interested alike with the working man – that is, speaking of the 
small farmer of course, the poor and oppressed farmer – in the overthrow of the capitalist system, 
for he is a victim of that capitalist system just as the wage worker is. The agencies and mode of 
exploitation are different.361 
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Given a commitment to popular unity against exploitation, the possibility emerges to build a 
common ideology of cooperation around distinct experiences of exploitation. Linked to the 
history of agrarian cooperatives, a number of SPA members saw continued efforts at agrarian 
cooperative organization as integral to the cooperative commonwealth. At the SPA’s 1910 
convention, a committee on farmer’s concerns outlined a rural socialist program based on the 
formation of cooperatively owned grain elevators and warehouses, cooperative societies for 
purchasing agricultural machinery, low-interest loans issued by the state, and direct election of 
members of the Board of Agriculture by farmers, a program drawn up by socialist farmers.362 As 
the Oklahoma socialist Oscar Ameringer argued, the formation of cooperatives was a cardinal 
component of what made small farmers an important constituency for socialism: “Many of the 
farmers in the southwest, where I am acquainted, have a good many co-operatively managed 
enterprises. They have started co-operative general stores, they have started co-operative mills, 
and they are going into co-operative business down there. The farmer is recognizing the fact that 
he must be the owner of all the means with which he works.”363 For Ameringer, fighting for the 
cooperative commonwealth implied working alongside everyone who suffered from exploitation, 
encouraging the integration of their immediate demands into a general vision of a cooperative 
society.  
 For other socialists, these proposals were controversial, not necessarily due to an 
inveterate industrial, anti-agrarian bias, but because the agrarian question catalyzed a debate 
about whether the SPA could simultaneously appeal to both property-owning farmers and farm 
laborers, or whether these groups had zero-sum antagonistic interests. At the root of the 
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controversy was whether private ownership of land inherently vested its owner with the power to 
exploit, or whether, given the fact that a significant amount of agricultural production still took 
place on small-holdings operated directly by farmer-owners or tenants, the SPA had reason to 
believe that they could support forms of non-exploitative private ownership of the direct means 
of labor. If all forms of private property in productive resources tended toward exploitation, the 
SPA reasoned that they should follow European socialist parties and include the nationalization 
of land in their immediate demands, which they expected would appeal to farm laborers who 
were exploited by land-owning farmers. In defense of small farmer title, Algernon Lee argued 
that, “In the field of industry, what the Socialist movement demands is the social ownership and 
control of the SOCIALLY OPERATED means of production, not of ALL means of production. 
Only to a very small extent is the land now, only to a very small extent is it likely to be for many 
years to come, a socially operated means of production.”364 And as he clarified further, 
“Collective ownership is encouraged by the Socialist, not as an end in itself, not as a part of a 
utopian scheme, but as a means of preventing exploitation, then such ownership is opposed by 
Socialism.”365 As Lawrence Goodwyn explained in an important essay deeply critical of socialist 
land policy, American socialists who supported agrarian demands assumed that a program of 
land ownership based on “occupancy and use only” and nested within a cooperative economic 
infrastructure would have united the Populist tradition to the Socialist aspiration to transcend 
exploitation.366 When other socialists rejected these proposals outright, they did not simply miss 
an opportunity to broker and compromise with the interests of farmers for the sake of forming an 
electoral coalition, but rejected an opening to map the entire terrain of exploitation within the 
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national economy based on the direct experiences of workers. As our examination of the Populist 
movement showed, agrarian labor was not simply the entrepreneurial work of farmers operating 
their own means of production and selling commodities in a market, but was shaped by a variety 
of mechanisms of exploitation emanating from high-interest credit, lack of democratic control 
over marketing, storage, and distribution, and struggles to retain land-ownership. If agrarian 
grievances manifested in desires for the security of their holdings, this demand was no more 
‘pro-capitalist’ from a socialist standpoint than trade union demands for higher wages.367 A 
successful, democratic socialist party had to balance the synthetic possibilities of the party-form 
with radical democratic connections to the entire subset of productive workers, acknowledging 
that forming a constituent, popular force mobilized against exploitation would require complex 
negotiations around the institutional shape of social cooperation in various sectors of the 
economy. Rather than simple brokering, the attempt to synthesize experiences based on direct 
popular connections would inform how the party elaborates principles of cooperation, connects 
these aspirations to concrete experiments in self-organization that reformulate engrained patterns 
of association, and articulate political demands that work to entrench cooperative social relations 
against exploitative social relations. In both their successes and defeats, the People’s Party and 
the Socialist Party began to forge these connections, leaving a record of cooperative political 
struggles that extend from the redefinition of democratic ideals of social equality and power 
sharing to the organizational realities of party-formation and political mobilization.   
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The Infrastructure of Intelligence: John Dewey, Social Democracy, and Cooperative 
Experimentalism 
“This basic problem of industrial society is to establish conditions that will place all men in their 
labor on the plane which the small class of scientists and artists now occupy. Then there will be a 
real consummation of social life in full freedom. There will [be] a true social democracy.”  
– John Dewey, Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy368 
 
 In October of 1933, John Dewey spoke to an audience at the People’s Church in Chicago 
about the need to build a new political party. He claimed that the problems facing the country 
required more than the piecemeal reforms and compromises with vested interests that existing 
parties were capable of offering, and he suggested that the political imaginary shared by the 
major parties had to be replaced by “a new conception of politics, a new conception of 
government, and of the relation of the government to the people in this country.”369 Dewey 
advocated such a sweeping vision because he thought that the causes of current problems went to 
the foundations of the social and economic order; they were grounded in the inability of a system 
of production based on profit-accumulation and competition to secure genuine political equality 
and enable democratic problem-solving. As Dewey put it, “we have gone from the war on the 
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battlefield between nations to the war in the factory and in the market place between individuals 
and groups. And it is that which demands not a “patching” here and there but some fundamental 
re-thinking of our social and political relations and the development of a new conception of what 
government is for: an instrument in the service of the people and not, as under the system of 
competition for power and competition for command of power, the tool and instrument of selfish 
and acquisitive interests.”370 To advance this vision of democratic politics, Dewey had helped to 
form League for Independent Political Action (LIPA) in 1928, an organization that aspired to 
unite the different factions of the democratic left – ranging from the Socialist Party, The Farmer-
Labor Political Federation, trade unions, and other reform organizations – into a new popular 
party that could serve as a vehicle for social democracy. 
When he discussed the new party, Dewey placed his own agitation within a general 
history of third party efforts in the United States, ranging from the Granger-influenced anti-
monopoly parties of the 1870’s through the Greenback Party, People’s Party, and Socialist 
Party.371 He suggested that the Depression had done more to vindicate a renewed effort against 
the power of organized wealth and privilege than any crisis in recent memory, and wrote that, 
“events are rapidly educating the voters to realize the flabbiness and futility of the old parties, 
along with the fact that neither of them has either the desire or the ability to deal in any 
fundamental way with the causes of our industrial and financial collapse.” Going further, he 
continued to explain that whatever the identity of a new party:  
its platform will contain socialistic planks in the sense that it will demand that our enormous 
natural resources, our vast machinery of production and distribution, and the wonderful technical 
skill the country possesses shall no longer be used to enrich a privileged few but be directed to 
serve the well-being of all men and women of good will. Its aim will be to put an end once for all 
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to the scandal and the tragedy of want in the midst of plenty, of inability to buy and consume in 
the midst of abundant production, and to make liberty and equality a reality by bringing about a 
cooperative industrial society.372 
 
Dewey’s vision for a “cooperative industrial society” was a new iteration of the cooperative 
commonwealth. As a theory of cooperative democracy, it contained a number of insights that 
enrich our understanding of cooperation’s political meaning. While Dewey himself never 
engaged in detailed study of the dynamics of cooperative movements and his vision of the 
politics of cooperation reflects these limitations, I argue that his perspective would have been 
enriched, rather than undermined, by such a study. Ultimately, I argue that Dewey’s conception 
of democracy helps to clarify three central dilemmas in the politics of cooperation: first, Dewey 
helps illuminate the meaning of “cooperation” as a form of free association outside the 
parameters of liberal individualism; second, his theory offers a way to conceptualize how social 
and political institutions can abet, rather than impede, cooperative experimentation; and third, his 
theory of democratic transformation offers a productive emphasis on the contingency of 
democratic action, even if it suffers from limitations as an account of political conflict and 
popular mobilization.  
Dewey’s idea of the cooperative commonwealth centered on his conviction that a 
democratic society must actively promote the joint self-fulfillment of its members, facilitated by 
their full participation as intelligent agents in all facets of their social experience. The connection 
that Dewey drew between democratic agency and social intelligence was not only at the core of 
his vision of social cooperation, but it also constituted the ethical core of his critique of 
capitalism. For Dewey, the failure of American social and political institutions to allow the free 
development of social intelligence constituted their greatest flaw. Dewey was able to formulate 
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these criticisms because he understood social intelligence in a specific way. Rather than 
conceptualize intelligence as an abstract faculty of isolated individual minds, Dewey conceived 
of intelligence as an embodied form of associated, reflexive, and experimental action. In other 
words, intelligence does not inhabit an abstract “intellectual” domain, but, properly understood, 
is a property of social interaction. In his words, intelligence is “a short-hand designation for great 
and ever-growing methods of observation, experiment and reflective reasoning which have in 
very short time revolutionized the physical and, to a considerable degree, the physiological 
conditions of life.”373 As an inherently social and collective capacity, one bound up not only in 
the worldviews of society’s members, but in the formation of their collective habits and agential 
possibilities, intelligence and its attendant phenomena – reflexivity, problem-solving, 
experimental exploration, and personal growth – constituted the core of Dewey’s social theory. 
In Dewey’s view, if society were to foreground the value of social intelligence, it would place a 
premium on egalitarian cooperation. As equal co-participants in the making of society, each 
person experiences a particular vantage point on the social whole, and each person’s contribution 
to identifying and resolving common problems is equally valuable in devising appropriate 
solutions. For this reason, Dewey claimed that democracy not only requires an elementary 
commitment to freedom of conscience and inquiry, but also an equally elementary commitment 
to the open, practical participation of all citizens in all facets of their common life. As Dewey 
understood, capitalism made such comprehensive participation impossible, and its tendency to 
thwart the free, practical cooperation of society’s members constituted the core of its ethical and 
political failure.  
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Drawing the connection between the Populist legacy, cooperation, and Dewey’s third 
party activism is less common than situating Dewey within the historiographical confines of the 
“Progressive Era” or later developments in American liberal thought. Dewey’s emphasis on the 
democratic value of scientific progress, his philosophy of “pragmatism,” and his connections to 
middle-class social reformers appear to corroborate his place within the secure parameters of an 
American tradition of liberal reform. Embedding Dewey within these traditions has often suited 
his liberal admirers and radical critics equally well. Richard Rorty, for instance, celebrated 
Dewey as an architect of American liberal nationalism, a figure who successfully united 
American cultural identity to the ideals of liberal democracy, pluralism, and tolerance, and 
helped provide the nation with its most compelling self-image. He wrote, for instance, that, 
“Whitman explicitly said that he would “use the words America and democracy as convertible 
terms.” Dewey was less explicit, but when he uses “truly democratic” as a supreme honorific, he 
is obviously envisaging an achieved America.”374 Critics have often seized on claims like these 
to claim that Dewey’s politics and philosophy are ultimately complicit in the rationalization of 
American social and political development, making Dewey’s vision an inappropriate basis for a 
critique of power. For Cristopher Lasch, Dewey’s philosophy represented a typical response by 
liberals in the Progressive Era to the onslaught of “large-scale production and mass 
communications,” which he believed undermined the communitarian localism that Dewey 
himself occasionally admired.375 In Lasch’s view, Dewey’s affirmation of “constructive 
intelligence” and “constructive social engineering” represented the eclipse of Populist resistance 
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to industrial society, making Deweyan democracy a sign of Populism’s defeat.376 Along similar 
lines, Bryan Lloyd has argued that Dewey, “welcomed, rather than suspected, the impersonal, 
cooperative, large-scale, linked-with-production science deployed with such success by the 
modern corporation. Even as he mourned the human toll of corporate capitalism, he used its 
language – integration, continuity, division of labor.”377 It comes as no surprise, then, that during 
Cold War, the philosophy of “pragmatism” became central to a liberal nationalist ideology that 
defined “political obligation and national loyalty in a secular and imperialist age.”378 For Lloyd 
and other leftist critics, Dewey’s proximity to the ideological language of mid-century liberalism 
is sufficient to read his work as capitulation rather than critique.  
This is unfortunate, since Dewey not only offers a unique critical perspective on 
American social and political development, but his theory of social intelligence offers a way to 
conceptualize cooperative activity as a constructive form of agency with a distinct set of 
obstacles rooted in the material relations of popular disempowerment. Like the Populists and 
Socialists, Dewey was wrestling with the problem of how to square cooperative activity with 
self-determination in societies that were becoming increasingly complex, where the social 
relations in which people were embedded reproduced forms of coercive power that escaped their 
control and robbed them of the value of their social contribution. Dewey’s most radical attribute 
was not a theory of class struggle, but a basic conviction that any theory of class struggle should 
also accept: the basic capacities of human agency endow us with an equal ability to participate in 
self-government, and any limitations in our collective capacity for self-government derive not 
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from our anthropological failings, but from limitations in the social infrastructure that we have 
created. 
 
I. From Social Ethics to Cooperative Intelligence: Cooperation and Industrial 
Democracy in Dewey’s Early Writings 
At the time of the Populist movement, Dewey was in the midst of the first decade of his 
academic career, absorbed in philosophical debates ranging from the nature of psychology to the 
fundamentals of ethical theory.379 As he did throughout his career, Dewey developed his 
philosophical perspective alongside continuous reflection on social and political issues. While 
Dewey wrote more explicit commentary on politics during his later years, his early writings also 
evince a clear interest in contemporary controversies. Dewey’s impassioned support for the 
Pullman strike soon after his move to the University of Chicago in 1894 is often mentioned as 
early evidence of his radical democratic tendencies, but Dewey’s commitment to a radical 
conception of democracy is a consistent feature of his political philosophy from his first 
writings.380 In his lectures on political philosophy offered at the University of Michigan in 1892, 
he singled out contemporary labor relations for specific critique, lamenting how “the value of an 
individual as an organ of activity is appropriated by others,” and claiming that an alternative, just 
division of labor, “is never complete until the laborer gets his full expression … The kind we 
now have in factories, – one-sided, mechanical – is a case of class interest; i.e. his activity is 
made a means to benefit others.”381 In Dewey’s mind, this instrumentalization of the activity of 
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workers within production was a basic ethical defect of American society, inhibiting not only 
individual workers’ self-fulfillment, but the general cultural progress of society as a whole.  
 Dewey’s simultaneous focus on the “expression” of workers in their activity alongside 
any appropriation of the “value” they create was a general aspect of his thinking about inequality 
that persisted throughout his work, and Dewey tended to emphasize the priority of the ethical to 
the economic throughout his writings on industrial democracy.382 In his early work, this ethical 
focus was deeply connected to his vision of democratic self-government, and it entailed a 
specific justification for industrial democracy that centered on cooperation. In his first piece of 
writing on democracy, an essay called “The Ethics of Democracy” (1888), Dewey began to spell 
out a theory of democracy based on a critique of any social arrangement that subjected the 
people to the government of the few – a problem he considered endemic to an ‘ethics of 
aristocracy’ that still had considerable sway over the minds of major politicians and intellectuals.  
In Dewey’s mind, any cultural progress toward fuller democracy required abandoning the 
aristocratic view. According to that view, “The few best, the aristoi, these know and are fitted for 
rule; but they are to rule not in their own interests but in that of society as a whole, and therefore, 
in that of every individual in society. They do not bear rule over the others; they show them what 
they can best do, and guide them in doing it.”383 For Dewey, this vision not only suffered the 
ethical defect of making some into the instruments of others, but it also suffered from a practical 
defect. History had repeatedly shown that, “the practical consequence of giving the few wise and 
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good power is that they cease to be wise and good,” not simply because power corrupts, but 
because government by the few inherently divorces the activity of government from “the needs 
and requirement of the many.”384 Effectively, this makes the people “aliens to that which should 
be their commonwealth. Not participating in the formation or the expression of the common will, 
they do not embody it in themselves.”385 Dewey argues that the only way to bridge the alienating 
gap between political power and social need is democracy, a society where there is no governing 
class set against the many and guiding their behavior, but instead only an association of free 
individuals jointly participating in shaping their common will. As Dewey wrote, “Government 
does not mean one class or side of society set over against the other. The government is not made 
up of those who hold office, or who sit in the legislature. It consists of every member of political 
society. … in democracy, at all events, the governors and the governed are not two classes, but 
two aspects of the same fact – the fact of the possession by society of a unified and articulate 
will. It means that government is the organ of society, and is as comprehensive as society.”386 
For Dewey, the fact that all citizens of a democracy are co-constitutors of popular sovereignty 
not only implies that they possess inherent rights to full participation in all the activities of their 
society, but that they require a political infrastructure comprehensive enough for their needs, 
ensuring that their participation is linked to an effective organ of political power. In Dewey’s 
mind, democracy’s central aspiration is not simply majority rule, but the creation of a society 
that closes the gap between governor and governed at all levels, ensuring that the people remain 
in full possession of their self-determining power, assisted by the social and political 
infrastructure that they create. 
                                                      
384 Ibid.  
385 Ibid., 237.  
386 Ibid., 238-239. 
 185
 While some might believe that citizens require a homogenous identity in order to have a 
common will, Dewey believed that this idea derived from false assumptions about the nature of 
individuality. In a critique of Sir Henry Maine’s Popular Government that occasioned the essay, 
Dewey wrote that underpinning Maine’s aristocratic critique of democracy was the mistaken 
view “that men are mere individuals, without any social relations until they form a contract … 
men in their natural state are non-social units, are a mere multitude; and that some artifice must 
be devised to constitute them into political society.”387 From this vantage point, Dewey argued 
that democracy can only be conceptualized as the rule of the majority envisioned as a numerical 
aggregate, what Maine had portrayed as, “a heap of grains of sand needing some factitious 
mortar to put them into a semblance of order.”388 For Maine, if democracy means purely 
majority rule it was clearly irrational: there is no reason to believe that a majority necessarily 
produces wise legislation. Rather than simply defend numerical majoritarianism on the analytical 
terms proposed by Maine, Dewey argued that, by positing society as a numerical aggregate, 
Maine ignored the associational fabric of social interaction that constitutes the true locus of self-
government. For Dewey, at the root of popular self-government was not the confluence of 
individual private wills expressed in a majority vote, but how the people’s possibilities for 
personal self-development and community bonds reciprocally shape one another and unfold. 
Self-government therefore requires an active attempt to create the social conditions for the 
people’s free self-development as social persons, a process that Dewey envisioned as the 
concrete realization of democracy’s three cardinal values: liberty, equality, and fraternity.389  
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As noted above, Dewey imagined the integration of citizens through the metaphor of a 
common will. Again, by this, he did not mean that atomized private citizens would all share the 
same subjective opinions, nor did he imagine that their common will would be secured by a 
homogenous identity. Instead, he saw in a society of intersubjective relations among associated 
citizens a latent possibility to connect particular individual strivings to the common good of the 
whole, a social arrangement that would merit the name “democracy” insofar as it secured for a 
freely associated people their constituent power to make and re-make society according to their 
collective deliberation. Following Hegel against Rousseau, Dewey did not think that particular 
individual strivings and the general interest would be united by the formation of a general will 
embodied in law, but through the ethical life of society, specifically through an ethical vision of 
what he called “personality.”390 As Dewey wrote, “the full significance of personality can be 
learned by the individual only as it is already presented to him in objective form in society; it 
admits that the chief stimuli and encouragements to the realization of personality come from 
society,” suggesting that individuals’ capacities for self-fulfillment are inseparable from the 
general, background structures of social interaction. At the same time, individual particularities 
are each their own moment of these social processes, a doctrine that, “holds that the spirit of 
personality indwells in every individual and that the choice to develop it must proceed from the 
individual.”391 So long as individuals were not conceived as pre-social atoms who could only be 
formed into a stable society by an external compulsion (whether the fiction of an original 
contract or the coercive discipline of a governing class), Dewey understood the possibility of 
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ethical unity between the common good and individual experiences not only as a possible ethical 
horizon, but as a cardinal component of the ideal of democratic self-government.  
 Dewey was clear that his critique of aristocracy extended into industrial relations. Insofar 
as American society had embraced the democratic ideal, he claimed that, “We have, nominally at 
least, given up the idea that a certain body of men are to be set aside for the doing of this 
necessary work.”392 At the same time, American society constitutively failed to live up to this 
ideal: on the industrial front, “society is still a sound aristocrat.”393 For Dewey, the imperative of 
a democratic organization of the economy raised the question of “the supposed tendency of 
democracy toward socialism, if not communism.”394 Alongside his critique of Maine’s 
disaggregation of the people into a numerical mass, he claimed that democratic equality was not 
an arithmetic principle – one that simply implied an equal division of resources – but an ethical 
principle, centered on the development of individual personalities connected to the common 
good. In Dewey’s mind, socialism was on the right track insofar as it aspired to make industry 
into a social institution where individual activity and the common good can be synthesized, but 
he argued that it would become undemocratic if some agency were to merely administer the 
economy to the detriment of individual initiative and responsibility.395 When he imagined 
socializing industry, he did not envision its administration by bureaucracy, or even the 
application of external rules to govern industrial activity, but instead as the internal 
reconstruction of economic relations along cooperative lines. He wrote, “We admit, nay, at times 
we claim, that ethical rules are to be applied to this industrial sphere, but we think of it as an 
external application. That the economic and industrial life is in itself ethical, that it is to be made 
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contributory to the realization of personality through the formation of a higher and more 
complete unity among men, this is what we do not recognize; but such is the meaning of the 
statement that democracy must become industrial.”396 For Dewey, if ethical unity among citizens 
pursuing a common will were to become possible, it would require that all facets of their 
experience reflect a basic harmony between individual striving and the common good. Even if 
his vision does not manifest in strict numerical equality, Dewey argued that it required “a 
democracy of wealth,” and he argued that without a more equal distribution of wealth, society 
would not be able to close the gap between governor and governed, implying that its civil and 
political institutions would reflect the one-sided domination of wealthy interests over the general 
interests of the people as a whole.397 
 As Axel Honneth clarifies, Dewey gained his confidence in the possibility of reconciled 
ethical life from a naturalistic vision of Hegelian philosophy, one that saw pre-political forms of 
cooperative action as the original, experiential locus of self-government. “If this natural-like 
process of a communal employment of individual forces on the part of all society’s members is 
raised to consciousness and viewed as a cooperative project, then that ideal evolves that bears the 
name “democracy.””398 Similar to the practices of mutual aid in early cooperative movements, 
Dewey understood basic experiences where members of an associated group seek to realize their 
own freedom in non-instrumental relations of solidarity as the elementary building-block of 
democracy. According to Honneth, the core problem of Dewey’s early theory is was his overly 
optimistic assumption that, on the basis of these initial experiences, “if all members of society 
could actualize their own developmental potential on the basis of equal opportunity, they would 
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want of their own free will to become good cooperative partners in the social division of 
labor.”399 Whether Dewey took this confidence from Hegelianism or Christian idealism, Honneth 
argues that he ultimately abandoned this naïve assumption, and replaced his ethical idealism with 
concrete investigations into social psychology and the philosophy of science. In these studies, 
Dewey did not presume the possibility of ethical reconciliation, but sought to understand how 
personal self-realization and social compatibility could be squared through the concrete practices 
of collective problem-solving that formed the basis of social intelligence.  
To see why Dewey retains the ideal of social cooperation as a form of free association 
even as he makes this turn toward a theory of problem solving, it is important to grasp that while 
Dewey may appear to simply transition from ethics to instrumental rationality – positing that 
personal and social interests can unite only when individuals share a common goal in solving a 
discrete problem – Dewey continued to imagine experimental problem solving in terms that 
exceeded its instrumental utility. In his turn toward pragmatism, Dewey did not lose his ethical 
commitment to de-instrumentalizing our relationships to one another; he did not seek to replace a 
society where some are the instruments of others with a society where each is the mutual 
instrument of the other. What binds cooperators in joint problem-solving is not only an 
instrumental interest in resolving a specific problem, but the practice of cooperative 
experimentation as its own form of self-realization. Because Dewey did not see intelligence as a 
merely ‘discursive’ form of rationality, but as an embodied practical activity, he insisted that 
intelligence was only possible through the active participation of agents in formulating and 
undergoing experimental activity. For these reasons, Honneth rightly notes that Dewey’s 
experimentalism is better grasped by the idea of “social cooperation” than the ideas of 
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“communicative consultation” of “intersubjective speech” common to theories of deliberative 
democracy.400 
To give a better sense of how Dewey envisioned the relationship between instrumentality 
and non-instrumental relations of solidarity in his emerging vision of industrial democracy, we 
can examine a few passages in his subsequent works. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey 
emphasized how, with the right background conditions in place, productive labor can serve as a 
self-fulling moment of integration with one’s natural and social environment that directly 
facilitates the growth of agential capacities. While production always has an instrumental quality, 
he also noted that reducing production to pure instrumentality severs it from forms of self-
fulfillment that are elementary to the experience of agency. He wrote that, “A skilled artisan who 
enjoys his work is aware that what he is making is made for future use. Externally his action is 
one technically labeled “production.” It seems to illustrate the subjection of present activity to 
remote ends. But actually, morally, psychologically, the sense of the utility of the article 
produced is a factor in the present significance of action due to the present utilization of abilities, 
giving play to taste and skill, accomplishing something now. The moment production is severed 
from immediate satisfaction, it becomes “labor,” drudgery, a task reluctantly performed.”401 If 
laborers deserve to appreciate their skill and creativity in the act of production, Dewey did not 
believe that this would be restricted to the isolated experience of individual laborers. If this were 
the case, one could imagine managerial attempts to increase work satisfaction as a possible result 
of Dewey’s meditations on agency. Instead, Dewey was clear that these relations of personal 
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self-fulfillment could only be truly realized in shared cooperation with fellow-workers, and that 
cooperation needed to extend to the organization of labor itself. In Democracy and Education, he 
wrote that “the great majority of workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits 
and no direct personal interests in them. The results actually achieved are not the ends of their 
actions, but only of their employers. They do what they do, not freely and intelligently, but for 
the sake of the wage earned.”402 Again, this instrumentalization of activity remained ethically 
problematic for Dewey, since it ultimately posited a managerial aristoi that provided workers 
with the rationale for their own behavior in a one-sided fashion, inhibiting the latent possibility 
that the self-fulfillment of each could become the condition for the self-fulfillment of all in 
arrangements reached by common deliberation and problem-solving. 
While Dewey’s vision of cooperation clearly resonates with the earlier views we have 
explored, it also suffers from a series of ambiguities. First, without an underlying economic 
rationale to critique exploitation – whether the Populists’ opposition to the confiscation of their 
value in the market or the Socialists’ critique of exploitation based on the labor theory of value – 
Dewey had trouble clearly formulating what a “democracy of wealth” would imply. Clearly, this 
imprecision left room for ambiguity. What prevents a “democracy of wealth” from manifesting 
in a combination of high profits, high wages, and mass consumption? Against the suggestions of 
Lasch and Lloyd noted above, Dewey would have clearly rejected the basic, Taylorist idea that 
cooperation between labor and management could result from efficient productivity, which 
would maximize the utility of both classes and serve the public interest within the confines of the 
existing social order. This vision was indeed offered in progressive terms that resonate with 
concepts used by Dewey: the reconstruction of society through scientific experimentation, a 
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defense of the public interest, and the reconciliation of individual strivings with the general good. 
At the same time, Dewey’s axiomatic commitment to a simultaneously democratic and social 
union of the particular and the general clearly warded off these conclusions. In Dewey’s view, a 
democratic solution to the problems of aristocratic industrial relations required forms of skilled 
participation and non-instrumental solidarity that were more akin to the aspirations of socialist 
unions than Taylorist managers.  
At the same time, the absence of a theory of capitalism in Dewey’s philosophical 
apparatus made it difficult to assess why economic relations inhibited the forms of cooperation 
Dewey favored, and it also limited the possibilities of Dewey’s strategic thinking. These 
difficulties not only manifest in Dewey’s imprecise use of terms (pitting a “democracy of 
wealth” against “aristocracy” could describe the aspirations of 18th century bourgeois 
revolutionaries against feudal privilege as much as aspirations for workers’ democratic control of 
industry), but they also point to an underlying difficulty in his social theory. As in the last 
chapter, this difficulty revolves around the relationship between structure and subject. While 
Honneth praises Dewey’s turn to social psychology, Dewey’s effort to resolve the gap between 
the particular and the general through a theory of psychology rather than a theory of political 
economy (which was Marx’s route out of Hegelian idealism) always carried the risk of missing 
how society’s material infrastructure reproduces regular, distinct patterns of habit-formation 
among different social classes rooted in economic dynamics. At issue is not simply whether 
Dewey discusses different forms of domination that result in different forms of habit-formation 
(which he does), but the role of political economy in shaping his overall social theory. While 
Dewey was clear that for the reformulation of social habits, “There must be a change in objective 
arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of 
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men,” he did not explicitly theorize political economy as a central site where these “objective 
arrangements” are shaped.403 Part of the reason for this oversight was that Dewey often conflated 
economic determinism with utilitarianism – the idea that, as he put it, “Desires first for the 
primary necessities of life and then for power over others and for enjoyment of the luxuries due 
to wealth are the only explaining causes” of social behavior404 – but his aversion to these 
arguments also related to his important insistence on the power of ideas to remake society. 
Against a strong tendency in Marxism, Dewey was right that social progress does not occur 
through a kind of brute conflict among classes alone, but through combinations of practical 
struggle and ideological reformulation.405 As we will see in the next section, Dewey’s mature 
political philosophy began to correct for an earlier, overly ethical discussion of the structuring 
power of economic change on social habit, and, at the same time, he would retain his insistence 
on the creative power of social intelligence to democratize society. 
 
II. The Infrastructure of Intelligence: The Great Community and the Cooperative 
Commonwealth 
In Axel Honneth’s estimation, one of Dewey’s productive moves from his early to his 
later writings was his discovery of the idea of “the public sphere” as a mediating arena between 
state and society where citizens collectively form their democratic will through public 
deliberation. For Honneth, this turn toward the idea of the public demonstrates how, “it is only 
where methods of publicly debating individual convictions have assumed institutional form that, 
in social life, the communicative character of rational problem solving can be set free … It was 
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now possible for [Dewey] to grant to procedures of unconstrained opinion and will formation a 
much greater role in true democracy.”406 For Honneth, this move is essential for Dewey’s 
continued effort to seek the reconciliation of individual expression and social freedom, since the 
public sphere becomes a domain in which the desires and opinions of citizens can be 
communicatively negotiated. At this stage in the exposition of Dewey’s views, a number of 
further ambiguities can be introduced, and they center around the depth of the “social” quality 
that Dewey accorded to cooperation and the nature of his specific conception of “the public.” 
Resolving these issues also cuts to the core of Dewey’s radicalism, since Dewey’s response to 
these difficulties demonstrates the inadequacy of most theoretical appropriations of his 
arguments, which rest not on his own social theory, but on theorists’ own attachment to the 
neoclassical theory of the market and their hopes for its administrative regulation. Moreover, the 
difficulties that arise demonstrate why, in envisioning the cooperative commonwealth, Dewey 
stuck to its radical democratic core rather than adapt its normative orientation to victories of anti-
democratic forces over the people’s own cooperative self-government. 
In basic outlines, Dewey understands “the public” as a community of concern that 
develops when social interactions create consequences that a directly associated group cannot 
manage alone.407 While Dewey understands this idea in expansive terms – as we will see below – 
it is often glossed in terms that are more narrow than Dewey’s original meaning. To take one 
example, Charles Sabel simply assimilates the public’s role to the management of market 
externalities. In his explanation of Dewey’s idea of the public, he writes: “Private transactions, 
paradigmatically in the form of bi-lateral contracts, often had consequences for others not party 
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to the agreement: externalities, as we would say.”408 From this point of view, while the 
consequences of market activity may become public concerns – and therefore justly amenable to 
political regulation by the state – market relations themselves constitute a “private” and non-
political bedrock of society that is itself not the site of political reconstruction. Along different 
lines, Sabeel Rahman reads Dewey as a classic Progressive Era proponent of the expansion of 
the administrative state, but one who hoped that the spread of administrative agencies would help 
constellate issue-area publics that focus democratic lobbying effort and help make economic 
relations more transparent.409 At an underlying level, both positions resonate with Jürgen 
Habermas’s conception of the public, which he portrays as a sphere of deliberation and public 
will formation “outside the realm of the state and the economy,” that generates legitimating or 
delegitimating discourses that seek to influence established institutions.410 As he clarifies: 
“Discourses do not govern. They generate a communicative power that cannot take the place of 
administration but can only influence it. This influence is limited to the procurement and 
withdrawal of legitimation.”411 In all cases, the idea of “the public” is conceptualized as a sphere 
of discursive norm-generation that can influence administrative agencies, often in their efforts to 
regulate the consequences of private activity.412 
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What each of these perspectives misses is the depth of Dewey’s unique, context specific 
argument about the problem of the public in the early 20th century United States. Reviewing the 
specificity of his argument is central for appreciating how he integrated a deeper appreciation for 
the structural power of economic change in shaping social perceptions and agential possibilities 
in these later years. Dewey did not orient his argument about the public to the problem of market 
regulation per se, but to a deeper problem that was also shared by socialists in the previous 
chapter: the entire edifice of industrial society increases the people’s capacities for collective 
power, but these agencies are not under the cooperative control of the agents who set them into 
motion on a daily basis. When the people participate in the relations of production, distribution, 
communication, and political negotiation created by what Dewey called “the Great Society,” the 
consequences of their own activity far outrun their individual apprehension.413 In Dewey’s mind, 
this creates the elementary conditions for a new ‘public’ to emerge and subject the consequences 
of these new practices to democratic supervision, but as of yet, no public had adequately 
emerged. As Dewey puts it, “The public is so confused and eclipsed that it cannot even use the 
organs through which it is supposed to mediate political action and polity.”414 In other words, the 
public’s problem is not simply a need for administrative regulation, but as John Medearis 
helpfully notes, the result of Dewey’s continued preoccupation with the problem of alienation, 
specifically the alienation that occurs when the people’s own capacities for self-government are 
thwarted by the very institutions they participate in, rendering their activity subordinate to the 
guiding agency of external powers over which they exercise no direct control.415 
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In the 1920’s, while figures like Walter Lippmann had begun to reiterate Maine’s 
arguments about atomic individualism to launch a general critique democracy – Lippmann 
argued that the very idea of the public was a wishful figment of the democratic imagination in a 
society of private individuals who were largely bystanders to political affairs – Dewey sought to 
subject the status of the public to simultaneous historical and philosophical critique.416 For 
Dewey, the public was not a fantasy, but a latent organizational possibility in any complex 
society. The public’s problem was that that the forms of social intelligence upon which public 
consciousness in the Great Society were built – “our enormous natural resources, our vast 
machinery of production and distribution, and the wonderful technical skill the country 
possesses” – had not yet created democratic political agencies adequate for their cooperative 
control by a self-governing community. As Dewey wrote, “Industry and inventions in 
technology, for example, create means which alter the modes of associated behavior and which 
radically change the quantity, character and place of impact of their indirect consequences. These 
changes are extrinsic to political forms, which, once established, persist of their own momentum. 
The new public which is generated remains long inchoate, unorganized, because it cannot use 
inherited political agencies.”417 For Dewey, the problem of the public was not any defect in 
human rationality or collective agency, but that the public did not possess adequate political 
instruments to subject the consequences of associated activity to democratic supervision. Dewey 
placed the onus for democratic deficits not on the people, but on the quality of their institutions. 
As he continued, inherited political agencies that subsist after major economic transformations, 
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“prevent that development of new forms of the state which might grow up rapidly were social 
life more fluid, less precipitated into set political and legal molds. To form itself, the public has 
to break existing political forms. This is hard to do because these forms are themselves the 
regular means of instituting change. The public which generated political forms is passing away, 
but the power and lust of possession remains in the hands of the officers and agencies which the 
dying public instituted. This is why the change of the form of states is so often effected only by 
revolution.”418 For Dewey, a central problem of democratic transformation was discovering an 
organizational form for collective organization with autonomy from the existing governing 
infrastructure, that was capable of organizing a public based on clarification of the consequences 
of the people’s own associational activity, and that could leverage the collective power to create 
new infrastructure that facilitated the people’s ongoing self-government. Ultimately, these were 
among Dewey’s unrealized hopes for the new party.  
Grasping what Dewey meant when he insinuated that a ‘previous’ public had formed the 
existing, inadequate state requires clarifying how he understood the current predicament more 
fully. In a later essay for the socialist journal Common Sense, Dewey acknowledged that “there is 
something to be said for the assertion that the so-called democratic states of the world have 
achieved only “bourgeois” democracy. By “bourgeois” democracy is meant one in which power 
rests finally in the hands of finance capitalism, no matter what claims are made for government 
of, by and for the people.”419 In Dewey’s view, these “bourgeois” forces were behind the 
formation of modern liberal states and representative democracy. While these were themselves 
progressive achievements, Dewey thought that the institutions of parliamentary representation, 
the vision of liberal individualism and popular suffrage they occasioned had not only proven 
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inadequate to democratically manage the new society, but had become defined by capitalist 
interests and had come to transparently serve these interests in a kind of corrosive functional 
unity. As Dewey noted, “The forms of associated action characteristic of the present economic 
order are so massive and extensive that they determine the most significant constituents of the 
public and the residence of power. Inevitably they reach out to grasp the agencies of government; 
they are controlling factors in legislation and administration.”420 As he put it elsewhere: “The 
same forces which have brought about the forms of democratic government, general suffrage, 
executives and legislatives chosen by majority vote, have also brought about conditions which 
halt the social and humane ideals that demand the utilization of government as the genuine 
instrumentality of an inclusive and fraternally associated public.”421  
Again, the problem of the public was not simply to create a bureaucratic apparatus to 
manage this complexity according to some vision of the general interest, but the formation of “an 
inclusive and fraternally associated” social grouping that would re-claim the people’s collective 
intelligence based on a renewed appreciation of the consequences of their activity.422 At a 
fundamental level, this required the creation (or transformation) of agencies that would serve as 
nodes of information and political education. At the basic experiential level, a public begins to 
form when the consequences of associated behavior begin to exceed the direct self-management 
of an individual community. “When these consequences are intellectually and emotionally 
appreciated, a shared interest is generated and the nature of the interconnected behavior is 
thereby transformed.”423 This transformation creates a constituency that aspires to subject those 
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consequences to scrutiny, creating an elementary bridge between particular activity and a general 
interest. Inherently, the formation of the public requires elementary relationships of 
representation. By definition, a public emerges when a local group is effected by consequences 
of activity beyond their immediate control, so any attempt to control these consequences requires 
joint activity by the public constituency and representative agencies beyond their group.  
In this relationship, Dewey claims to have defined the proper function of the state and 
public officials. While the public requires its own forms of self-organization based in local 
practices of cooperation (more about this in a moment), Dewey also claims that, “The public … 
is organized in and through those officers who act in behalf of their interests,” setting up a 
dynamic tension between the public, representative institutions, and the immediate social 
interactions that compose shared experience.424 To appreciate what Dewey means by “officials” 
it is important to note that he does not necessarily mean “experts,” “elites,” or “bureaucrats,” 
though these associations are often grafted to Dewey’s more abstract, functional use of the 
term.425 Dewey makes clear that officials are not necessarily defined by any epistemic or status-
superiority, but by their function as representatives of the public. “Officials” are those who 
assume the role and responsibilities of attending to public concerns; for this reason, the inverse 
of “official” is not the ordinary citizen, but the private individual. As Dewey writes, “It is not 
without significance that etymologically “private” is defined in opposition to “official,” a private 
person being one deprived of public position,” and he notes that the concrete role of a public 
official can extend to anyone who assumes a public function, including “a citizen-voter” who 
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“expresses his will as a representative of the public interest.”426 And as he specifies further, 
officials do not populate a remote administrative sphere divorced from society but are 
themselves always meaningfully embedded within society: “The buildings, property, funds, and 
other physical resources involved in the performance of this office [of representation] are res 
publica, the common-wealth.”427 Rather than immediately attach to Progressive-Era 
administrative state-building, Dewey’s conception of officials extends to all offices that care for 
the consequences of associated action in response to public problems, whether politicians, 
educators, trade union delegates, or voters. In a similar fashion to the late 19th century American 
socialist Laurence Gronlund, Dewey sought to recognize how the social roles often considered 
‘private’ were actually public functions whose everyday activity significantly affected the 
experiences of all members of society. Arguing against the view that socialism’s inevitable fate 
would be the construction of a vast civil service that would dominate society, Gronlund retorted, 
“Civil Service increased, you say. Then you are truly nearsighted. What else now are our 
merchants, our foremen, our superintendents, our bank presidents, our cashiers … Is there not an 
immense number of men now, occupying private positions intent only on their interests or the 
interests of their employers and yet to all intents and purposes [are] officials of Society? The 
only change, then, which our Commonwealth will bring about in that respect is to change these 
private functionaries into public officials.”428 As Gronlund and Dewey both emphasized, 
recognizing the public quality of private roles only implied a greater opportunity to subject the 
panoply of social activities that shaped democratic association to popular supervision. From the 
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public’s standpoint, the key is that officials “employ [their powers] for the public and do not turn 
them to their own private benefit,” an inherent problem in any relationship of representation.429 
While Dewey believed that the formation and recognition of official agencies would 
assist democracy by offering effective organs for the people to resolve their common problems, 
he based his hopes for a new industrial state on the public’s basic capacities for social 
intelligence. While Dewey clearly believed that more public agencies were necessary to manage 
a modern economy democratically, too strong a focus on bureaucratic expansion overlooks the 
extent to which Dewey relied on the practices of “local neighborhood groups carrying on, though 
intimate meetings and discussions, the management of their own affairs,” which Dewey thought 
was necessary “if political democracy was to be made secure.”430 Dewey expressed this idea 
through the concept of “community,” but it was also intimately related to how he understood 
social intelligence and social cooperation. In an often-quoted remark, Dewey wrote that 
democracy “is the idea of community life itself.”431 In Honneth’s view, Dewey’s focus on 
community is a precondition for citizens to draw any substantial connection between the 
coordinating rationality of the state, public sphere, and officials, and the experiential reality of 
citizens cooperatively addressing problems. “Society’s members must have been able to see in 
advance that, through their cooperative action, they are pursuing a common goal, in order to be 
able to understand the establishment of democratic institutions of self-organization as the means 
for a political solution to their problems of social coordination.”432 While the ideal of 
‘community’ is often used in vague terms, the radical consequence of this position resides in how 
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it recalls Dewey’s early views about industrial democracy in “The Ethics of Democracy.” Since 
no domain of social activity is inherently ‘private’ and citizens have an elementary democratic 
right to participate in the identification and resolution of common problems at all levels of 
society, these practices of cooperative experimentation must extend into the social sphere, 
ensuring that effective public representation is subtended by workplace democracy. To begin to 
clarify what this means, we can see how Dewey aimed to model an ideal division of labor on the 
community of scientific inquirers. In his Logic, Dewey explained this view in the following way:  
An inquirer in a given special field appeals to the experiences of the community of his fellow 
workers for confirmation and correction of his results. Until agreement upon consequences is 
reached by those who reinstate the conditions set forth, the conclusions that are announced by an 
individual inquirer have the status of an hypothesis … The point involved comes out clearly 
when the social consequences of scientific conclusions invoke intensification of social conflicts. 
For these conflicts provide presumptive evidence of the insufficiency, or partiality, and 
incompleteness of conclusions as they stand.433  
 
Just like it is only through actual negotiation of conflicts that emerge among equal individuals 
that adequate scientific practice is conducted, Dewey aspired for all social sectors to adopt these 
practices, a goal he recognized carried profound consequences for the reorganization of society.  
In Freedom and Culture, Dewey describes the spread of such cooperative experimentalism 
through society as the achievement of a “free culture,” where experimental problem-solving 
becomes a collective habit in all facets of society. A free culture, in Dewey’s view, would be a 
cooperative culture where the synthesis between particular and general interests would not be 
effected by coercive power, but through non-instrumental relations of social solidarity modeled 
on the community of inquirers – a form of association where all participants attempt to discover 
creative resolutions for shared problems and act within an arena of common concern. While 
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Dewey often described the development of free culture as the proliferation of an ethos, he was 
also clear that it was an institutional problem:  
The predicament is that individuality demands association to develop and sustain it and 
association requires arrangement and coordination of its elements, or organization – since 
otherwise it is formless and void of power. … Persons acutely aware of the dangers of 
regimentation when it is imposed by government remain oblivious of the millions of persons 
whose behavior is regimented by an economic system through whose intervention alone they 
obtain a livelihood … the kind of working together which has resulted is too much like that of 
the parts of a machine to represent co-operation which expresses freedom and also contributes to 
it. No small part of the democratic problem is to achieve associations whose ordering of parts 
provides the strength that comes from stability, while they promote flexibility or response to 
change.434  
 
In Dewey’s view, the proliferation of these cultural habits would be tantamount the conscious 
attempt to center the cultivation of social intelligence as basic principle of social relations, a 
project that required egalitarian cooperation. Such intelligence could only be cultivated 
collectively, and it required real investment in the infrastructure that would sustain it. In Dewey’s 
mind, the creation of this infrastructure was the cardinal task for the public as well as a 
comprehensive ethical vision of self-government. “The notion that intelligence is a personal 
endowment or personal attainment is the great conceit of the intellectual class, as that of the 
commercial class is that wealth is something which they personally have wrought and 
possess.”435 As Dewey knew well, these problems were interrelated, and any attempt to create 
the infrastructure of intelligence implied a direct challenge to the power of wealth.  
 
III. The Means and Ends of Cooperative Reconstruction 
Dewey’s aspirations to liberate the possibilities of social intelligence and connect them to 
effective, public means of problem-solving constitutes a clear – if institutionally not fully 
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elaborated – guiding ideal for democratic transformation. In contemplating any process of 
transformation, Dewey’s theory of action consistently warned about the separation of means 
from ends, which he viewed as phases of a continuous, integrated process of experimental 
action.436 In Human Nature and Conduct, he warned specifically against positing an ideal that 
was not tethered to means for its realization, writing “The “idealist” sets up as the ideal not 
fullness of meaning of the present but a remote goal. Hence the present is evacuated of meaning. 
It is reduced to being a mere instrument, an evil necessity due to the distance between us and 
significant valid satisfaction.”437 Concretely, this implies that if fuller social cooperation is the 
goal of Deweyan democracy, that cooperation cannot be posited merely as the end result of a 
transformative means disconnected from cooperative practices themselves. At an elementary 
level, this proscription appears to forbid the socialist theory of revolution. As we saw in the 
previous two chapters, repeated practical attempts to form cooperative forms of economic 
organization failed due to infrastructural facets of capitalist society that were extremely difficult 
to change by political means. Moreover, given the scale of modern industry, workers would 
never be able to ‘become their own capitalists’ like late 19th century iron-molders had, by 
purchasing capital to form their own independent cooperative. The only way to lay claim to these 
means of production was to seize capitalist property – based on the normative justification that 
that property was merely a tool of exploitation, not the legitimate incarnation of its owners own 
agency and individual liberty – a project that required the revolutionary organization of workers 
in the trade union movement. Off of these assessments, socialists argued that true cooperation 
could only be achieved not only after capitalist property had been transformed into social 
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property, but after workers had formed a democratically planned economy that indexed 
production to need, decreased the working day in proportion to productivity, and emancipated 
workplace organization from the disciplinary constraints of the competitive market. These were 
eminently practical conclusions derived from cooperative experimentation. Does Dewey’s 
argument about ends and means imply discarding the ideal of socialist cooperation in a post-
revolutionary setting? Does the socialist ideal of social cooperation reduce the present struggle to 
being “a mere instrument” in the struggle for an end that makes the present “evacuated of 
meaning”?  
Despite his relationship with the Socialist Party, Dewey never clearly addressed this 
question head on in the terms just outlined. On Dewey’s own terms, though, Debs’s and 
Robertson’s vision of socialist unionism as an anticipatory practice should allay this worry. In 
the socialist union, practices of cooperation are built up that can still hold the fuller ideal of 
social cooperation as an end-in-view. If they can be institutionalized and supported by the labor 
movement, these practices could constitute part of how an incipient Deweyan ‘public’ comes to 
consciousness of its own alienated intelligence and begins to create new institutional forms for 
the management of public affairs (immediate workers’ councils, district councils).438 What 
Dewey would have added to these formulations was his insistence on a broad view of social 
intelligence, not reducible to economic self-management alone. Building up these broader, 
cultural resources required looking beyond the admittedly short-sighted idea that if capitalist 
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property were divested of its power to exploit, social cooperation would straightforwardly 
follow. As he wrote:  
The facts that justify economic emphasis do not prove, however, that the issue of co-operative 
democratic freedom can be settled by dealing directly and exclusively with the economic aspect, 
if only because command of the means which would be needed to effect desirable changes in 
industry and in the distribution of income can be achieved only by the aid of correlative changes 
in science, morals and other phases of our common experience. The fact brings out in sharp 
outline that as yet the full conditions, economic and legal, for a completely democratic 
experience have not existed.439 
 
What Dewey shared with socialists was a clear aspiration to understand how such conditions 
might come to exist. 
While there are many attributes that separate Dewey and a figure like Debs, what 
distinguished Dewey most from socialists like Debs is his strong emphasis on the importance of 
voluntary persuasion in effecting democratic change. From his early neo-Hegelian reflections on 
the idea of “personality,” Dewey always believed that democracy implied a primary emphasis on 
eliciting individual volition through persuasion as a means to effect change. As he had put it, 
“The democratic ideal includes liberty, because democracy without initiation from within, 
without an ideal chosen from within and freely followed from within, is nothing.”440 While this 
emphasis clearly did not outlaw coercion as a strategy for reconstructing the background 
conditions for cooperative experimentation, the ideal of voluntary initiative is central to Dewey 
given the premium he placed on social intelligence as an ends and a means. While Livingston 
clearly demonstrated how Dewey believed that the use of coercive action could be understood as 
a democratic means to provoke inquiry and catalyze the public’s intelligence, he also clearly did 
not believe that a protracted struggle between propertied and dispossessed social classes would 
lead to the democratic victory of workers, nor was he confident that such a process would 
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intelligently create a social infrastructure adequate to subserve the public’s intelligence.441 In 
Freedom and Culture, Dewey wondered about whether the general idea of socialist transition 
was adequate to the problem it had set for itself:  
Consider, as an example, the argument that since the processes of industry, on the side of both 
labor and capital, have become collective, ownership and control must also be collective, 
resulting in elimination of private income from rent, interest, and dividends. From the standpoint 
of democracy, this end, which is put forward in the interest of the maintenance of democracy, 
raises the problem of the possibility of its execution by democratic methods. Can the change be 
effected by democratic means? After it is effected, supposing that it is, can production and 
distribution of goods and services be effected except by a centralized power that is destructive of 
democracy?442  
 
For Dewey, achieving these results democratically did not primarily require a political battle, but 
an agency capable of intelligent transformation that could clearly link ends and means in a 
process of change. Particularly because the future is always uncertain, action cannot assume that 
sacrificing the values underpinning its ideal end could ever meaningfully advance that end; 
rather, it would likely set society on the wrong evolutionary path. Dewey’s response to the 
question above was to echo his argument in The Public and its Problems about the need for the 
public to “break existing institutional forms”: “The very necessity for change only makes urgent 
the question of whether the existing agencies of democracy are competent to effect the change … 
It is the basic problem which has precedence over the various plans and policies that are urged 
from one quarter or another.”443 The primary agency that Dewey himself tried to create to create 
the basis for this project was the LIPA – again positing that a third party independent of capitalist 
parties could serve as the political and organizational vehicle for a process of cooperative, social 
democratic transformation.  
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A social democratic party intent on creating and re-working the infrastructure for social 
intelligence would need to exercise coercion against powerful interests, and it would also work 
to re-shape the associational life of citizens. One way we might think of the normative basis of 
such a project is to extend an insight from Livingston, when he writes that, “Deweyan 
democracy opposes coercive means used to impose outcomes on inquiry rather than coercion 
used to spark a process of inquiry.”444 Coercively imposing an outcome on inquiry violates the 
experimental method because it is a form of ideological indoctrination; it imposes ex ante 
restrictions on the content of the experimental process, inherently prohibiting the free process of 
problem-solving. On the other hand, Dewey understands inquiry as a social practice whose 
preconditions are formed by the infrastructure of social habits; insofar as he is committed to 
deepening the vitality of social intelligence, Dewey can justify the use of coercive action to 
reconstruct the conditions of possibility for successful collective experimentation.445 Unlike 
liberal theories that see the precondition of free association as a ‘rule of law’ that inhibits some 
agents from harming or impinging on the freedom of others, Dewey aspired to unite the 
particular and the general by ensuring the free practice of cooperative, experimental association.  
Through the LIPA and a parallel organ called The People’s Lobby, Dewey lamented how all of 
the early measures of the New Deal were, “compromised, prejudiced, yes, nullified, by private 
monopolization of opportunity.”446 Even the TVA, which he called “the most promising 
enterprise of the New Deal,” was compromised since “The new values that will result from it are 
going to be absorbed by those who monopolize the land and the machines that are made out of 
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the products of the land.”447 Yet in a confused way, Dewey referred to Henry George’s idea of 
taxing the value of ground rent as a solution for this problem, leaving the gains accruing to 
private ownership of capital unaffected. At the same time, he advocated progressive taxation as a 
step toward socialization, criticizing “Over-zealous advocates of socialization of all means of 
production, distribution, and exchange,” hoping that progressive taxation could constitute a 
majoritarian proposal for the legal and consensual transfer of resources back to the people, in 
preparation to pay for public services and future efforts at socialization.448 The possible success 
of such proposals presumes a strong organized constituency outside the state, willing to sustain a 
conflictual public legislative and legal battle – another reason why an independent party organ 
would serve an essential role in Dewey’s projected efforts. Like any social democratic proposal, 
Dewey’s hope for intelligent reconstruction using both new agencies (parties, unions, farmer 
organizations) and inherited agencies (legislature and bureaucracy) moves the axis of conflict for 
cooperative politics away from the direct confrontation of social classes on the economic terrain. 
It gains in the possibility of more clearly and explicitly linking the ends of a new industrial state 
that subserves self-government to institutional means that preserve enough continuity to provide 
a stable basis for experimentation.  
Had Dewey squared himself with a consistent theory of political economy, his powerful 
ethical exhortations that social intelligence should be the common inheritance of all of its 
participating members in order to facilitate their free self-government might have been connected 
to a clearer strategy. If this was the case, he might not have fallen into the illusions of Georgism 
in the midst of the Depression. Dewey’s aspirations for social democratic transformation were 
not obviously wrong-headed, but the failure of 20th century social democracy to prevent its own 
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decline into neoliberalism now count among the lessons of historical experiments that 
cooperative theory needs to take into account. Those results are not a referendum on the ideal of 
a parliamentary road to socialism, particularly not the effort to combine parliamentarism with 
participatory activity along the lines that Dewey hoped. Indeed, Dewey’s effort to insist that 
local ‘grass roots organization’ is truly democratic when it is based on non-instrumental, 
cooperative relations of solidarity and collective experimentation is his most valuable enduring 
legacy as a democratic theorist.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cooperation Against Empire: W.E.B. Du Bois from the Group Economy to Socialist 
Internationalism 
 
 Assessing W.E.B. Du Bois’s legacy for political theory remains a site of scholarly 
controversy. Over the course of his long career from the turn of the 20th century through the 
1950’s, Du Bois combined historical, sociological, and philosophical study with concrete 
interventions in political strategy, leaving behind a long record of reflections on some of the 
major political transformations of the 20th century. Characterizing the meaning of these 
reflections for contemporary political theory is often complicated by the array of positions Du 
Bois adopted across his career, a feature of his legacy that has often garnered him advocates 
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from opposed ideological positions. As Charles Mills put it, Du Bois has been characterized as a 
““Talented Tenth” elitist, democrat, Eurocentric snob, celebrant of the folk tradition, 
integrationist, separatist, Marxist, black nationalist, Stalinist, radical democrat, prophetic 
pragmatist – the list of possible and actual descriptions of Du Bois’s political identity is long and 
contradictory.”449 In this chapter, I will not try to overcome these contradictory assessments 
through a comprehensive account of Du Bois as a political thinker, as others have attempted to 
do.450 Instead, I will follow one thread that unites Du Bois’s earliest and latest work and that 
reveals both consistency and change in his understanding of democracy – namely, his interest in 
developing a theory and practice of cooperation as an integral component of democratic politics. 
From his early sociological studies at Atlanta University to his embrace of international 
socialism at the end of his life, Du Bois wrestled with the meaning and possibilities of social 
cooperation, not only as a specific organizational strategy for black Americans in their struggle 
against segregation and white supremacy, but as a general aspiration for a democratic society.  
Clarifying Du Bois’s theory of cooperative democracy and setting him with a common 
radical democratic legacy as the Populists and Socialists requires two inter-related arguments. 
First, it requires a response to critics who see a persistent elitism in Du Bois’s thinking. From 
this point of view, Du Bois may have championed democracy, but he always imagined the 
radicalization of democracy as an elite-led project. Adolph Reed, for instance, acknowledges a 
connection between Populism, cooperative theory, and Du Bois, but distinguishes Du Bois from 
the Populists’ radical democratic legacy. In Du Bois’s autobiography Dusk of Dawn: The 
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Autobiography of a Race Concept (1940), he described how he had come to see the People’s 
Party as, “a third party movement of deep significance” and he lamented how it was kept from 
power, “on the one hand by the established election frauds of the South, of which I knew, and by 
the fabulous election fund which made McKinley President of the United States.”451 
Nevertheless, Reed argues that Du Bois’s elite-led vision sharply distinguishes him from the 
Colored Farmers’ Alliances, which “represented an indigenous strain of black populism” based 
on participatory democracy.452 For Reed, Du Bois’s fundamental commitment was not to the 
popular classes, but “to the “cultured classes,” that is, not simply the black middle class writ 
large, but that complement that was trained in the techniques of modern civilization … It was 
this stratum he saw leading his cooperative commonwealth in the 1930’s and 1940’s, and to 
whom he assigned a place atop the black population.”453  
To address this argument, I trace the shifts in Du Bois’s evolving understanding of the 
economic basis of black political strategy throughout his career. Du Bois’s early emphasis on the 
black middle class was not simply the effect of cultural elitism, but emerged from his 
understanding of the political-economic dynamics of leadership and cultural uplift. As the 
impasses in his early activism grew apparent and his theory of political economy transformed, so 
did his conception of democracy and the kinds of agency required to radicalize it. Since his 
earliest sociological studies at Atlanta University at the turn of the 20th century, Du Bois hoped 
that African-American progress could rest on the development of a “group economy” based on 
the ownership and cooperative management of small capital. At this point, Du Bois saw the 
economic basis of the African-American predicament as poverty – making building wealth the 
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solution. Democratized capital ownership could facilitate racial progress if it was balanced by 
practices of mutual aid that ensured the provision of social insurance, secure employment, and 
public goods like education and social infrastructure that benefitted the whole community. When 
Du Bois had developed a clearer criticism of capitalism by the 1930’s, he did not upend this 
vision, but modified it. Now, he understood exploitation as the economic basis of social 
problems, which could only be solved by the cooperative transformation of social relations. 
When Du Bois broke with the NAACP during the Depression for its lack of a meaningful 
economic program, he proposed a new vision of the group economy, this time rooted specifically 
in consumers’ cooperatives and argued that it could form the organizational basis of a peaceful 
transition to socialism. In these years, Du Bois’s mature vision of democratic cooperation 
emerged, based in practically suppressing how the profit motive shapes economic activity, and 
his conception of democratic agency was also sharpened, which was based on forging 
connections between plural sites of popular power that harness the people’s latent material force 
against exploitation.  
From the beginning of his career, Du Bois sought a political force that could drive 
cultural and economic progress, centrally for black Americans, but also for all modern societies 
grappling with the contradictions between democracy, capitalism, and empire. Using a 
contemporary idiom, he often called this progress “uplift.” Although Du Bois began his career 
thinking that uplift must be led by “exceptional men” of culture (who he called “the Talented 
Tenth”454), his ultimate answer to the problem of social progress sought to clarify how black 
Americans could become the agents of “social reconstruction” in the context of an international, 
interracial movement against imperialism. Like others in this study, Du Bois’s attempt to 
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theorize social reconstruction responded to a basic dilemma in the people’s status as a self-
determining constituent power. Achieving the collective ability to subject engrained patterns of 
association to reflective self-control – the essence of what Du Bois understood as “social 
reconstruction” – requires a combination of organizational innovation, popular self-education, 
and political struggle. For Du Bois, the cardinal example of social reconstruction in American 
history was Reconstruction itself. Reconstruction demonstrated how mass popular agency, 
economic re-organization, and political negotiation can produce a transformation in social 
relations that, however fragile, meaningfully advances the cause of democracy. 
The formative power of Reconstruction and its failure has, so far, not been a central 
element of our examination of the ideal of the cooperative commonwealth. While Debs had tried 
to link labor’s cause to the memory of abolition, Dewey’s vision of the formation of “the Great 
Society” did not mention the Civil War or Reconstruction. Integrating a clear account of slavery, 
war, and Reconstruction into the historical memory of the push for the cooperative 
commonwealth centrally concerns the role of racism and the dynamics of popular interracial 
unity in the history of popular-democratic struggle in the United States, and it also points to 
equally profound questions about the formation of the American state and the consolidation of a 
national ruling class around a political project that while not at all internally unified, formed a 
stable enough base for a broadly shared project of imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. Du Bois’s sensitivity to these dynamics in his mature years changed how he envisioned 
the nature of cooperation, its alliances, and its social history in the United States. Du Bois’s 
mature conception of democracy was not meant to vindicate Reconstruction, but to correct for its 
failures and its inherent limitations. In place of radical Reconstruction’s emphasis on 
democratized capital, Du Bois substituted a program of social cooperation; in place of its 
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reliance on Northern financial and industrial hegemony, Du Bois sought the revolutionary 
alliance of the Third World, an incipient array of agencies who could strive for a world that, as 
he put it, was not based on the imperative to “lie, steal and kill” as we provide for our common 
needs.455  
 
I. Beyond Elitism?: Making Space for Cooperative Agency  
 If our historical memory of Du Bois’s politics remains defined by a series of competing 
and even contradictory positions, each one claimed by sympathetic interpreters, it is difficult to 
form a clear understanding of his place in African-American political history and his lessons for 
us today. Such a comprehensive assessment is complicated not only by the shifts in Du Bois’s 
intellectual career, but also his central importance for African-American intellectual history. As 
Reed correctly notes, “Du Bois’s prominence overloads the ideological significance of 
characterizing him and defining his legacy. Examination of the historically conditioned 
foundations of his thinking, therefore, has taken a backseat to establishing or reaffirming his 
position in history.”456 Against the temptation to vindicate Du Bois and secure his place in an 
intellectual pantheon, Reed seeks to historicize Du Bois’s contributions, and by contextualizing 
Du Bois within the intellectual culture of early 20th century progressive reform, he hopes to 
reveal Du Bois’s limitations for contemporary politics. In contrast to those who appropriate Du 
Bois for democratic purposes, Reed argues that Du Bois’s defining characteristic was his 
continuous insistence on the black cultural elite as the bearers of social progress. In studies that 
associate Du Bois with radical democracy, Reed observes that “all too often his elitism is 
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mentioned offhandedly, without critical examination or careful description of its substantive 
characteristics.”457 This is a deep mistake, Reed argues, since “the elitist strain in his thought 
runs far deeper and is connected with his most basic views concerning proper social organization 
in general and organization of the Afro-American population in particular.”458 By eliding Du 
Bois’s elitism, critics not only fail to see how it conditioned the radicalism of Du Bois’s later 
years – manifest in his association with authoritarian forms of socialism and inegalitarian forms 
of Pan-Africanism – but they also mischaracterize his basic views about political agency, social 
organization, and democratic progress.  
Reed is right that the elite-centric strategy that defined Du Bois’s early career needs an 
explanation, but the explanation he offers fails to establish a frame that explains the shifts in Du 
Bois’s career. According to Reed’s contextualist interpretation, Du Bois’s worldview borrowed 
from three strands of American progressivism that permeated his education and shaped his 
foundational studies. Each strand represents a distinct response by reform-minded intellectuals to 
the rise of industrial capitalism. According to Reed, Du Bois’s politics were shaped, “in a critical 
intellectual environment dominated by three ideological responses to the consolidation of 
corporate industrialism: collectivism, the cooperative commonwealth (the font of homegrown 
American socialism), and antimodernism.”459 For Reed, each of these trends was a distinctly 
intellectual response to capitalist development, and each reflected intellectuals’ specific role in a 
new division of labor shaped by the imperatives of corporate consolidation, scientific labor 
management, and new forms of national and international economic interdependence.460 For 
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progressive collectivists in particular, meeting these challenges often required abandoning the 
19th century dogma of laissez-faire, and as a corrective, they often emphasized rationalizing 
economic and political procedures by superseding the conflicting interests of the competitive 
private sphere with neutral, scientific accounts of the general interest. From this movement 
emerged not only directly economic innovations like Taylorism, but calls for a “new 
nationalism” that would unite a large, fractious country around a common progressive project, 
opposing tendencies toward “drift” with new techniques of “mastery” based on scientific 
expertise.461 The result of these tendencies was that, “The positive valuation of consciously 
organized society is a distinctive outlook of corporate-era intellectuals,” a basic orientation that 
shaped the political consciousness of the Harvard-educated Du Bois as much as others of his 
generation.462   
Despite the importance of situating Du Bois’s within his historical milieu, the three 
strands of reform ideology that Reed analyzes cannot account for his early interest in cooperative 
democracy or anticipate the subsequent transformations in his vision of social cooperation.463 
Specifically, Reed’s interpretative frame mischaracterizes the meaning of the cooperative 
commonwealth ideal, missing an opportunity to grasp Du Bois’s evolving connection to the 
democratic core of its politics. Nevertheless, Reed’s anxieties about Du Bois’s progressive 
inheritances are important and illuminating, and will set the distinctiveness of Du Bois’s 
evolving position into sharper relief. For Reed, progressive collectivism is fundamentally based 
on the vision of a technically rational society, organized scientifically by elites who can 
supersede the competing pressures of particular interests and provide the blueprint for a more 
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efficient, harmonious, and just social order. Its goal is to confront rising industrialism with a 
political project of rationalization, spearheaded by experts. While Reed acknowledges that Du 
Bois did not embrace this ideology entirely, he does claim that Du Bois accepted collectivism’s 
basic premise that innovations in social organization must be effected by educated, scientifically 
minded elites. Since collectivism’s a vision of “the technicization of social life”464 ultimately sits 
awkwardly with a number of Du Bois’s constitutive commitments – like his aspiration to 
articulate the “spiritual strivings” latent in black culture or his phenomenology of double 
consciousness465 – Reed accounts for these tendencies by noting that Du Bois’s views also 
“reflected the tracings of an antimodernist tension”466 that romanticized black folk culture. The 
romantic tendency emerges from a backward-looking response to industrialism that longed for 
what rising industrialism threatened – traditional patterns of sociality undermined by 
urbanization, migration, technological change, and increasingly anonymous forms of social 
interconnection.  
Yet from his earliest writings, Du Bois’s understanding of cooperation reflected neither a 
scientific ideal of technological rationalization, nor a romantic attachment to specifically racial 
forms of community. Instead, it rested upon concrete analysis of how group economic activity 
developed in black communities as a result of both popular and elite organizational initiatives, 
adaptations to changing social conditions, and basic drives for democratic autonomy. Reed’s 
third progressive option – the cooperative commonwealth – can clarify Du Bois’s aspirations if it 
is properly understood. In his account of this trend, Reed acknowledges the connection between 
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cooperation and Populism, but then allows a specific subset of cooperation’s representatives – 
specifically Laurence Gronlund and Edward Bellamy – to define the ideal as a whole. For Reed, 
the defining feature of the cooperative commonwealth is that it represents “the community’s 
reassertion of its control over industrialization,” not by means of developing new associational 
patterns among citizens, but by the state taking on the task of forming solidarities in place of the 
pre-industrial, personal forms of interdependence that structured pre-industrial communities.467 
In his words, the cooperative commonwealth implied that, “The state … was to become the 
community, substituting the precision of self-regulating – and thus totalitarian – rational 
administration for the more personal and relational basis of legitimacy that had been abolished 
by large-scale industrialization.”468 In this analysis, the concrete, innovative practices of 
cooperation institutionalized within the Farmer’s Alliances become absorbed into an idealized 
vision of “community” threatened by industrialization. Since pre-industrial farmers and artisans 
cannot reverse the process of history and restore their community bonds, only the state can 
become the bearer of social cooperation. Within this framework, “cooperation” devolves into a 
subset of “collectivism,” and in an industrial setting, implies a necessarily ill-fated attempt to 
restore harmonious interconnection by means of scientific, bureaucratic management.469 From 
this point of view – which echoes the republican nostalgia of some Populist admirers like 
Goodwyn and Lasch – the onset of industrial society renders the Populist hope for cooperative 
democracy impossible, since in the context of large-scale industry and national economic 
integration, its basic aims could only be fulfilled by elite-led rational management: the 
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coordination of productive activity according to scientific standards for the purposes of 
efficiency, not democratic power-sharing between equals.  
As we have seen, though, the rise of a fully industrial capitalist society rested on defeats 
for cooperative democracy, but it did not render social cooperation impossible. Grasping Du 
Bois’s contribution to theorizing how cooperative democracy could develop through popular 
political agency requires acknowledging that the possibilities of association are themselves a 
mutable social product, amenable to change by a combination of voluntary effort, political 
struggle, and infrastructural changes in the operation of power. This is so in part because social 
cooperation is not simply the result of communitarian bonds that capitalism had rendered 
obsolete, nor is it the product of technically rational coordination; instead, it names the 
egalitarian practice of sharing power for the common advancement of all. Du Bois was surely a 
creature of the early 20th century, but as an analysis of his first sociological studies shows, his 
relationship to progressive reform, social scientific investigation, and critiques of power are more 
nuanced than the above frames allow. As Du Bois examined how black Americans developed a 
capacity for collective action during slavery, were incorporated into capitalist social relations 
during Reconstruction,470 and developed incipient forms of collective power through both self-
help and political action, his worldview was indeed framed by the tensions between capitalism 
and democracy that defined the progressive era. Yet at the same time, understanding the nature 
of his early middle-class progressivism and its ultimate mutability require clarifying how his 
initial emphasis on the black middle class was not simply the effect of elitism, but the product of 
his specific understanding of leadership, political economy, and social progress as they had 
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already played out in black history. Du Bois was clear that the political leadership of a talented 
tenth required material support within black communities, which created the imperative for 
ownership and control over capital – what Du Bois initially called “the group economy.” To be 
effective, Du Bois hoped that leaders would not simply follow the path of acquisitive 
materialism, but support race-conscious plans of community development that uplifted the group 
as a whole. While Du Bois subsequently abandoned his hope that black capitalism embedded in a 
cooperative group economy could facilitate political democracy, how and why he held these 
views in his earliest writings sheds important light on the meaning of his emphasis on middle-
class leadership, the nature of his ideological transformations, and how the basic aspiration to 
cooperation drove Du Bois in a more egalitarian direction.   
 
II. The Origins of Cooperation: The Idea of the Group Economy in Du Bois’s 
Atlanta Studies 
Du Bois joined the faculty at Atlanta University in 1897 and began to collaborate on the 
University’s annual series of studies of black American social life. Du Bois’s research in Atlanta 
informed his evolving political judgments and left an enduring mark on his worldview. While Du 
Bois’s Atlanta studies are often noted by scholars, their significance for his evolving 
understanding of democracy tends to be under-emphasized. Even according to Manning Marable 
– a defender of the radical democratic Du Bois – the Atlanta studies reflect the height of Du 
Bois’s embeddedness in a black middle-class milieu. For Marable, “Du Bois’s activities at 
Atlanta University were one dimension of a broader trend among the small black middle class 
toward professional organization and race-conscious development.”471 While Marable defends 
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Du Bois’s later socialist commitments, he also leaves them disconnected from the Atlanta-era 
study on cooperative economics, Economic Co-Operation Among Negro Americans, missing an 
opportunity to trace how and why Du Bois’s understanding of social cooperation changed 
throughout his career. Marable observes how, “The major attempt of the volume was to illustrate 
collective activity within the private sector and to suggest methods for stimulating “the group 
economy” of black Americans,”472 and notes the connection between this vision and Du Bois’s 
interest in consumer cooperatives during the Depression, but he fails to reconstruct why Du Bois 
placed the middle class at the core of the group economy in his earliest studies and consumers’ 
organizations three decades later. Charting this trajectory not only illuminates changes in Du 
Bois’s own thinking, but alternative responses to the problem of cultivating democratic self-
determination in capitalist societies. 
The goal of the Atlanta studies was to provide thorough investigations of different 
aspects of what was called “the Negro Problem,” covering issues ranging from health and 
economics to religion and charitable organizations. To grasp the significance of these early 
studies, it is helpful to note that Du Bois’s conception of black political strategy always rested on 
explicit economic foundations, even if these foundations are not the central aspect of some of his 
most well-recognized texts. To take one prominent example, in his well-known disagreements 
with Booker T. Washington, Du Bois emphasized political agitation against segregation 
alongside higher education as necessary components of political strategy, in contrast to 
Washington’s appeasement of Jim Crow politicians and his emphasis on industrial training.473 
While the debate positioned Du Bois on the side of civil rights and high culture against 
Washington’s crass materialism held together by corrosive compromise and measured in dollars 
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and cents, Du Bois and Washington shared a basic expectation that black Americans would have 
to actively mold their place within the American capitalist economy for social progress to be 
possible. When Du Bois wrote, for instance, that, “So far as Mr. Washington preaches Thrift, 
Patience, and Industrial Training for the masses, we must hold up his hands and strive with 
him,”474 he reflected their shared conviction that social progress implied operating within 
capitalism to amass the necessary wealth for social progress.  
While their views overlapped in this basic sense, Du Bois and Washington differed with 
respect to the kind of political leadership they envisioned guiding progress, a disagreement that 
not only reflected different opinions about education, but also about political economy. 
Specifically, they disagreed about what ideal of economic development would underpin race 
progress and about the nature of the economic base on which race leadership would rest. 
Washington’s “Atlanta compromise” advocated alliance between Southern capital and black 
labor (pitted against the prospect of Southern white leaders seeking white immigrant labor) as the 
basis for black workers to begin to amass earnings, purchase land and capital, and work toward 
civic equality.475 Educational institutions like Tuskegee not only trained students for earning and 
property-ownership, but rested on a supporting coalition composed of the Southern elite, black 
industrialists, and industrial educators. Du Bois’s “talented tenth,” by contrast, were teachers and 
other cultural leaders who communicated an integrated, aspirational political vision in both 
universities and common schools. As he wrote in his essay, “On the Wings of Atalanta,” “In the 
Black World, the Preacher and Teacher embodied once the ideals of this people, – the strife for 
another and a juster world, the vague dream of righteousness, the mystery of knowing; but to-day 
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the danger is that these ideals, with their simple beauty and weird inspiration, will suddenly sink 
into a question of cash and lust for gold.”476 Embodying such a comprehensive vision did not 
mean spurning political economy for the sake of high culture, but required a distinct vision of 
political economy based on a distinct supporting coalition. The Atlanta Studies themselves were 
funded by voluntary contributions by scholars, community members, and Northern 
philanthropists, and a number of these studies actively explored how the talented tenth not only 
carried the potential to advance the group, but were themselves a social product of the black 
community.477 The talented tenth played a specific role within Du Bois’s theory of the group 
economy, and the fact that he saw the educated middle class as the driving force behind social 
progress was a function of Du Bois’s understanding of the concrete possibilities available to 
black Americans for economic development. In his Atlanta years, Du Bois’s aim in formulating 
the possibilities of the group economy was not to overcome exploitation generally, but to 
illuminate how black communities could organize self-sustaining economies within a capitalist 
system oriented toward the common welfare of the group. He understood the basic principle of 
the group economy as a generic form of cooperation for mutual benefit, one that often 
manifested in voluntary financial contributions to a self-help organization that provided public 
goods.  
Before Du Bois’s arrival at Atlanta University, the University’s annual studies began 
with two investigations of black urban life, encouraged by graduates who had taken up work in 
urban areas and convinced the University that “there exists a great need for a systematic and 
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thorough investigation of the conditions of living among the Negro population of cities.”478 Over 
the next two decades, the University conducted a yearly study of a particular component of black 
life and that culminated in a publication and an annual conference open to educators and the 
public. Du Bois served as the editor of the series during his tenure at the University (from 1898-
1914). In addition to informing scholars and the general public, he specifically hoped that the 
studies would instruct the work of black schoolteachers. In 1900, he addressed a group of 
primary school teachers in Athens, Georgia, soliciting their participation in the studies and 
encouraging them to understand themselves as bearers of both cultural progress and economic 
development. Du Bois acknowledged that of all social problems, the problem of envisioning 
economic opportunity for graduates is particularly salient for black teachers. Among all aspects 
of black life, he wrote, one problem stands out: 
This is the problem of earning a living: the question as to how the scores of young people whom 
we are annually sending forth from our schools are going to be able to earn their bread and butter 
in a respectable way. It is nothing strange or unusual that this economic problem should be the 
question of questions for the Negro in the opening years of the 20th century. It is the logical fruit 
of slavery and always where there are freedmen there must be poverty. The struggle for bread 
must be hard and the condition of survival is such economic cooperation as will furnish wages 
suited to the wants of the new laborer.479  
 
When Du Bois invoked “cooperation” here, he invoked his specific vision of the group economy. 
For Du Bois, even though black Americans were often organized as a group – both voluntarily in 
their own religious and cultural organizations and involuntarily through segregation – they had 
not yet developed the capacity to institute social relations that could catalyze progress. After 
lamenting how the South was full of black workers of “increasing skill and willing strength” and 
naturally possessed “abundant resources only half-developed,” black communities had yet to 
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discern how to harness these potentials for their progressive development.480 In Du Bois’s view, 
this impasse pointed to a problems within the organization of the black community itself. 
Speaking to the teachers, he asked, “What does this mean? It means that the fault lies in the 
organization – in the whole social situation and that unless we thoroughly understand and 
carefully study the delicate and intricate relations of this great group of men we shall not know 
how to train the heads and hands of the freedmen’s sons to develop the rich resources of this 
land.”481 Even as Du Bois correctly criticized Washington’s tendency to “shift the burden of the 
Negro problem to the Negro’s shoulders … when in fact the burden belongs to the nation,”482 he 
nevertheless believed that tactically, black communities (like any other oppressed group) require 
empowering forms of self-organization to channel their efforts for social progress, and he 
recognized that in oppressive conditions, these forms of self-organization are always difficult to 
institute and sustain. In essence, Du Bois was wrestling with a basic dimension of the problem of 
collective autonomy: how could black Americans develop the shared capacity to re-organize and 
transform their own social relations as they challenged the powers that curtailed their progress?  
In Du Bois’s view, this transformation of social relations would not emerge by appeasing 
the Southern elite’s demand for labor, but required organizing a black elite capable of guiding a 
different kind of economic development based around the common advancement of the entire 
black community. This is why Du Bois primarily envisioned teachers and cultural leaders, rather 
than businessmen connected to Southern industry, at the head of this development. For cultural 
leaders to serve this role, they had to distance themselves from the materialist culture of the 
“New South” elites. In his address to the Athens teachers, he counseled them to not “succumb to 
                                                      
480 Ibid.  
481 Ibid.  
482 Du Bois, “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others,” 45.  
 228
the temptation to ape the extravagant dressing and living of the leaders of the White south; so 
long as they try to rise by showing off and by practicing the arts of demagoguery among these 
simple-minded people or so long as they let their efforts to earn bread and butter utterly absorb 
and choke the intellectual life – so long will culture and civilization fail where it is most 
needed.”483 Serving as the bearer of cultural ideals required an ethical commitment on the part of 
educated black citizens, but at least in embryo, the sense of solidarity and uplift implicit in the 
pedagogical relationship incentivized identification with students’ aspirations as both individuals 
and as a group. Moreover, since black teachers taught in segregated schools, a vision of race-
consciousness often structured the environment and helped to secure identification across class 
lines between the black middle class and the lower classes who Du Bois hoped they would serve.  
Du Bois believed that the educated middle class required a general strategy for 
progressive change based in scientific study of the current economic situation of black 
Americans, and his goal in the Atlanta studies was to contribute to this body of knowledge. 
Ideally, teachers would come to understand the unique possibilities offered by the group 
economy, opening possibilities for alternative paths of economic development that were 
integrated with the aspiration to both a freer culture and broadly shared progress. From his first 
study in 1898, Du Bois explored the historical development of the group-centric economic 
progress that black Americans had cultivated since slavery, a preoccupation that eventually 
culminated in the 1907 study, Economic Co-Operation Among Negro Americans. Du Bois’s first 
study of cooperative economics appeared in that first study, called Some Efforts of American 
Negroes For Their Own Social Betterment (1898). Its goal was to answer a general question that 
Du Bois thought structured contemporary commentary on the black political condition: “What is 
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the Negro doing to help himself after a quarter century of outside aid?”484 To address this 
question, the study examined five different kinds of self-help organization: the church, secret 
societies, mutual insurance societies, cooperative business, and charity organizations. In his 
introduction, Du Bois noted, “The main answers to this question hitherto have naturally recorded 
individual efforts in education, the accumulation of property and the establishment of homes. 
The real test, however, of the advance of any group of people in civilization is the extent to 
which they are able to organize and systematize their efforts for the common weal; and the 
highest expression of organized life is the organization for purely benevolent and reformatory 
purposes.”485 By focusing on self-help, Du Bois hoped to portray a specific side of black social 
life that not only undermined the racist assumption that black Americans simply awaited the help 
of others, but also identified a persistent set of practices of mutual aid that black Americans had 
engaged in since slavery.486  
Some Efforts reveals Du Bois at his most openly capitalistic. In the opening of his 
discussion of cooperative business, he even criticized slavery for subjecting the enslaved to a 
form of communism that sapped their private initiative and undermined the entrepreneurial skills 
required upon emancipation: “There are undoubted proofs that the native Africans, or at least 
most Negro tribes, are born merchants and traffickers, and can drive good bargains even with 
Europeans. Little trace of this, however, survived the fire of American slavery. Communism in 
goods, abolition of private property, and absolute dependence on the master for daily bread 
almost completely robbed the slaves of all thought of economic initiative.”487 Cooperative 
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business represented one way of reclaiming that initiative, and in ways that did not simply 
encourage private earning and integration into white society, but that sought the common uplift 
of the group. As much as cooperative enterprise, Du Bois was particularly interested in how self-
help organization could help bring resources under community control, and he noted how 
segregation itself often created these organizations’ condition of possibility. For instance, he 
observed how “the pressure of race prejudice” had segregated real estate markets, creating 
openings for black-owned building and loan associations like The Workingmen’s Loan and 
Building Association of Augusta, GA, which had purchased over 100 homes for its members 
over the course of its nine-year existence.488 While Du Bois saw these forms of cooperation as 
instances of private enterprise and as a means to property ownership, he hoped these imperatives 
could be shorn of their tendency to stratify the black community into distinct classes, and instead 
be shaped by cooperative sensibilities that raised the cultural level of the group as a whole.  
In this first discussion of the group economy, Du Bois praised black leaders who invested 
in community development and criticized those who did not, he also acknowledged an inherent 
tension between black elites’ economic interests and racial uplift. In a footnote, Du Bois noted 
that the fact that black businessmen often invested in white-owned organizations that were 
explicitly racist rather than community uplift is unsurprising; overall, the goal of profit drives 
decision-making. “The money of men who have successfully accumulated property is attracted 
mainly by the returns to be gained and less by philanthropic or sentimental reasons; that of the 
lower and middle classes is more influenced by considerations of race pride and social 
advance.”489 The key was not to simply appeal to the generosity of black businessmen, but to 
find a middle strata that could connect organizational talents and resources with a positive vision 
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of reform. Nevertheless, he also observed optimistically that even among black elites, group-
consciousness meant that opportunities for race uplift could be encouraged: “It is however, no 
mean compliment to Negro business enterprise that it has thus early been able to attract 20% of 
the well-to-do of the race in competition with the business of an industrial age.”490 In this 
context, he held out the specific example of the Coleman Manufacturing Company, a cooperative 
cotton-mill spearheaded by a black business leader named W.C. Coleman.491 While started by 
(and named after) Coleman, the mill was organized as cooperative joint-stock enterprise where 
all workers were granted ownership shares. At the same time, Du Bois also acknowledged the 
efforts of a segregated black labor union, the Cotton Jammers and Longshoremen’s Association 
No. 2 of Glaveston, Texas, which exercised cooperation by pooling its dues to buy tools and pay 
workers’ sick and death benefits.492 While the example of Coleman clearly shows one exemplary 
way that the talented tenth could combine private initiative and group leadership, Du Bois was 
also clear that the leaders of building and loan associations and trade unions also fulfilled this 
role; they helped to coordinate voluntary efforts to secure the control of resources and 
opportunity for common uplift. When Du Bois wrote in a subsequent study, The Negro Artisan, 
that “above all, black men of light and leading, College-bred men, must be trained to guide and 
lead the millions of this struggling race along paths of intelligent and helpful co-operation,”493 he 
held out multiple avenues and institutional sites where race leaders could facilitate cooperative 
organization and the progressive development of the group economy. 
In 1907, Atlanta University conducted its most thorough investigation of the group 
economy, Economic Co-Operation Among Negro Americans. Du Bois’s opening remarks begin 
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to reveal shifts in worldview over this nine-year period. In this study, Du Bois drew a clearer 
contrast between economic competition and economic cooperation, he began to explore the 
historical foundations of the group economy more thoroughly, and he broadened his assessment 
of the development of black social cooperation since slavery. He began the study claiming: 
the economic development of Negro Americans at present is at a critical state. The crisis arises 
not so much because of idleness or even lack of skill as by reason of the fact that they 
unwittingly stand hesitatingly at the cross roads – one way leading to the old trodden ways of 
grasping fierce individualistic competition, where the shrewd, cunning, skilled and rich among 
them will play on the ignorance and simplicity of the mass of the race and get wealth at the 
expense of their general well being; the other way leading to co-operation in capital and labor, 
the massing of small savings, the wide distribution of capital and a more general equality of 
wealth and comfort.494 
 
Still, Du Bois’s conception of cooperation was not socialist. He saw no inherent division 
between capital and labor that undermined the possibility of free cooperation between them. 
Instead, cooperation implied adjusting the relationships between capital ownership and labor for 
the benefit of the group, often by ensuring an even distribution of basic resources like land, 
increasing black workers’ access to well-remunerated skilled labor, and combining private 
enterprise with community organizations that provided public goods. As Jessica Gordon-
Nembhard has observed, “his intention in these early studies appears to be to document the 
variety of ways in which African Americans shared the costs, risks, and benefits of economic 
activity that helped Black families and communities.”495 Nevertheless, Du Bois clearly departed 
from political economists who viewed the economy as a zone of instrumental rationality, driven 
by each individual’s aspirations for their private advantage. In his study, economic competition 
does not form a natural basis of sociality, and his research showed how the history of black 
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economic association was structured by a diverse set of both cooperative and competitive 
practices. 
The study found the origin of economic cooperation in black cultural societies, which Du 
Bois argued were initially formed during slavery. When isolating the cases for a study on 
economic cooperation, Du Bois noted that, “so completely do these cultural aspects of their 
group efforts overshadow the economic efforts that at first a student is tempted to think that there 
has been no inner economic co-operation, or at least that it has only come to the fore in the last 
two or three decades. But this is not so.”496 The study therefore examined how economic 
cooperation was embedded in a variety of social institutions, centering a single dimension: “the 
conscious effort in economic lines not, primarily, so far as individual effort is concerned, but so 
far as these efforts are combined in some sort of effort for mutual aid, that is: it is a matter of 
group co-operation that we have before us.”497 While centered on practices of mutual aid, Du 
Bois also acknowledged that the cooperation his study examined “is not always democratic co-
operation,” since the basic notion of ‘mutual benefit’ does not itself imply an egalitarian sharing 
of power.  
Du Bois’s exposition proceeded historically, culminating in a survey of contemporary 
forms of economic cooperation. In the slaveholding American colonies, Du Bois no longer 
argued that the possibility of property-ownership and commerce among the enslaved repressed 
their economic initiative; instead, he claimed that economic cooperation manifested within 
religious organizations and secret societies among the enslaved that organized black social life 
around mutual support. For Du Bois, this kind of cooperation had roots not only in the basic 
impulse for local self-help, but was nurtured by the transformation of religious cultures that 
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originated in Africa but developed in the New World, what he called “Obeah worship.”498 For 
this reason, Du Bois wrote, “A sketch of co-operation among the Negro Americans begins 
naturally with the Negro church” which was “the first distinctively Negro American social 
institution.”499 Again, Du Bois’s approach integrated economy and society, and it framed social 
cooperation as embedded in spiritual efforts to create common sensibilities and collective 
organization among the enslaved.  
These collective efforts manifested in two primary ways under slavery: insurrection and 
mutual insurance. In the first case, religious self-organization not only nurtured collective 
aspirations to political freedom that motivated revolt, but also became the organizational locus of 
those revolts.500 Du Bois wrote that, “Tendencies toward political autonomy still showed 
themselves in the insurrections that took place from time to time,”501 and noted how these were 
often led a spiritual leader who, “found his function as the interpreter of the supernatural, the 
comforter of the sorrowing, and the one who expressed rudely but picturesquely the longing, 
disappointment, and resentment of a stolen people.”502 Such leadership conveyed a “spirit of 
revolt” that not only gave form to the group, but crystalized and guided collective aspirations to 
autonomy.503 In Du Bois’s view, “we must find in these insurrections a beginning of co-
operation which eventually ended in the peaceful economic co-operation.”504 (See figure 1). 
What unites peaceful cooperation and revolt is not only the effort to constitute the group as a 
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group (a question of identity as a collective actor), but also the effort to actively re-work the 
parameters of social life through concrete practical struggles. The basic principle of cooperation 
for shared freedom could materialize in a number of forms and strategies, but in each instance, 
the enslaved organized their collective material force to create a freer experience of sociality.  
Religious organizations also became mutual benefit societies, initially in charge of 
coordinating burial services and providing aid for the families of the deceased. Here Du Bois 
cited a study from Hampton University that stated, “from reliable sources we learn that more 
than seventy-five years ago there existed in every city of any size in Virginia organizations of 
Negroes having as their object the caring for the sick and the burying of the dead. In but a few 
instances did the society exist openly, as the laws of the time concerning Negroes were such as to 
make it impossible for this to be done without serious consequences to the participants.”505 Du 
Bois argued that as soon as slaves began to be emancipated and flee to the North, these societies 
became openly organized. 
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Figure 1: Du Bois’s genealogy of the group economy.506 
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 One of these organizations became the African Methodist Church, whose articles of 
association from April 12, 1787 declared that its members “unanimously agree, for the benefit of 
each other, to advance one shilling in Pennsylvania silver currency, a month; and after one year’s 
subscription from the date thereof, then to hand forth to the needy of this society, if any should 
require, the sum of three shillings and nine pence per week of the said money; provided, this 
necessity is not brought on them by their own imprudence.”507 As Du Bois went on explain, 
economic cooperation in the form of pooling finances not only allowed for mutual insurance, but 
also provided resources to coordinate efforts at escape and manumission and to collectively 
purchase property. Institutionalized now in religious organizations outside the plantation system, 
the same spirit of revolt now “led to widespread organization for the rescue of fugitive slaves 
among Negroes themselves, and developed before the war in the North and during and after the 
war in the South, into various co-operative efforts toward economic emancipation and land-
buying.” 508 In Du Bois’s view, all other forms of economic cooperation that defined the group 
economy descended from these basic practices: “Gradually these efforts led to cooperative 
business, building and loan associations and trade unions.”509  
Du Bois also explored how basic principles of social cooperation linked practices 
developed during slavery and after emancipation. He claimed that under slavery, “a kind of quasi 
co-operation was the buying of freedom by slaves or their relatives,” which he considered a 
predecessor to the formation of workers’ cooperatives.510 When emancipated slaves saved their 
earnings to emancipate others, they directly connected their own productive labor to the 
realization of another’s freedom. Like in the cooperative shop, productive labor for these 
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workers was not an individualistic pursuit of private advantage, but a process of securing 
common needs oriented toward a shared freedom. Upon emancipation, this impulse toward 
social freedom manifested in the desire to create workplaces that operated for the equal and 
mutual benefit of all members, where the fruits of labor would no longer secure the rule of a 
privileged class but redound to the common benefit of all.  
After emancipation and the collapse of Reconstruction,511 Du Bois explored how 
cooperative organizations now encountered new possibilities and difficulties. Emancipation 
conferred citizenship and the possibility of more open and powerful organization (though secrecy 
remained necessary in many cases). Even so, the civic emancipation of the enslaved did not grant 
them the power to cooperatively re-shape their social relations. Cooperation could develop in 
local experiments, but the larger success a cooperative group economy remained distant. With 
black labor now integrated into a variety of forms of agricultural debt and wage labor 
arrangements, the problem of social freedom was not resolved, but became bound up in the 
general labor problem of the late 19th century. Du Bois cites the formal address of a convention 
of black organizations held in Nashville on May 6-9, 1879, which criticized the relationship 
between capital and labor in similar terms to the Populist movement. It stated that, “with a fair 
adjustment between capital and labor, we as a race, by our own industry, would soon be placed 
beyond want and in a self-sustaining condition.”512 Adding the specific inequalities of racism, 
they also claimed that under current conditions, “Our toil is still unrequited, hardly less under 
freedom than slavery,” and continued: “This unfortunate state of affairs is because of the 
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intolerant spirit exhibited on the part of the men who control the state government of the South 
today. Free speech in many localities is not tolerated. The lawful exercise of the rights of 
citizenship is denied when majorities must be overcome … in places of public amusement, in the 
jury box, and in the local affairs of government we are practically denied the rights and 
privileges of freemen.”513 For these authors, the problem of inequality was primarily political: if 
political rights could be substantively granted, black workers would be able to organize for their 
common benefit, ensure an adequate return for their labor, balance the relationship between 
capital and labor, and exercise the liberties that allow them to participate in democratically 
shaping their future. 
Even with these political goals unattained, black citizens still organized a variety of forms 
of economic cooperation. In particular, Du Bois noted, “A remarkable Negro organization,” 
called The Farmers’ Improvement Society of Texas, which was organized in 1890 by R.L. 
Smith, a local leader who became a state legislator on the Republican ticket in 1895.514 
Organized with similar goals to the Alliance system but integrated into the Republican party 
through Smith, the organization held a charter from the state of Texas that declared, “We Pledge 
Our Members – 1st To fight the credit or mortgage system, which is the Negro’s second slavery. 
2nd To improve our method of farming, we want closer attention to business, improved stock, 
better crops and better financial returns. 3rd To co-operate in buying and selling. We can buy 
cheaper by buying together. By selling together we can sell higher. By co-operation, stores can 
be established and manufactories built and our boys and girls given employment.”515 The 
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organization had considerable durability, and by 1907, it had 10,000 members and provided 
health and crop insurance, collectively purchased land for members, ran its own agricultural 
training centers, and held agricultural fairs for its members and the broader community.516 In 
organizations like these, Du Bois saw the group economy as an emerging reality, ripe for 
cultivation by college-educated, race-conscious leaders. 
In addition to Alliance-style cooperative organizations, Du Bois also explored the 
formation of worker cooperatives, and his discussion reflected a familiar optimism based on a 
specific analysis of cooperation’s struggles. He situated black productive cooperation within the 
broader history of workers’ efforts to form their own self-managed enterprises, and wrote that, 
“The history of co-operative business among Negroes is long and interesting. To some it is 
simply a record of failure, just as similar attempts were for so long a time among whites in 
France, England, and America. Just as in the case of these latter groups, however, failure was but 
education for growing success in certain limited direction, so among Negroes we can already see 
the education of failure beginning to tell.”517 Du Bois appeared to derive this sense of optimism 
from a report written for the study by Mason A. Hawkins of Baltimore High School. Hawkins 
took an active interest in a number of cooperatives operating in Baltimore, and his assessment 
echoed the analysis offered by some Knights of Labor: productive cooperation begun by workers 
struggled because of limited access capital and because of inexperience in business. With a 
combination of patient accumulation of savings before beginning the undertaking, expert 
guidance that had learned from past errors, and the firm commitment of its participants, 
productive cooperation could begin to succeed as well as any other business. Hawkins wrote, 
“the faith of our people in standing by co-operative enterprises in face of the signal failures of 
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co-operative undertakings among us here, is most remarkable. And at the present time, so ready 
and willing is the support of the masses of the people, that the most pessimistic would hesitate to 
say that the dozen or more co-operative enterprises now will not come through all right.”518 
While Hawkins’s report applied to employee-owned joint stock cooperatives, Du Bois’s overall 
analysis of cooperation remained embedded in his broader visions for the group economy, and he 
included analyses of black-owned cotton mills, coal mines, and dockyards that paid wages to 
black workers (in some cases alongside ownership shares), as well as family owned oyster beds 
that operated with the guidance of a chartered trade association similar to the Farmers’ 
Improvement Society.519 Again, any organization where black capital and labor organized as a 
group oriented toward mutual benefit constituted social cooperation.  
Despite the proliferation of instances of economic cooperation that their study uncovered, 
Du Bois noted that cooperation remained localistic in nature and oriented toward self-help. 
Earlier in the study, when discussing organization for the purposes of migration from the South, 
he noted that despite the existence of cooperative sensibilities, “Since 1880 immigration to the 
North has gone on steadily, but there has been no large co-operative movement.”520 How could 
such a movement be brought about? Since embryos of the group economy already existed in a 
number of places, Du Bois thought that its progressive development primarily required guidance 
by educated leadership informed by contemporary social science. Du Bois had become familiar 
with forms of group economy since his first sociological study of Philadelphia, and his further 
studies convinced him that they existed wherever black Americans created their own semi-
autonomous economic environments. At the conclusion of the study, Du Bois wrote,  
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We have studied the various forms of co-operation, but there is a larger from which I have 
elsewhere called the Group Economy. It consists of such a co-operative arrangement of 
industries and services within the Negro group that the group tends to become a closed economic 
circle largely independent of the surrounding white world. … today in every city of the United 
States with considerable Negro population, the colored group is serving itself with religious 
ministration, medical care, legal advice, and education of children: to a growing degree with 
food, houses, books, and newspapers.521  
 
Du Bois estimated that nearly one half of black citizens were in some way embedded in the 
group economy, and welcomed the rise of an independent black press as an integral component 
of the system and a possible catalyst for future organization. Later, as the editor of the NAACP’s 
magazine, The Crisis, Du Bois himself wrote a number of articles on cooperatives, held meetings 
of a short-lived Negro Cooperative Guild in the Crisis’s main office, and he worked alongside 
cooperative organizations like the Cooperative League of America to help develop cooperative 
organizations in black communities.522  
 Reflecting on the possibilities of the group economy, Jaqueline Jones noted that it offered 
the “mixed blessings of semiautonomy.”523 Du Bois understood its possibilities along similar 
lines. Even as Du Bois always hoped for an end to segregation and race prejudice, the group 
economy appeared to reinforce rather than dismantle segregation. At the same time that 
segregation offered opportunities for group-cohesion and self-determination, these opportunities 
could not only reinforce racial division, but they developed within parameters imposed by the 
broader society. Nevertheless, Du Bois’s studies showed how within segregated spaces, the 
group economy could contest dominant patterns of social investment and economic association 
for the common benefit of the group. Still, access to society’s central resources and major 
industries, its legal institutions, and political power all required challenging the color line. In 
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both his early and mature writings, Du Bois wrestled against these limitations, but also accepted 
that, under the constraints of a racist society, racial self-organization could serve as a progressive 
social force if it tended toward internal empowerment and always left open the possibility for 
coalition-formation across racial division. As he put it elsewhere, his goal was never to reinforce 
segregation, but always to, “work for the emancipation of all men from caste through the 
organization and determination of the present victims of caste.”524  
In addition to the thorny dynamics of segregation, Du Bois’s early theory of the group 
economy also struggled with a series of difficulties that he had not yet addressed. The first was 
economic: what does it mean for there to be “cooperation” between capital and labor? Does this 
mean that black capitalists hire black workers and pay decent wages? Is there any credible hope 
that “race-consciousness” would ameliorate the tendency of those who own and control industry 
to maximize profit at the expense of workers? As Du Bois himself would later recognize, his 
early studies shared a common theory of political economy with Washington that understood 
“capital” as the legitimate savings of thrift and wise investment: it was rightfully accumulated by 
effort and it could be utilized both profitably and productively by the right kind of leadership. By 
the 1930’s, he considered this assumption to be the group economy’s greatest flaw. He wrote that 
the group economy’s democratic limitations arose from the fact that, “such co-operation as we 
have carried out within the race has been carried out in accordance with the private profit idea; 
that is, we have tried to make the incentive success and the enriching of our own owners of 
capital.”525 Finding an alternative model of cooperation required deeper reflections not only on 
the meaning of “cooperation” itself, but also the nature of popular agency. Methodologically, Du 
Bois had focused narrowly on educating the educators; he hoped his study of cooperation would 
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influence teachers’ and college-educated students’ conception of the political economy of race 
uplift. This methodological orientation was interrelated with his programmatic conclusions. On 
the one hand, Du Bois showed a democratic core of cooperative effort in his emphasis on self-
help, and the basic tendency of the oppressed to organize for mutual benefit. On the other hand, 
even though Du Bois had granted that not all forms of cooperation explored in his study were 
democratic, his lack of a rigorous distinction between elite-led cooperation and cooperative 
democracy manifested in how freely Du Bois’s melded organizations that appeared to 
institutionalize democratic decision-making within production and consumption and 
organizations that merely apportioned ownership shares or paid wages. Rather than suppress 
these questions, though, Du Bois used them to reformulate his vision of the group economy after 
two decades of work with the NACCP.  
 
III. “An Economic Nation Within A Nation”: Cooperation as Social Reconstruction 
After his 1907 study, Du Bois’s interest in cooperation continued, but it did not take on a 
new meaning that focused his conception of political strategy until the mid-1930’s. By then, Du 
Bois’s political aspirations were aligned to socialism, which he defined in his latest years as, “a 
planned way of life in the production of wealth and work designed for building a state whose 
object is the highest welfare of its people and not merely the profit of a part.”526 Du Bois always 
understood creating such a society as a lengthy process inevitably fraught with defeats, mistakes, 
and compromises, and he was always clear that it would require collective agencies that operated 
on multiple fronts. While socialist theorists have long noted Du Bois’s contribution to theorizing 
the racial dimensions of capitalist development by connecting Atlantic slavery and its racial 
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myths to a general account of capitalist modernity,527 Du Bois also contributed to socialist theory 
both theoretically and strategically by transforming his early vision of a cooperative group 
economy into an organizational power-base for socialist transformation.528 While Du Bois’s 
critics were right to clarify some limitations of his proposal, they often did so by pitting his 
strategy of democratic community planning against socialist labor politics in ways that failed to 
grasp the subtleties of alliance-formation and the variety of possible strategies for forging 
democratic cooperation. What appeared to many as Du Bois’s naïveté about the possibilities of 
racial self-organization within American capitalism was not result of his lack of clarity about 
socialism’s formidable obstacles; instead, his unique proposal was the result of his continued 
aspiration to catalyze the latent power in black social organization to not only fight racism and 
propel integration, but also to create concrete embryos of alternative democratic futures for 
society as a whole. The latent possibilities of parallel economies were revealed to Du Bois during 
his early studies of the group economy, and they were transformed by his major study of 
Reconstruction. His persistent belief in cooperative empowerment through community 
organization that descended from these foundational studies informed his specific contribution to 
socialist thought.  
As noted above, Du Bois’s efforts to develop the group economy by encouraging 
cooperative organizations existed in tandem with his editorship of the Crisis. Yet when Du Bois 
began to make cooperation the center of his political vision in the 1930’s, it precipitated a break 
with the organization’s more conservative leadership. In Du Bois’s telling, despite the severity of 
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the Depression, NAACP leaders continued to regard dismantling segregation as their goal, and 
they were as hostile to thoroughgoing social critique as any program that appeared to support 
segregation.529 By the 1930’s, Du Bois had begun to believe that American economic evolution 
disproved the viability of the NAACP strategy; capitalism had not only demonstrated its 
instability in its propensity toward crisis, but the concentrations of wealth and power that rested 
on exploited white and black labor alike could not be challenged by desegregation alone. These 
realities needed to be faced squarely with a plausible program for direct economic and social 
uplift that could nurture the collective agency of the popular classes themselves.  
Du Bois’s laid out the rationale for his decision to leave the organization alongside his 
counter-proposal in a short essay called “A Negro Nation Within the Nation,” and he justified 
both more extensively in another essay called “The Negro and Social Reconstruction.” In that 
latter essay, he wrote that civil rights groups like the NAACP, “were for the most part no clearer 
than Mr. Washington in their conception of fundamental economic forces and impending 
industrial changes.”530 Not only did they fail to grasp the dynamic forces of economy and 
society, but despite their real successes in particular instances, the inherent limits of their central 
goals were clearly on view. The NAACP had shown that white Americans would sympathize 
with the cause of civil rights, but also that white allies were unlikely to fight for social equality, 
ensuring that, “the difficulties which faced the Negroes in the basic matter of earning a living 
were still so large and went so deep that the Negroes themselves did not have the power to make 
effective their demands for their rights.”531 For Du Bois, these limitations disclosed the 
fundamentally social and economic basis of popular power, which not only proved the 
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limitations of catering to the conservative philanthropic interests of white elites, but illuminated 
the generic limitations of a purely civil rights struggle. Even though Southern 
disenfranchisement was a glaring injustice, Du Bois had come to consider achieving voting 
rights as a decisively partial victory: “On the whole … the social and economic emancipation of 
the Negro race by means of the ballot has failed of any great success, but perhaps the failure has 
been no greater in the case of Negroes that it has in that of whites. It has simply made the fact 
more clear that without economic reconstruction political freedom and power is impossible.”532 
Effectively, civil rights organization without a comprehensive and plausible economic strategy 
reduced black political agency to demanding rights that they had no material collective power to 
democratically enforce and guarantee. For Du Bois, the fundamental question for political 
strategy became cultivating this collective agency, oriented toward social reconstruction. By 
social reconstruction, Du Bois envisioned a process like the experience of Reconstruction itself, 
when a significant portion of the country underwent a dramatic change in its basic patterns of 
social relation under the imposing power of the popular classes, which, inspired by the Russian 
Revolution, he called “the dictatorship of the proletariat.”533 Du Bois’s did not advocate for 
revolution and proletarian dictatorship in response to the Depression – in fact, he considered 
Communist efforts to organize Southern blacks as a separate nation for revolution not only 
ignorant of local possibilities, but “suicidal.”534 Even as Du Bois’s study of the Civil War and 
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Reconstruction instilled him with the sense that violence often accompanies social change, his 
ambitions for socialism rested on the peaceful transformation of the group economy, envisioning 
cooperation as both a means and end in a process of social reconstruction.  
Du Bois’s proposal outlined in “A Negro Nation Within the Nation,” was immediately 
controversial. Broadly speaking, Du Bois’s plan would reformulate the group economy around 
consumers’ cooperatives, which would organize black buying power and community investment. 
At the time, Du Bois was confident that the winds of history were on the side of change and that, 
“Greater democratic control of production and distribution is bound to replace existing autocratic 
and monopolistic methods.”535 In his view, strategic thinking needed to integrate black 
Americans into this general historical movement, preparing them to enter “the new industrial 
State” that he saw looming on the horizon.536 While withering in its criticism of racism within 
the AFL, Du Bois’s essay did not counsel abandoning the labor movement for this project, 
simply pitting economic nationalism against class struggle. Yet at the same time, he did place a 
theory of the group economy, and not a theory of the labor movement, at the center of his 
proposal. He wrote that, “Negroes can develop in the United States an economic nation within a 
nation, able to work though inner cooperation, to found its own institutions, to educate its genius, 
and at the same time, without mob violence or extremes of race hatred, to keep in helpful touch 
and cooperate with the mass of the nation.”537 Organized in neighborhoods, churches, and 
cultural centers in the segregated enclaves of black America, Du Bois thought that consumer 
cooperation could direct black buying power toward black business while utilizing a cooperative 
philosophy of race uplift to suppress the profit motive. As he elaborated, “By letting Negro 
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farmers feed Negro artisans, and Negro technicians guide Negro home industries, and Negro 
thinkers plan this integration of cooperation, while Negro artists dramatize and beautify the 
struggle, economic independence can be achieved. To doubt this is possible is to doubt the 
essential humanity and the quality of brains of the American Negro.”538  
As a basic proposal for dealing with Depression-era conditions, Du Bois’s essay was not 
only spurned by liberals in the NAACP, but harshly criticized by the black Left. For these 
figures, whether Du Bois’s proposal for cooperative economic nationalism is possible does not 
depend on “the essential humanity and the quality of brains of the American Negro,” but on 
whether a cooperative group economy within American capitalism was a plausible strategy for 
the problem Du Bois had isolated: how can the members of an oppressed group develop the 
capacity to transform their own social relations as they transform the political and social power 
that exploits them? As E. Franklin Frazier wrote, “When Garvey proposed a grandiose scheme 
for building a black commercial empire Du Bois ridiculed his naïveté. But what could be more 
fantastic than his own program for a separate non-profit economy within American 
capitalism?”539 More specifically, Frazier argued that a parallel cooperative economy could do 
nothing about capitalist control of credit and the production of major commodities, and if 
cooperatives could not compete with these capitalist institutions on the terms they set, the group 
economy would be unable to offer impoverished black workers a feasible economic alternative. 
However imposing black buying power in the aggregate, it was an illusion to think that it could 
be intelligently directed toward an internal group economy when the nation’s major industries 
were under the powerful control of the capitalist elite; no amount of race-conscious consumption 
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could change the basic social fabric of production. For Frazier, this implied that, “With 
thousands of Negroes being displaced from the farms of the South while many more thousands 
are depending upon relief in the cities, a co-operative program could only adopt “Share Your 
Poverty” as a slogan.”540 And if it did not descend into a poverty-sharing program, the base of 
Du Bois’s group economy would be restricted to the middle-class, since its initial steps would 
require black organizers with sufficient means to establish, finance, and keep the cooperatives 
afloat.541 Du Bois again looked to the guiding role of the “finest, most vigorous and best 
educated Negroes”542 in leading the effort, a comment that perhaps inspired one of Frazier’s 
most acerbic criticisms: “Nothing would be more unendurable for him than to live within a Black 
Ghetto or within a black nation – unless perhaps he were king.”543  
Frazier’s polemic appropriately highlighted the limitations of the group economy as a 
comprehensive anti-capitalist strategy, though it did not exhaust how Du Bois’s understood its 
potential. Like others, Frazier pitted Du Bois’s proposal against the movement to integrate labor 
unions and unite black workers with radical workers across the color line. For Frazier, the end of 
this integration was not a new social order, but political radicalization: it gave the both the black 
and white worker “a realistic conception of capitalist economy and the hopelessness of his 
position in such a system.”544 For Frazier, the agency to reconstruct society could only be built in 
socialist unions that directed these thwarted energies toward a political party, and this 
organizational task required direct and clear agitation in industrial unions as well as in politics, 
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where black and white workers should unite to clarify the limitations of the capitalist system and 
proselytize for socialism. With these goals, Du Bois’s program only muddied the waters by 
substituting race-identification for class and by envisioning an illusory nation-building power 
easily absorbable into capitalism. 
Yet Du Bois was more circumspect than Frazier, and did not propose his reiteration of the 
group economy as a comprehensive alternative to the Depression or as an alternative to the labor 
movement. While Du Bois did believe that consumers’ organizations could facilitate some 
immediate relief, he saw consumers’ organization as strategy to prepare black Americans for a 
further transformation toward socialism by beginning to organize their shared capacity for 
democratic planning. Against Frazier, Du Bios did not see political radicalization as an end; 
cooperative agency could be built in the present, even if it was only an embryo of the goals that 
he and Frazier shared. The appropriate dispute between their positions is whether there was any 
progressive, democratic potential in linking consumer cooperation to community planning, 
including whether such a project could ally with an integrated labor movement, as well local and 
regional political power, to form a pluralistic locus of cooperative agency. Behind the brief 
explanation of Du Bois’s plan articulated in “A Negro Nation Within a Nation” lay a fuller 
exposition of his argument in “The Negro and Social Reconstruction” as well as major mature 
study, Black Reconstruction in America, which contains the core of Du Bois’s mature conception 
of democracy. An examination of both clarifies why Du Bois conceived of the group economy as 
a transitional experience toward socialist cooperation, and it also shows how Du Bois’s 
conception of cooperation was not simply a form of coordination leveraged by middle-class 
elites, but the gradual creation of a cooperative community with a broad-based emancipatory 
vision.   
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Du Bois’s hopes for the group economy underwent three constitutive transformations by 
the 1930’s. First, he no longer formulated the black predicament as rooted in poverty, but rather 
in exploitation. Overcoming impoverishment required building wealth (often under capitalist 
auspices), whereas overcoming exploitation required social reconstruction – a new way of 
organizing production and consumption and allocating society’s surplus around a vision of 
cooperation. Second, while the group economy was always the product of forms of collective 
agency, Du Bois changed how he understood the relationship between agency and leadership. 
While Du Bois had focused extensively on educating the educators in his early years, his later 
discussions of cooperation clarified how cooperative organization was animated by the dynamic 
agency of its participants. And finally, Du Bois dove deeper into the strategic dilemmas of social 
reconstruction, including the nature of its alliances, organizational forms, and ideological 
background.  
 In his final autobiography, Du Bois acknowledged that his early debate with Washington 
concealed significant overlap. He wrote of their proposals that, “These two theories of Negro 
progress were not absolutely contradictory. Neither I nor Booker Washington understood the 
nature of capitalistic exploitation of labor, and the necessity of a direct attack on the principle of 
exploitation as the beginning of labor uplift.”545 While Du Bois and Washington had once seen 
the accumulation of capital as the precondition of black freedom – but disagreed about how that 
capital would be accumulated and managed – the elder Du Bois saw a “direct attack on the 
principle of exploitation” as the orienting aim of black politics. While Du Bois’s encounter with 
Marx helped to provide this insight,546 the centrality of exploitation also emerged from his 
concrete historical analysis in Black Reconstruction. In his study of Reconstruction, Du Bois 
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argued that in the United States, the reality of exploitation was often obscured by the pervasive 
assumption that capital is the legitimate product of thrift and savings. In his view, the dominant 
ideology of radical Reconstruction – which he celebrated as “the abolition-democracy” – as well 
as Du Bois’s own previous views were structured by what he called this “American 
Assumption”: 
The American Assumption was that wealth is mainly the result of its owner’s effort and that any 
average worker can by thrift become a capitalist. The curious thing about this assumption was 
that while it was not true, it was undoubtedly more nearly true in American from 1820 to 1860 
than in any other contemporary land. It was not true and not recognized as true during Colonial 
times; but with the opening of the West and the expanding industry of the twenties, and 
coincident with the rise of the Cotton Kingdom, it was a fact that often a poor white man in 
America by thrift and saving could obtain land and capital.547 
 
Now, Du Bois believed that behind capital was not thrift or saving, but the power to exploit. In 
the United States, race often helped conceal this reality by diverting the experience of 
exploitation onto non-whites. For the poor white in the mid-19th century, land could often be 
purchased as the result of “thrift and saving,” but behind that purchase lay Native dispossession. 
In the Cotton Kingdom, land ownership was monopolized by the wealth generated by exploiting 
black labor, to the disadvantage of poor whites. To shore up this regime, which kept landless or 
land-poor whites in grinding poverty, Southern elites cultivated a racial consensus that revolved 
around antagonism to enslaved blacks. Though he notes that poor Southern whites did resist 
planter rule, Du Bois argues that not only were their ambitions foreshortened by fears that 
disturbing planters would incite slave rebellion, but he also demonstrates how a middle class of 
whites who worked as slave-traders, police, and merchants were deeply tied to plantation 
owners, were adamantly pro-slavery, and forestalled any popular white unity.548 Divided by 
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slavery and race, the disadvantaged classes on whom the burden of social reproduction rested 
most heavily never formed a popular bloc capable of altering social arrangements. Outside the 
slave states, where land, small capital, and entrepreneurship were available for whites, settler 
insiders could credibly believe that small property ownership and the profit motive could 
maintain a universal class of producer-citizens and form the social basis of American democracy, 
and their aspirations were often the bedrock of the nation’s democratic ideals. But however 
democratic, these ideals always rested on the exploitation of others – not only on the primitive 
accumulation of Native genocide, but on the fruits of slave exploitation that empowered 
Northern finance and investment. Du Bois argued that it was not until Reconstruction that 
universal democracy became conceivable, when radical Republicans sought to integrate black 
labor into the egalitarian small-producer tradition through the redistribution of plantation 
property and the formation of multiracial democracy under Northern military tutelage.549 If 
radical Reconstruction could succeed, ensuring that wealth rested in the hands of the broad mass 
of the people regardless of race and that popular strivings were truly rewarded according to 
merit, the nation’s basic democratic aspirations could be realized.  
Du Bois had initially aspired to this vision, and he never fully abandoned its democratic 
substance. As he said of Thaddeus Stevens in the 1930’s, “If he had succeeded, he would have 
changed the economic history of the United States and perhaps saved the American farmer from 
his present plight.”550 Ultimately, though, Du Bois argued that this vision was sundered from 
within by its political-economic assumption that capital represents the legitimate gains of thrift 
and wise investment. While this ideal once embodied a democratic aspiration for a society open 
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to talents and without hereditary, aristocratic distinctions, it had now become simply a mask for 
industrial despotism; the rationalization of capital as legitimate social power simply buoyed the 
rule of those who owned and controlled the means of social labor, allowing them to exploit 
workers, amass wealth, and control the political system. In Du Bois’s telling, the democratic 
problem with these capitalist assumptions only fully emerged in the United States after the 
“counter-revolution of property” that ended Reconstruction, when Southern elites accepted their 
subordination to Northern industry and finance in exchange for a free hand to restore white 
supremacy. This compromise meant that the nation was reorganized not around popular 
democracy for all, but by a counter-revolutionary South and a North and West under the 
increasing control of big business. For Du Bois, “This control of super-capital and big business 
was being developed during the ten years of Southern Reconstruction and was dependent and 
consequent upon the failure of democracy in the South, just as it fattened upon the perversion of 
democracy in the North.”551 As he put it in a later essay, and in a direct rebuke to some 
arguments on the left that Reconstruction was the completion of the nation’s bourgeois-capitalist 
revolution: “What ensued in the South after emancipation was not at all the classical bourgeoisie 
revolution but something far more complicated and reactionary.”552  
For Du Bois, a clear lesson of Reconstruction’s failure is that the goal of radical 
democracy cannot be providing land and capital on a wide basis as abolition-democrats during 
Reconstruction had believed, but required the creation of a cooperative commonwealth where 
social labor retains its surplus for democratic use and distribution and where the basis of 
exploitation in the private ownership of the means of social labor is abolished. While Black 
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Reconstruction did aim to rehabilitate our historical memory of Reconstruction’s black and white 
political leaders after decades of slander, Du Bois clearly argued that their vision could not have 
succeeded. If Reconstruction was an “unfinished revolution”553 for Du Bois, it was not simply 
because its defeat ensured that its goals remained the task of future generations, but because its 
underlying democratic ideology failed to anticipate how capitalist development would turn its 
democratic vision into a rationale for labor’s exploitation. Du Bois wrote Black Reconstruction 
not to vindicate its leaders, but to situate the unique political experience of emancipation and 
Reconstruction within the history of American capitalism and to clarify the role of democracy in 
a worldwide struggle against exploitation. As he ended his first chapter, “Out of the exploitation 
of the dark proletariat comes the Surplus Value filched from human breasts which, in cultured 
lands, the Machine and harnessed Power veil and conceal. The emancipation of man is the 
emancipation of labor and the emancipation of labor is the freeing of that basic majority of 
workers who are yellow, brown, and black.”554 Even as Reconstruction offered lessons for the 
future, directing reconstruction against exploitation required a different ideology, different 
organizational strategies, and different agencies. 
Given Du Bois’s assessments of the dire situation after Reconstruction – he essentially 
argued that a corporate “super-government” nearly impermeable to democratic pressure was 
formed in its wake – it is hard to portray Du Bois as naïve about the power behind American 
capitalism and the difficulties of developing reconstructive agency adequate to creating a 
radically democratic, cooperative society. “The Negro and Social Reconstruction,” clarified his 
appreciation of these difficulties both during and after reconstruction, and there, he used a 
renovated critique of Washington to explore their ramifications. Importantly, his critique of 
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Washington also had consequences for his own earlier hopes for the group economy. 
Specifically, he noted how Washington failed to anticipate the inherently limited power of 
accumulating earnings to purchase capital in a mature capitalist society, as well as his inability to 
perceive capitalism’s tendency to suppress the social power of small land-ownership and skilled 
labor, the two economic arenas on which he concentrated his energies to develop black wealth.555 
But as Du Bois also clarified, capitalist progress also undermined crucial aspects of the group 
economy infrastructure through concentration and competition. The black-owned credit unions, 
building and loan associations, grocery and drug stores, and workers’ cooperatives that formed 
the bedrock of the early 20th century group economy were all steadily out-competed by larger 
enterprises superintended by mostly white capitalists, a tendency that was only exacerbated 
during the Depression.556 For Du Bois, these developments only solidified how abolition-
democracy’s hope to furnish the freedmen with the material basis of their economic 
independence by offering access to land and skilled labor was destined to be swallowed by 
capitalism, unless the basic principles of the group economy could be reformulated.  
Du Bois responded to these challenges by shifting the locus of economic agency from 
production to consumption. While inherently limited, targeting consumptive power did offer a 
locus of cooperative activity that could catalyze collective agency. Du Bois’s plan aspired to 
more than Nikhil Pal Singh has suggested, since it did not simply seek to organize black 
communities into a distinct “public” and locus of their own political self-awareness, but sought 
to materially reshape community relations by consciously directing consumption patterns toward 
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both local and broader cooperative goals.557 As noted above, Du Bois was impressed by the 
incipient potential of black buying power, and wrote that, “Two million eight hundred thousand 
Negro families must spend at least two billion dollars a year.”558 Even if black Americans were 
excluded from powerful positions in the nation’s major industries and labor unions – “we have 
no decisive economic place in production or transportation, in commerce or credit, or in 
government”559 – he argued that black Americans do have a basic independent power as 
consumers and therefore the possibility to shape production: “The economic process today does 
not logically begin with production, but with consumption. We do not consume in order to 
produce. We produce in order to consume.”560 While it would have been better to clarify that 
capitalism implies production for profit, which requires both adhering to and shaping patterns of 
consumption, organized consumer power in capitalism is not illusory. 
For Du Bois, what transformed this latent power into self-conscious agency was the 
potential to organize black buying power along cooperative lines, opening the possibilities for 
democratic planning and community investment. He believed that, “proper adult education and 
economic organization among intelligent American Negroes” could consciously direct 
consumption toward a series of concrete aims that had already been raised by black activists: the 
reduction of the cost of staples by wholesale purchasing; supporting black business and 
boycotting racist employers (“don’t by where you can’t work”); creating an internal market by 
investing in cooperative enterprises that produce goods that communities need; targeting local 
                                                      
557 For Singh’s argument that Du Bois was engaged in a “reconstruction of democratic publics” rather than a 
reconstruction of society see Nikhil Pal Singh, Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 66-78. Singh agrees with Du Bois’s critics that his consumer program 
is not an alternative to capitalism, but then salvages Du Bois’s argument on a merely discursive level: if it could not 
succeed, it could stimulate the formation of black self-awareness and “make the unthinkable thinkable.” 78. As we 
saw in the last chapter, this would not capture Dewey’s view of the public.  
558 Du Bois, Against Racism, 143.  
559 Ibid., 146.  
560 Ibid., 146.  
 259
industries where competition with national industry is not too severe; and seeking integration 
with white labor and consumer organizations to the extent possible.561 Du Bois considered each 
of these to be immediate and achievable goals, and while none of them would deliver a socialist 
society, each pointed to a concrete limitation of existing capitalist economy and would enhance 
the awareness and agency of cooperators through their own participation in the cooperative 
movement. Consumer cooperation helps to make economic processes more transparent by 
turning an abstract “market” into an intelligible series of relations through which production 
might be organized through shared self-reflection on community needs. For Du Bois, 
cooperatives and related cultural institutions would also create space for black communities to 
develop greater awareness of their needs and aspirations without enduring a prior battle against 
discrimination, frequently an uphill battle that risked becoming an end in itself.  
Du Bois also believed that a cooperative group economy could train socialists by actively 
working to suppress the profit motive, which he did not understand as a natural aspect of human 
consciousness or sociality but the artificial product of specific forms of social organization. Since 
it structured society, the profit motive could not be simply “abolished,” but had to be unlearned 
through empowering experiences of cooperative association. It was these experiences that Du 
Bois wanted to guide the reformation of existing group economies. While he suggested that these 
economies often faltered for lack of coherent organization (led by informed elites who 
understood the ins and outs of cooperative economics), he also wrote:  
But, there is even a greater drawback and cause of failure than this lack of organization. It is that 
such co-operation as we have carried out within the race has been carried out in accordance with 
the private profit idea; that is, we have tried to make the incentive success and the enriching of 
our own owners of capital. What I propose is a complete revolution in that attitude; that we begin 
the process of training for socialism which must be done in every labor group in the world an in 
every country in the world, by organizing a nationwide collective system on a nonprofit basis 
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with the ideal that the consumer is the center and the beginning of the organization; and that to 
him all profits over the cost of production shall be returned.562  
 
Du Bois did not quite make the “nonprofit” basis of his plan clear, or what it meant that the 
consumer would retain “all profits over the cost of production,” but it appears that his reference 
to the nonprofit quality of consumer cooperation was a reference to basic Rochdale principles.563 
At the end of “The Negro and Social Reconstruction,” he recommended a book called What is 
Cooperation? by James Warbasse, the founder of the Cooperative League of America, that 
explains the non-profit basis of consumers’ cooperation. While Warbasse exaggerated when he 
wrote that consumer cooperation “eliminates the profit motive from industry”564 since 
cooperatives purchase goods from firms producing for profit in a market, he does illuminate how 
consumer cooperatives can manage their own surplus on a democratic, non-profit basis. As 
member-based organizations, when cooperatives purchase goods according to their own 
collective deliberation, the members then own the goods in common. When members go to the 
store, they do not technically “buy” the goods, but each “takes away with him what he has 
already paid for.”565 The cooperative holds a surplus, derived from a difference between the 
purchase price and sale price, but it does not keep this surplus as profit. Instead, the surplus is in 
part a loan to the cooperative that allows it operate and keep goods stocked – and it is only 
loaned since a portion of the surplus is paid back to members each quarter in proportion to their 
expenditures – but it is also a form of tax that the cooperative can retain for democratically 
designed social investment.  
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Du Bois was attracted to this idea not because it would create a fully cooperative society, 
but because it would begin to train people to think of production and consumption as forms of 
cooperative service, not as opportunities for profit-seeking and accumulation.566 He wrote that 
consumer cooperation would help create both the skills and the attitude necessary for democratic 
planning since, “you cannot get social planning with every person struggling for his own 
advancement.”567 He also hoped that communities would come to recognize that their self-
education required developing a critical awareness of the limitations of prevailing economic 
discourse, and come to ensure that their effort “pays for popular education of the people in the 
meaning and expansion of co-operation,”568 combatting the corrosive effects of the surrounding 
acquisitive culture. While Du Bois had once thought of “uplift” as the result of instruction by 
college-educated elites, he now discovered a form of social practice that would raise the social 
character of groups through their own deliberate agency. There is no need to balk at the 
progressive teleology of this vision; Du Bois was clear that competitive individualism was a 
lower form of sociality that kept people exploited and impoverished, and that developing social 
cooperation would be a civilizational advance, a struggle for progress that could inspire workers 
and artists, middle-class teachers as well as the chronically unemployed. Moreover, Du Bois 
thought that the community benefits of cooperation could be proven in practice. Like the early 
Rochdale Pioneers and some Knights of Labor, Du Bois hoped that a cooperative group 
economy could begin to use its consumptive power to shape local markets, utilizing organization 
to create a market for cooperative production, which might also create employment opportunities 
for those out of work during the Depression.569  
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 Despite his enthusiasm for cooperative training, Du Bois had a realistic sense of its 
limitations. While he thought of the cooperative group economy as “an economic nation within a 
nation,”570 he was clear that black Americans were not a nation and did not seek to build a 
separate sovereign state. The nation metaphor was limited since, “all legal and police powers are 
out of our hands and because large industries, like steel and electric power, are organized on a 
national basis and impenetrable by small groups.”571 A socialist society would have to devise a 
cooperative way of managing all of society’s infrastructure, which for most socialists, implied a 
prior organization of workers in all major industries. Moreover, Du Bois was aware that even the 
limited advances of a cooperative group economy would struggle in hostile conditions. Du Bois 
wrote: “The real difficulty of any such organization would be the competition and undermining 
retaliation of surrounding capitalism” which would manifest “not simply in underselling, but in 
deception, in propaganda, in unjust laws and mob violence. In the end, it could only be 
counteracted by unusual race loyalty and by such combining of political power with the laboring 
classes of America as they could be made to agree to.”572  
Du Bois’s critics often ignored these overtures to uniting organized labor with 
cooperative group economies, but the possibility of their alliance was central for Du Bois. Du 
Bois had always maintained his only apparently paradoxical stance that integration would be 
facilitated rather than undermined by separate, race-conscious organizing, and he clearly 
understood that socialism required dismantling the color line as well as the cooperative operation 
and design of social infrastructure generally. In his explanation of the consumers cooperative 
plan, he also acknowledged that solidarity was as important if not more important than militancy, 
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arguing that, “The real problem them, is this concert of the workers. The real emphasis today 
should not be on revolution but on class consciousness, and labor’s uplift. This is the job of 
socialism, and the first proof of conversion is the abolition of color and race prejudice among the 
laboring class.”573 In his mature years, achieving integrated, egalitarian, and empowered 
communities among all workers was as much a part of how Du Bois envisioned “social 
reconstruction” as the internal reformation of the black group economy.  
While Du Bois did at times express despair of the prospects of mass labor unity on a true 
footing of equality, interracial labor cooperation and its difficulties was a central theme of his 
analysis of Reconstruction. Du Bois’s famous characterization of whiteness as a “psychological 
wage”574 in Black Reconstruction is often described as a structural feature of American society 
that prevents both labor unity and labor militancy – white workers experience whiteness as a 
symbolic “wage” on top of their earnings, so they measure their self-worth by their superiority to 
non-whites and do not see the need to participate in the labor movement. Du Bois never made 
this generic argument. Instead, he argues that the “sort of public and psychological wage” of 
whiteness manifests not in merely subjective gratification but in real material privileges like 
access to schools that receive public investment, the ability to vote, and racial monopoly on well-
paid public service jobs in clerical roles and especially the police force.575 Du Bois consistently 
refused two corrosive options that haunt the politics of race and class: making race-prejudice into 
a permanent fixture of American society on the one hand, and on the other, neglecting the depth 
of racism’s structuring power to the detriment of both social analysis and strategic thinking.576  
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Du Bois’s concern with the possibility of labor unity permeates Black Reconstruction, 
and manifests prominently is his persistent effort to understand why the dominant factions of the 
American labor movement did not see emancipation as integral to their own struggles. He notes 
how some labor leaders were able to traverse the color line and, even as they saw black workers 
being conscripted into what they considered wage-slavery, they strove to integrate emancipated 
black labor into their fight to abolish all forms of slavery. Du Bois quoted a speech by William 
Sylvis, who welcomed black labor into the National Labor Union by claiming that after 
emancipation: “We are now all one family of slaves together, and the labor reform movement is 
a second emancipation proclamation.”577 Yet Sylvis and the NLU were in a minority, as shown 
not only by the history of the AFL, but by limited support Southern white labor offered 
Reconstruction. In part as a counter to how racism prevented white labor from seeing black 
struggles as both related to and distinct from their own, Du Bois presented emancipation as a 
labor upheaval, designed to clarify to international labor movements everywhere the contribution 
of enslaved people to modern mass labor politics. As much as an interest in Marxism, this desire 
to re-narrate Reconstruction as an experience of mass strike and proletarian dictatorship was 
meant to situate emancipation alongside the large-scale strikes that paralyzed industries in the 
decades following the war, as well as the labor revolution that founded the Soviet Union. While 
he at no point underplayed how Reconstruction was propped up by the financial and military 
support of Northern capitalist industry – and in this and other senses was not literally a 
dictatorship of the proletariat578 – he nevertheless aimed to show how labor politics decisively 
shaped Reconstruction’s fortunes through its own repertoire of democratic agency. 
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In developing his argument that emancipation constituted a “general strike,” Du Bois 
centered a basic question about the Civil War: no one can deny that the North did not enter the 
war to end slavery, so why did it culminate in emancipation? In Du Bois’s view, emancipation 
was indeed a military necessity, but Northern pragmatism would not have seized upon it as the 
key to victory if it were not for the agency of the enslaved, who deserted plantations when the 
Union army entered Southern territory. To ground his argument, Du Bois relied on the testimony 
of Union generals, who described the experience of vast numbers of fugitive slaves approaching 
their armies: “The arrival among us of these hordes was like the oncoming of cities. There was 
no plan in this exodus, no Moses to lead it. Unlettered reason or the mere inarticulate decision of 
instinct brought them to us. Often the slaves met prejudices against their color more bitter than 
any they left behind. But their own interests were identical, they felt, with the objects of our 
armies.”579 In Du Bois’s view, abandoning the plantation did not simply represent “the mere 
inarticulate decision of instinct,” but a determination to abolish the conditions of labor to which 
they had been subject. In his estimation, the enslaved had no way to know whether the Union 
army would facilitate progress, but they were motivated by a basic revolt against their conditions 
of labor to seize the opportunity offered by an invading army: “This was not merely the desire to 
stop work. It was a strike on a wide basis against the conditions of work. It was a general strike 
that involved directly in the end perhaps a half million people. They wanted to stop the economy 
of the plantation system, and to do that they left the plantations.”580 What proved both the 
intentional and the political quality of the strike for Du Bois was that, when conscripted into the 
Union army as soldiers and workers, black Unionists actively sought to set the terms of their 
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labor and refused conditions that appeared to reinstate slavery. “The Negroes were willing to 
work and did work, but they wanted land to work, and they wanted to see and own the results of 
their toil. Here was a chance to establish an agrarian democracy in the South: peasant holders of 
small properties, eager to work and raise crops, amenable to suggestion and general direction. 
All they needed was honesty in treatment, and education.”581 Again, Union generals themselves 
reported how where this honesty in treatment was granted, there was success, and where it was 
not, there were failures.582 
Whether white labor could be made to identify with these historical experiences and see 
the collapse of Reconstruction as a tragedy for their own movements certainly depended on 
whether race-prejudice would insulate this identification, but it also depended on the shape of 
historical memory and the concrete politicization of common forms of social inequality in the 
present. Black Reconstruction recognized the Populist movement as such a moment of labor 
unity. For Du Bois, the only real problem with Populism was that it occurred too late, when the 
mass of an earlier generation of white workers had already sided with the Democratic party and 
its elites over the multi-racial democracy built during Reconstruction: 
It was not until after the period which this book treats that white labor in the South began to 
realize that they had lost a great opportunity, that when they united to disfranchise the black 
laborer they had cut the voting power of the laboring class in two. White labor in the populist 
movement of the eighties tried to realign the economic warfare in the South and bring workers of 
all colors into united opposition to the employer. But they found that the power which they had 
put in the hands of the employers in 1876 so dominated political life that free and honest 
expression of public will at the ballot-box was impossible in the South, even for white men. … 
The South has since become one of the greatest centers for exploitation of labor in the world, and 
labor suffered not only in the South but throughout the country and the world over.583  
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Whether Northern capital would have tolerated a Reconstruction based on mass interracial labor 
unity is another question, but Du Bois was right to note how the collapse of Reconstruction 
hampered the political possibilities of both white and black labor in the South. When 
circumstances create moments when the common interests between black and white labor 
become hard to conceal, organizations need to be in place that allow for federation among a 
variety of cooperative organizations that can prepare a political assault on privilege.  
 For such an assault, Du Bois called attention to the importance of coercion against the 
dictatorship of capital. Cooperation could develop voluntarily in socialist unions and among 
community groups, but it required some form of organized repression of elites to fully develop in 
the spheres of influence they controlled. Du Bois was admirably clear-headed about the 
difficulties involved in developing the constructive agency of the people and an organized force 
capable of suppressing capital. Following the Soviet experience, he wrote that, “The current 
theory of democracy is that dictatorship is a stopgap pending the work of universal education, 
equitable income, and strong character. But always the temptation is to use the stopgap for 
narrower ends, because intelligence, thrift and goodness seem to impossibly distant for most 
men. We rule by junta, we turn Fascist, because we do not believe in men.”584 Against this 
generic lack of faith in the agency of oppressed people, Du Bois argued that not only was this 
cynicism frequently proven wrong, but that social analysts and political actors alike have a 
“moral duty to see that every human being, to the extent of his capacity, escapes ignorance, 
poverty and crime,” ensuring that democratic strivings are never repressed by cynicism or 
despair.585 In this context, Du Bois plainly favored the ideal of popular domination of elites, 
claiming that even if popular rule is unwieldy and beset with errors: “The only unforgivable sin 
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is dictatorship for the benefit of Fools, Voluptuaries, gilded Satraps, Prostitutes, and Idiots. The 
rule of the famished, unlettered, stinking mob is better than this and the only inevitable, logical 
and justifiable return.”586 While Dewey was concerned about the possibility that the 
infrastructure of social intelligence would be too disturbed by popular domination of elites, and 
that these repressive means would not carry within them the end of advancing cooperative social 
freedom, Du Bois was willing to risk the possibility of building a new world on the ashes of the 
old. While Du Bois clearly knew that the idea of proletarian dictatorship could backfire – even if 
its original Ancient Roman meaning as the office of an individual was reformulated as the 
historic role of a class – he needed some way to express the structural imperative to suppress the 
power of elites in a period of social transformation.  
The ideal of proletarian dictatorship underwent a central transformation when it was used 
to justify forced collectivization (the dictatorship of the proletariat over the peasantry), which is a 
program that Du Bois would not have been likely to support. Instead, given his emphasis not 
only on plural alliances within working classes, but also even on his interest in working 
alongside middle classes, we can understand Du Bois’s position as one that recognized the need 
for a mass, political attack on privilege that refused to specify the form that attack would take. At 
times he seems to think that such a process is possible social democratically – by the imposing 
political power of a majority in the established institutions of liberal democracy – and other 
times he seems to keep the form of coercion unspecified. With respect to these questions – the 
subject of volumes of analysis on the left – Du Bois reaches some limits as a socialist theorist. 
Without using the term “hegemony,” though, Du Bois showed how cooperative politics could 
become a hegemonic politics – one that operates by fostering consensual cooperation in the 
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spaces where these experiences can be made possible, and partially out of these experiences, it 
generates the justification for coercing privilege through a robust account of the good of the 
commonwealth. Democracy will not be radicalized through the insistence on political rights or 
the petitioning of leaders soaked in the rationale of the institutional and economic status quo; it 
requires the formation of collective agencies capable of suppressing anti-democratic forms of 
association, cultivating collective power through incipient, anticipatory alternatives, and 
matching these initiatives with a hegemonic political force capable of re-appropriating the social 
wealth controlled by ruling classes. 
 
IV. Conclusion: Internationalism and Pluralizing Dual Power 
Du Bois’s quasi-nationalist arguments might be better understood, not as a variety of 
black nationalism, but as a way of configuring the relationship between concrete sites of dual 
power and internationalism. Du Bois was clear that part of the cooperative group economy 
should be seeking the alliance of not only white labor in the United States, but international 
labor. “The Negro and Social Reconstruction” argued that,  
If American Negroes, taking the path of organizing their consumers’ power, should be able to 
raise their working classes to dominate within their own group and to such a command of income 
and resources that they would not be objects of charity and dole, they can not only ally 
themselves with the white laboring classes in the United States and Europe, but equally well with 
the black laborers of the West Indies and South America and of Africa; and with the colored 
laborers of India, China, and Japan; and if this union could be cemented by mutual interests, by 
co-operative exchange of commodities … all this might lead to so strong an economic nexus 
between colored and white labor that the day of industrial imperialism would be over. It is a far-
fetched dream, but it is worth the contemplation.587  
 
International cooperative exchange based on socialist consciousness would be difficult to 
facilitate, but it demonstrates Du Bois’s expansive sense of socialist organizational sites and his 
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interest in exploring ways they might relate to one another as they developed cooperative 
empowerment.  
Du Bois’s conception of alternative sites of power was deeply social: community 
planning was a form of cultural “uplift,” now driven by the direct agency of the people in their 
efforts to develop new patterns of social relation that suppressed the profit motive and promoted 
egalitarian links in all directions that would receive them. Developing the “integration of 
cooperation” both within and between them would be a struggle, but this is as true of the labor 
movement as federations of community planning organizations (or radical municipal 
experiments). Du Bois’s network of cooperative organizations could not claim to be a state-
making force, but, like the secret religious organizations under slavery, they might develop both 
social cooperation and a spirit of revolt. How that spirit would manifest need not be predicted in 
advance, but if the relations of exploitation become intolerable, multiple sites of dual power can 
prepare for a political assault on privilege, irrespective of the borders of nation or race. At the 
end of his life, Du Bois’s channeled his own spirit of revolt into an idiosyncratic, ecumenical 
vision of communism. He wrote his final biography with an interlude that declared his hope to, 
“help the triumph of communism in every honest way I can: without deceit or hurt; … I know 
well that the triumph of communism will be a slow and difficult task, involving mistakes of 
every sort. It will call for a progressive change in human nature and a better type of manhood 
than is common today. I believe this possible, or otherwise we will continue to lie, steal and kill 
as we are doing today.”588 By the end of Du Bois’s life, communism was the vision of uplift that 
crystalized his hope for cultural, political, and material progress. 
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Conclusion: Cooperative Democracy Today 
 
Today, when our political alternatives are often presented as a choice between liberalism 
and populism, the history we have explored should show us that there is another cooperative 
route, if we are willing to struggle for it. In fact, we can also describe contemporary political 
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divisions outside the liberalism/populism dichotomy, based on a cleavage between the forces 
intent to entrench old hierarchies, divisions, and privileges, and the persistent efforts to work out 
alternative models of economic self-organization that seek to utilize new technological capacities 
for egalitarian and ecological ends. In the midst of all of today’s talk about populism, we have 
numerous examples of resurgent Populism, from the formation of a network of cooperative 
organizations in Jackson, Mississippi,589 to green energy cooperatives that aspire to 
democratically control the electrical grid as part of a broader plan for decarbonization,590 and 
electricity coops fighting telecommunications companies for the right to provide high-speed 
internet to rural areas that these companies have persistently ignored.591  
As in the past, all of these experiments depend on cultivating local empowerment based 
in the democratic values of self-help, self-education, and social solidarity. While the history we 
have surveyed shows that local cooperation always reaches its limits, it also shows that these 
concrete experiences are an essential component of the politics of cooperation. Whether in 
Alliance meetings, socialist unions, or local group economies, experiences of mutual support that 
demonstrate the possibility of alternative models of social relation constitute an elementary 
building block of cooperative transformation. This is far from merely a tactical point, reflecting 
the fact that any social movement requires an active membership or it will wither. Instead, it 
reflects the imperative to practically synthesize experiences of personal autonomy and collective 
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empowerment, opening the possibility for participants to envision shared democratic progress. In 
these moments, non-instrumental solidarity can develop and become politicized.  
In the past as today, one of the major limitations to cooperative localism is workers’ lack 
of access to productive capital. This is an elementary aspect of capitalist domination that 
sanguine accounts of the symbiosis between capitalism and democracy tend to ignore: the 
majority of the people do not have access to the means of our livelihood without submitting to an 
employer vested with the power to exploit our labor. While shoemakers and iron workers in the 
Knights of Labor could try to resolve this problem by becoming their own capitalists in an 
independent cooperative during the late 19th century, the steel-workers and shipbuilders of the 
early 20th century could never purchase the necessary capital to repeat these experiments. 
Instead, some of them joined a socialist party that could seek to divest private owners of their 
illegitimate title to socially operated means of production, allowing for the possibility that 
workers could exercise self-government on the job. While there have been numerous attempts in 
political theory to envision workplace democracy without repeating the problems of 20th century 
socialist planning,592 the basic problem identified by socialists remains: when ownership rights to 
socially operated capital are vested in private hands, the possibilities of democratic control of 
industry become, at best, limited to participation in decision-making without challenging the 
basic power that the prerogative to exploit labor vests in capitalists. If we make such a vision of 
‘industrial democracy’ our ultimate horizon, we forego the possibility to envision what the 
struggle for a cooperative commonwealth could entail today. Falling short of undermining 
exploitation is significant because exploitation not a narrowly ‘economic’ issue that pertains to 
distribution alone; instead, it vests in owners a fundamental power to shape the labor process 
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according to the strictures of capital accumulation and profitability. Contemporary labor 
practices continue to show the galling lengths that private owners will go to ensure profitability 
at the expense of workers’ control of their own labor. Amazon, for instance, owns a patent for 
robotic trolleys that would require employees to work inside cages in highly automated 
warehouses.593 These technologies have not yet been implemented, and strong unionism and 
employee representation could fight them, but these institutions cannot alter private capitalists’ 
fundamental imperative to accumulate capital by ratcheting down on labor discipline and 
replacing labor with machinery. This ensures not only that conflicts over workplace autonomy 
will continue to shape democratic societies, but also that the class power of capital will retain the 
upper hand. As earlier socialists knew well, the control over the surplus vested in the hands of 
capitalists not only constrains democracy at work, but limits the possibilities for democratic 
social development since we cannot utilize the surplus our labor creates democratically, 
embodied in public luxury and shared cultural progress.594   
 Even if one believes that this fundamental imbalance of power derived from exploitation 
is a problem for democracy, the failures of 20th century socialism remains an albatross around 
the neck of the international left, stultifying our collective potential to project a future beyond 
capitalism.595 While insufficient in itself, experimental localism is one way to quell the narratives 
of failure and betrayal that often continue to define the left’s political consciousness. Such a 
nexus of theory and experimental practice is also crucial if radical democratic theory will 
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maintain a connection to popular movements, which always theorize as they work to push past 
the barriers to democratic progress. Today, there are signals of a new kind of cooperative 
movement, based less on the organizations of the mass party and mass union, but on practices of 
networked association and modular forms of production that utilize new information technology 
to share resources. As in the past, these attempts to forge cooperation try to square the autonomy 
of self-directed work with the free interdependence of associates. While the early 20th century 
socialist movement came to favor unions over cooperatives, today’s activists tend to favor 
networking a plurality of organizational sites within common projects centered around the ideal 
of an alternative economy. Often, this plurality of organizational sites includes seeking to use the 
state at various levels, whether municipal or national. To take a representative example, the 
Symbiosis Research Collective argues that, “building networks of radically democratic, 
cooperative institutions can sustain our communities and our collective struggle in the near term, 
organize our base to win fights with the state and private sector, begin eroding public support for 
the current dysfunctional system, and, in time, become the dominant institutions of tomorrow’s 
world.”596 As Symbiosis claims, “The community institutions proposed here are modular. They 
can stand alone as individual projects, fine-tuned to solve specific problems created by the 
current system’s failures, but they are designed to be organized as a network. By working 
together and mutually reinforcing one another, these institutions can qualitatively change the 
power relations of a city or neighborhood, and lay the groundwork for new macro-structures of 
self-governance and civil society.”597 The fundamental question raised by these contemporary 
innovations is whether they are a re-iteration of voluntarist strategies destined to reach dead-ends 
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by avoiding large-scale political action, or whether they can learn from limitations encountered 
in the past while discovering the new openings for cooperative agency in our evolving contexts.  
As Kali Akuno of Cooperation Jackson argues, there is a paradoxical way that zones of 
capitalist disinvestment create opportunities for a new developmental models today. He claims 
that capitalism has always proceeded through a process of uneven development, not only in the 
global system, but within imperial metropoles. Areas like Mississippi have long been 
underdeveloped in the context of the national political economy, serving primarily as sites of 
resource extraction rather than loci of intensive capital accumulation. For Akuno, this 
disinvestment creates its own opportunities: “We harness this breathing room by exploiting the 
fact that there is minimal competition in the area to serve as a distraction or dilution of our focus, 
a tremendous degree of pent up social demand waiting to be fulfilled and a deep reservoir of 
unrealized human potential waiting to be tapped.”598 Rather than focus on agrarian wholesale 
cooperatives or consumers’ societies, Cooperation Jackson aspires to build a network of 
cooperative organizations that seek to manage a healthy food supply for poor communities, 
control recycling and waste, and cooperatively develop new information technologies that reduce 
the cost of access to capital (like 3D print manufacturing), alongside political projects to resist 
gentrification and transform municipal government.599 In many ways, their project is a 
continuation of Du Bois’s group economy, now updated for an era of ecological anxiety and 
advanced technological capacity. As Akuno and his cooperators know well, becoming an island 
of socialism in a sea of capitalism can only bring limited success. That is why they seek to 
politicize their organizations, positioning cooperation as a protracted struggle within and against 
existing social and political institutions, and taking a leading role in general social fights (like 
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anti-gentrification), in ways that progressive unions can also do. By building organizational 
capacity and public standing, the group aspires lead an alternative development model for the 
city of Jackson that can network with other like-minded cities throughout the world, sharing their 
modular experiments with others and learning from an ecosystem of efforts at municipal self-
determination from Caracas to Barcelona. In other words, the connection between local self-
determination and internationalism that Du Bois dreamed of is now facilitated in ways that he 
could have never imagined. 
One of the contemporary intellectuals who has done the most to articulate these trends is 
Paul Mason, one of Cooperation Jackson’s many influences. Mason’s perspective is useful to 
conclude because, even if it is not articulated as such, he formulates a new politics of cooperation 
for the early 21st century that reflects both the promise and limitations we have seen throughout 
this study. At a basic level, Mason is trying to comprehend how new experiences of cooperation 
can not only be forged today, but how these experiences can become inclusive principles for a 
new division of labor that requires political confrontation to develop. In his book Post-
Capitalism: A Guide to Our Future (2015), Mason argues that new technology creates the 
conditions for an emergent commons based in free and abundant information. He writes that, 
“With infotech, large parts of the utopian socialist project become possible: from cooperatives, to 
communes, to outbreaks of liberated behavior that redefine human freedom.”600 He claims that 
economic development is no longer driven by the mass capital infrastructure of the late 19th and 
early 20th century and the wage-labor necessary to operate it, but by the value-added of 
information technology and a reduced need for labor. At the same time, since information is a 
non-rival good – my using it does not prevent you from using it – a society that develops through 
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innovations in machine learning and automated production will struggle to domesticate these 
innovations through the institution of private property. For Mason, this means that, “The main 
contradiction today is between the possibility of free, abundant goods and information and a 
system of monopolies, banks and governments trying to keep things private, scarce and 
commercial.”601 In other words, our society is riven by a contradiction between network and 
hierarchy, with the former representing the forces of innovation and progress and the latter 
(Mason hopes) are destined to become a historical relic alongside the privileges of the feudal 
nobility. In his view, engaging in this conflict requires embedding political parties and unions 
within the network, and it does not require the old socialist belief that social cooperation is only 
possible after the political victory of workers over capitalists. As he writes further, “The 
socialists of the early twentieth century were absolutely convinced that nothing preliminary was 
possible within the old system … The most courageous thing an adaptive left could do is to 
abandon that conviction. It is entirely possible to build the elements of the new system 
molecularly within the old. In the cooperatives, the credit unions, the peer-networks, the 
unmanaged enterprises and the parallel, subcultural economies, these elements already exist.”602  
What makes these experiments more feasible today is that Mason believes that new forms 
of information technology can not only reduce the need for work, but can redefine the work we 
need to do along the lines of non-hierarchical networked cooperation, what he calls a “third 
managerial revolution.”603 For Mason, cooperative self-management would not be based on an 
external authorities commanding the labor of others, but on “modular, target-driven work, with 
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602 Ibid., 475. As we saw in Chapter 2, this is an overstatement, but socialists of the Second International did 
generally cease to believe that a parallel economy was possible without disrupting the class power of capitalists in 
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603 Ibid., 554. 
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employees enjoying a high degree of autonomy” as they participate in making and re-making the 
firm’s practices by cooperatively solving problems.604 In his view, such a form of management is 
already emerging in innovative sectors as a technically superior alternative to top-down control, 
since it is more adept at pooling resources to innovate and resolve issues: “the best human 
process for dealing with volatile outcomes is teamwork – which used to be called 
‘cooperation’ … cooperative, self-managed, non-hierarchical teams are the most technologically 
advanced form of work.”605  
Moreover, Mason believes that while earlier cooperatives struggled to get a foothold in 
the capitalist market, the cheapening of technology and automation of labor made possible by 
abundant information can allow a cooperative ecosystem outside the market. Today, Mason 
thinks that we can actively encourage the development of cooperative, non-market production 
through initial investment secured through democratic politics.606 Since innovation and progress 
are on the side of collaborative production and free and abundant information, the most dynamic 
sectors of the economy should be given explicit formulation along cooperative lines. He claims 
that, “What we need are co-ops where the legal form is backed up by a real, collaborative form 
of production or consumption, with clear social outcomes.”607 Like Symbiosis, Mason sees the 
traditional ecosystem of the left – party, union, state – as modular elements of a network, and 
sees no fundamental conflict between them. In this way, he imagines that a kind of radical, 
adaptive social democratic politics could facilitate the emergence of an alternative on multiple 
levels: through creatively using Open Source software to bypass the rationality of existing 
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606 In this sense, Mason repeats a refrain in the history of the politics of cooperation, going all the way back to Louis 
Blanc: state aid for cooperatives.   
607 Ibid., 533-534. 
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practices of managerial control, subsidizing cooperatives through municipal grants, and 
developing lifestyle transformations catalyzed by an interconnected world of shared knowledge. 
This is why, in Mason’s view, the agent of post-capitalist struggle will not be the old working 
class, but what he calls “networked humanity.”608 As he states, it was not trade unions and a left 
party, but “networked individuals who have camped in the city squares, blockaded the fracking 
site, performed punk rock on the roofs of Russian cathedrals, raised defiant cans of beer in the 
face of Islamism on the grass of Gezi Park, pulled a million people on to the streets of Rio and 
São Paolo, and now organized mass strikes across Southern China.”609  
Mason’s arguments are clearly intended to kindle optimism, but they would benefit from 
a clearer-eyed assessment of the difficulties faced by cooperative movements in the past. The 
first issue that his book raises for a study of the politics of cooperation has to do with forming 
inclusive and durable organizational sites of cooperation. Cooperation Jackson’s aspiration to 
develop cooperatives around low capital-intensity automated production could offer an 
opportunity for organizational growth, but it cannot itself provide an alternative for the majority 
of Jackson’s working class. As we saw in the move from Populism to Socialism, in many ways 
unions are a more inclusive site of cooperative agency than independent cooperatives, since they 
reach workers in the role that capitalist society inevitably designs for the majority of them: 
sellers of labor-power. On this issue, Jackson’s effort to link cooperatives and trade unions is 
promising, and on this front, modularity and network organization do exhibit real strengths by 
balancing functional autonomy and interconnection in ways that seemed unwieldy in the past.  
Again on the theme of inclusivity, Mason’s image of “the networked individual” needs to 
explain how this personality type connects to the asymmetrical forms of social power available 
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to different groups within networks. Mason clearly has in mind a character type broader than the 
metropolitan middle classes who are often associated with a ‘networked lifestyle,’ emphasizing 
the possibilities that new technologies open for all. He notes, for instance, how migrant workers 
have re-made internet cafes into zones of workers’ autonomy, which we might see as akin to the 
bar-rooms and public parks that defined earlier phases of working class activism.610 Even so, 
“the networked individual” lacks the sociological specificity of a category like “working class,” 
creating an imperative to clarify how such a political subject really reflects a diverse strata of 
agents, on whom the perils and possibilities of social developments like automation fall very 
differently. It is not enough for figures like Mason to simply acknowledge these differences, or 
claim that the difficulties they raise can be ameliorated by policies like basic income; they need 
to be an element of the very categories we use to describe social agents as potential cooperators.  
Again on the issue of automation, Mason should also clarify more explicitly than he does 
what differentiates his use of the term “cooperation” from attempts by capitalists to rationalize 
their model of networked production as a superior or necessary form of cooperation. As we saw 
with Taylorism, scientific managers understood their time and motion studies as the building 
blocks of a form of cooperation that bridged the conflict between capital and labor, making 
efficiency and profitability the standard of productive activity in the interests of the consuming 
public. Modular production and networked association might have an emancipatory dimension, 
but they are not inherently emancipatory, in the same way that mass industrial production could 
promise alleviation for labor by producing cheaper goods more efficiently but also carried new 
forms of de-skilling and discipline. Whether new information technologies produce an emergent 
commons or caged Amazon workers surveilled as they perform modular tasks depends 
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fundamentally not on technology, but on power. Workers need to exercise this power through 
self-organization and politics, but they also need to clearly formulate an alternative to the vision 
of social organization rationalized by their adversaries. This requires more than invoking 
“cooperation” as a generic ideal of equality and social harmony, but elaborating its political, 
polemical meaning. In so doing, we need to stress the non-instrumental, normative core of what 
I’ve been calling the cooperative idea: that all of our contributions create our shared progress, 
and that each of us has an elementary right to benefit equally from the abundance we create.  
Finally, if we do not account for how the diffuse agency of the network can cohere into a 
self-aware movement capable of enduring struggles with powerful forces, the possibility of 
synthesizing personal and collective autonomy in new forms of networked association will 
remain unfulfilled. In Mason’s account, the ideal of networked association remains too diffuse; 
not only is its polemical character left vague, but the phenomenological nature of networked 
interdependence and its relationship to the solidarities of direct organizing and mass action that 
have defined the left is unclear. To take one representative example, Mason’s attachment to the 
network as a model of cooperation goes too far when he dismisses the idea that capitalism will 
be overcome by what he calls “forced-march techniques,” drawing a sharp contrast between 
determined mass action and the emergence of the embryo of a new order within the shell of the 
old.611 Institutions like parties and unions that defined earlier cycles of left politics cannot be 
subsumed within the network to the point that their mass, democratic character becomes erased. 
As we saw in the case of the Socialists, the party does not only serve as a hub of information and 
coordination, but also helps instill an integrated ethic to democrats who understand themselves as 
the active bearers of a better society. These efforts to constitute a mobilized, self-determining 
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popular force, institutionalized in a coherent organization, whose open ended goal was the 
furtherance of their own shared autonomy remains an enduring lesson of the history we have 
examined. However different today’s capitalism might be, the mass institutions of party and 
union have not lost their centrality for anti-capitalist struggle, even if their role can be conceived 
more dynamically than it was in the early 20th century. Renegotiating the terms of social 
interdependence does not only require new forms of voluntary cooperation, but requires 
mobilizing the people’s power to alter the course of social development, a process that is 
inherently conflictual and requires durable and coherent self-organization. 
As we saw throughout this study, cooperation is not a natural facet of sociality simply 
waiting to be liberated, but an active project that requires deliberate, self-aware political struggle 
to achieve. We cannot know whether a renewed cooperative struggle will succeed, and we 
cannot predict in the form of a blueprint what form a cooperative commonwealth would take. 
What makes the struggle worth engaging is that the ideal of cooperation appeals directly to our 
aspirations to merge our own self-determining agency with that of our companions, expressing 
democracy’s normative core: a society of freely self-governing citizens. Having robust 
democratic expectations that transcend the deadening realities of working to get by in the empire 
is a necessary component of any democratic politics. When these expectations can be practically 
connected to new possibilities of social organization, we can begin to see the artifice that 
surrounds us – the might that masks as right – and recover our elementary constituent capacities 
to re-create our world anew.  
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